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Abstract 
Governance is often treated as a ‘black box’ explanation for unproductive or destructive entrepreneurship. In 
order to improve our understanding of how governance structures influence entrepreneurship and innovation it is 
instructive to consider how entrepreneurs function in so-called hybrid political orders. Lebanon is such a hybrid 
political order in which a dual game of informal clientelism and formal programmatic competition shapes 
entrepreneurship. 
In this paper I provide an exploratory overview of the governance-entrepreneurship nexus in Lebanon. It is argued 
that although Lebanese entrepreneurial attitudes appear to be very positive, entrepreneurial activity seems to be 
adversely impacted by governance challenges and entrepreneurial aspiration is severely underdeveloped.  
In-depth interviews with Lebanese experts show that Lebanese entrepreneurs still face significant obstacles, often 
related to the political context and system. These include: the high costs of utilities and infrastructure; poor 
government support and a lack of political vision for the economy; and instability and unpredictability related to 
violent conflict that make investment and planning difficult and foster a short-term, migration-focused mentality.  
Lebanese entrepreneurs respond to these challenges by operating as independent from government as they can; 
taking a regional perspective; and diversifying. The challenging context, moreover, also offers particular assets 
and opportunities to entrepreneurs, such as a vibrant diaspora and a supposedly resilient business mentality.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Mention Lebanon and three connotations often spring to mind. First, the country is often associated 
with conflict (most notably the infamous 1975-1990 Civil War and the more recent 2006 Summer War 
between Israel and Hezbollah). Second, it is a prominent example of a hybrid political order (an 
uneasy marriage between liberal democracy and traditional sectarian institutions governing Lebanon’s 
seventeen sectarian communities). And, third, the country has been known for its considerable 
entrepreneurial acumen (from the legendary Phoenician traders to the renowned banking culture 
earning Lebanon the nickname of the ‘Swiss of the Middle East’).  
While these three connotations may at first seem contradictory, the relations between them are 
mutually reinforcing and complex. Higher levels of uncertainty and insecurity stemming from conflict 
may limit government support and regulation and reduce investment, encourage emigration and 
discourage innovation. On the other hand, fragile governance contexts may necessitate a flexible and 
entrepreneurial private sector with an innovative approach. In this paper I contribute to the 
understanding of the relationship between governance and entrepreneurship by exploring how the 
unique governance system in Lebanon shapes entrepreneurial activity, attitudes and aspirations.  
The paper makes a start with exploring how the governance dynamics and government system of a 
hybrid political order affect its entrepreneurship ecosystem – an issue that remains to be 
systematically explored (Naudé 2012:6).i Relatively little is known about the co-evolution of institutions, 
entrepreneurial behavior and a country’s stages of development (Fogel et al 2006:572 in Naudé 
2007:14; Ács and Naudé 2012). Correspondingly, there is a growing awareness about the strong need 
of empirical studies on the “interaction between entrepreneurs, policy, institutions and context” as an 
alternative to taking for granted the positive effect of entrepreneurship on development and prosperity 
(Shane 2008 in Guglielmetti 2010:1). Specifically, “fragile and post-conflict state policy priorities may 
differ from those of non-conflict affected countries because the necessities per se are different, but 
also because problems are atypically severe and they are atypically sensitive to specific reform 
processes” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002 in Guglielmetti 2010:1). Yet so far the link between the political 
environment and policy uncertainty is often assumed rather than systematically tested (Kenyon and 
Naoi 2010:487). Indicators in, for instance, the World Bank’s (WB) Doing Business survey do not deal 
with the relationship between hybridity and entrepreneurship (Guglielmetti 2010:2) and are very limited 
in capturing governance and corruption (Inman 2012). 
To cast more light on the above, the case of Lebanon is instructive for three main reasons. First, the 
relationship between governance and entrepreneurship has in recent years received increasing 
attention in the literature and in policy making circles, mainly as a result of the greater awareness of 
the importance of institutions, broadly defined, for economic development outcomes (Naudé 2010). 
This literature has however generally treated governance to be a very simple concept – either 
approximated by limited and outcome-type indictors (e.g. Kaufmann et al 2010) or by rather creative 
but distant and historic proxies such as settler mortality and pre-colonial decentralization (see e.g. 
Acemoglu et al 2001). So far the literature has, to my best knowledge, not dealt with the complex 
shapes of government, particularly fragile governance on entrepreneurship. The main reason is likely 
the lack of empirical data: the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) or the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys do not cover states with fragile governance. Another possible reason is that fragile 
governance is itself a concept with potentially different definitions and interpretations, with the type or 
source of fragility differing per context. A second reason for focusing on Lebanon is that despite its 
fragile context, it has witnessed a recent boom in initiatives supporting entrepreneurship and 
innovation. This offers an interesting opportunity to explore emerging aspects of the Middle Eastern 
entrepreneurship ecosystem. Third and finally, Lebanon is an interesting case because despite its 
entrepreneurial history, its challenging context and current entrepreneurship ‘buzz’, Lebanon remains 
academically under researched when it comes to the political context for entrepreneurs (Welsh and 
Raven 2006:30). 
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The paper is based on an extensive literature review of entrepreneurship and governance in Lebanon, 
complemented by a survey of 29 local experts on entrepreneurship and business. The (qualitative) 
survey was conducted in July 2012.ii  
The paper consists of four sections. Section two contains a literature review, including a discussion of 
key concepts. Section three provides an assessment of the Lebanese political system and 
entrepreneurship ecosystem. Section four reports and critically evaluates the survey results. Section 
five concludes. 
 
2. Key Concepts and Literature  
 
2.1. Entrepreneurship: innovation, opportunity, necessity  
Entrepreneurship is living “a renaissance the world over according to a recent survey in the 
Economist” (Ács and Szerb 2009, see also Isenberg 2010). Most entrepreneurship definitions either 
refer to the creation of a new venture (Mehzer et al 2008:35) or the realization of a new idea. As 
Kooiman (2003:161) notes, in the classical Schumpeterian definition, the entrepreneur is “a 
revolutionary, ‘changing conditions of supply, combining new resources, and setting up a new 
production function. Entrepreneurial innovation is a creative act, breaking through a wide array of 
ordinary constraints.”  
In line with this, three categories of entrepreneurs can be distinguished: innovation entrepreneurs, 
entrepreneurs who “create new demand by nourishing an innovative idea they have conceived or 
acquired,” opportunity entrepreneurs, who “recognize a demand/supply gap in the market, an unmet 
need or an opportunity for change”; and necessity entrepreneurs, who “have been forced by their 
environment to seek self-sufficiency and satisfy their basic needs of food, shelter and security” (World 
Economic Forum (WEF) 2011:8).iii The differences may be important from a policy view, as Schoar 
(2010:57) convincingly argues that “people engaging in these two types of entrepreneurship are not 
only very distinct in nature but only a negligible fraction of them transition from subsistence to 
transformational entrepreneurship,” even if many development policies support subsistence 
entrepreneurship with the aim of generating transformational entrepreneurs.iv 
In this paper, an entrepreneur is a person or company who starts and owns a new business involved 
in creating new demand and supply dynamics – either out of inspiration, opportunism or necessity 
(loosely based on WEF 2011:8). 
 
2.2. The entrepreneurship ecosystem: attitudes, activities, aspirations 
It is useful to consider these categories of entrepreneurs as reflecting a country or region’s 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, that is characterized by entrepreneurial attitudes, entrepreneurial activity 
and entrepreneurial aspirations (Ács and Szerb 2009).  
Attitudes refer to “the general attitude of a country’s population toward recognizing opportunities, 
knowing entrepreneurs personally, attaching high status to entrepreneurs, accepting the risk 
associated with business start-up, and possessing the skills required to successfully launching 
businesses.” Entrepreneurial activity is defined as the start-up activity in medium or high technology 
sectors, “initiated by educated entrepreneurs and launched because of opportunity motivations in a 
not too highly competitive environment.” Entrepreneurial aspiration closely corresponds with 
innovation and refers to “the effort of the early-stage entrepreneur to introduce new products/services, 
develop new production processes, penetrate foreign markets, substantially increase the number of 
firm employees substantially and finance the business with formal and/or informal venture capital.” 
This firmly entrenches the notion of innovation within the concept of entrepreneurship.  
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Entrepreneurial attitudes Entrepreneurial activity Entrepreneurial aspiration 
 opportunity perception 
 start-up skills  
 non-fear of failure 
 networking 
 cultural support 
 opportunity start-up 
 tech sector  
 quality of human 
resources  
 competition 
 new product  
 new technology 
 high growth 
 internationalization 
 risk capital  
Schedule 1: Ács and Szerb’s (2009 attitudes, activities and aspirations 
 
For present purposes it is useful to keep in mind how the context of governance can influence 
entrepreneurial attitudes, activities and aspirations. For instance, Ciarli et al (2009:19-20) found that in 
Afghanistan objective conflict measures had little effect on the occurrence of entrepreneurship, but 
that subjective perceptions of violence and conflict had a negative impact on the percentage of 
entrepreneurs. Lund (2011:90) also emphasizes the importance of security and stability for 
perceptions of entrepreneurs. 
 
2.3. Innovation 
Innovation has been centre stage in development discourse (see for instance Aghion and Howitt 1997 
in Ardagna and Lusardi 2010:17 and Briscoe 2009:v).v As Naudé (2007:7) reviews, a recent string of 
researches confirm the importance of innovation as a source of growth and suggest that start-up firms 
are the ones most likely to grow (Lingelbach et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 2000) and to create new jobs 
(Audretsch et al. 2006:25; McMillan and Woodruff 2002:166). Regarding the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), for instance, WEF estimates that the region needs to create “75 million jobs by 2020 – 
a jump of more than 40 per cent over the number of jobs in 2011 – just to keep employment close to 
current levels.” The single most important driver of such job creation, according to WEF, is 
entrepreneurship that can foster “a business environment in which entrepreneurs can easily start new 
companies, spread innovation and spur economic activity in general.” 
In this paper innovation is seen as an inherent component of entrepreneurship consisting of the 
creation, on different scales, of new demand and/or supply for specific knowledge or products. The 
level of innovation will vary for different entrepreneurs and enterprises.  
 
2.4. Fragility and hybridity  
Many countries in need of job creation and development do not just face poverty, but a post-conflict 
situation in which fragile or hybrid political institutions shape entrepreneurial attitudes, activities and 
aspirations. In this paper it is most appropriate to focus on two inter-related elements of this post-
conflict political context: (i) fragility (mostly violent conflicts) and (ii) hybridity (particularly state-society 
relations and the role of the government in the private sector). Fragility, in this sense, concerns the 
broader context of governance. Hybridity, concerns the specific system of governance.  
2.4.1 Fragile governance contexts: conflict, politicization, limited capacity and vulnerability  
Some states have been labelled ‘fragile’ (e.g. Naudé et al 2012). However, given that all states are 
fragile to some extent, depending on the extent to which they exhibit political will and/or capacity to 
“provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security 
and human rights of their populations” (the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC) 2008:15-19), it may be more useful to refer to 
situations of fragile governance.vi  
Based on Naudé et al (2011) fragility can be conceptualized by means of four core characteristics: i) 
legacies of violent conflict and risk of recurrent conflict; ii) politicization of private life; iii) limited state 
capacity and institutional multiplicity; and iv) vulnerability to external shocks and donor dependency. 
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Clearly, these characteristics are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing as, for instance, violence occurs 
where institutional alternatives to violence are weak and violence, in turn, further erodes and splinters 
political institutions (Jones and Elgin-Cossart 2011:3).vii  
2.4.2. Hybrid governance systems: institutions in a dual game  
A political order is the sum of institutionalized power and governance relations that one can empirically 
grasp at a given time and place (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009:44). This power consist of two 
dimensions: the access to it and the exercise of it (Munck and Skaaning in Schmotz 2010:5). Access 
to power is determined by competition (elections, lineage, party decree or military orders) and exercise 
of power is characterized by regulatory constraints (Schmotz 2010:5; Roesller and Howard 2007:3).  
Five regime types permeate the literature: monarchy, military, no-party, one-party, and multiparty 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2006:8 in Brownlee 2009:520). Yet the main typology is that between 
democratic regimes associated with a highly competitive access to and a highly constrained exercise 
of power and autocratic regimes with little or no competitiveness and few or absent constraints 
(Schmotz 2010:6). The organization of state power through a government in the bulk of fragile states, 
however, falls somewhere between these extremes. In response to this, a body of literature on hybrid 
political regimes has emerged that described such regimes as “a peculiar mix of democratic and 
autocratic features. The common denominator for hybrid governance appears to lie in its system “of 
regular, contested elections that are sufficiently unpredictable in outcome for incumbents to have to 
take them seriously but that nonetheless do not meet the procedural standards for democracy” which 
results in “a combination of vigorous political competition and lack of credible information regarding 
likely policy changes” (Kenyon and Naoi 2010:489).  
A useful metaphor to illustrate the idea of hybrid governance is that of the ‘dual game’ (Cammett and 
Issar 2010:383) which combines a formal (electoral) game, in which parties and groups aim to gain 
votes, with an informal (regime) game encompassing the struggle over the basic rules of allocating 
power in the polity. Power-sharing agreements in the electoral game can then “act as a fig leaf that 
obscures important governance issues” (Lund 2011:51, 58). The regime component of the dual game 
often prevents a merit-based bureaucracy from emerging, instead generating a public system in which 
clientelist distribution of jobs is the core function (Briscoe 2009:16). The intuitive logic of the dual game 
idea corroborates with institutional overlap between state institutions and ‘traditional’ authorities at the 
heart of Boege et al’s (2008) hybrid political order concept. Boege et al (2008:7) describe how “the 
state’s ‘outposts’ are mediated by ‘informal’ indigenous societal institutions which follow their own logic 
and rules within the (incomplete) state structures” through which institutions “become the subject of 
power struggles between competing social groups and their leaders.” They explain, taking a case 
study from Melanesia that seems instinctively representative for many other ‘hybrid’ government 
systems, how local customary leadership demands distributing gifts and resources to specific in-
groups whereas state politicians are obliged to act in the interest of a much broader common good not 
of kin group members, but of citizens.  In reality, however, many ‘bigmen’ are simultaneously 
politicians and will hence face fundamental challenges with reconciling these two roles. Often, “bigmen 
must become politicians, as only then will they get access to state coffers which make it possible to 
distribute gifts to their kin, and politicians must first be bigmen, as only then can they rely on the 
support of a loyal and powerful kin based constituency” (Boege et al 2008:7).viii 
The contemporary discussion about hybrid regimes has its intellectual foundation in the transition 
paradigm which makes it hardly surprising that scholars have long regarded hybridity as a transitional 
phase in an almost teleological development from autocracy to democracy (Linde and Ekman 2010:5). 
However, it is now increasingly accepted that most hybrid regimes are in fact relatively stable and 
show little propensity to becoming democracies (Howard and Roessler 2006:365 and 2007:3; Kenyon 
and Naoi 2010:488; Jones and Elgin-Cossart 2011:12).ix The emerging theory on hybrid regimes is in 
many ways a political economy counterpart of more sociological theories on clientelism, 
patrimonialism and suzerainty (Boege et al 2008:7) and still lacks empirical substance on what these 
black boxes of hybrid regimes actually contain (rather, the tendency is to focus on the transitional 
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dynamics and potential of such regimes). The hybrid regime concept also suffers from attributing a 
sense of peculiarity to ‘hybrid’ regimes glossing over the fact that such multiplicity and hybridity of 
power constitute a historical and geographical norm rather than exception (Boege et al 2008:2).x This 
is further illustrated by the state-centeredness of the concept, disregarding non-state institutions 
governing socio-political life. In line with the dual game logic, it is important to avoid the ‘electoral 
fallacy trap’ (Karl 1995 in Roesller and Howard 2007:4), because, as Brownlee (2009:526) argues, 
non-electoral variables, such as the internal cohesion of the ruling elite, are exerting the greatest 
influence on the maintenance or collapse of the regimes in question – a finding which, in his own 
words reinforces “the importance of contextual political and historical factors that are often treated in 
qualitative discussions but less often incorporated into statistical work” (Brownlee 2009:530). 
 
2.5.  Entrepreneurship in under Hybrid Governance   
2.5.1. Internal and external factors influencing entrepreneurship  
The attitudes, activities and aspirations shaping entrepreneurship are influenced by external and 
internal factors. The former are institutional, political and distributional elements that are outside the 
organization and not typically within the direct control of the entrepreneur, whereas the latter consists 
of variables that are within the organization (Mehzer et al 2008:36; Justino 2009 in Ciarli et al 2009:7). 
Certain studies indicated that up to 90 per cent of failures of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) can be attributed to internal factors such as management inadequacy and inefficiency 
(Berryman 1983; Williams 1986; Perry and Pendelton 1983 in Mehzer et al 2008:38), interpersonal 
skills, inadequate pricing strategies, inflexible decision-making, the lack of experience in a product line, 
the poor use of outside advisors, the lack of knowledge on the current business literature (Gaskill et al 
1993; Andrew et al 1999; Lussier 1996 in Mehzer et al 2008:38). 
Yet these internal factors are related to – and in turn influenced by – external factors. Mehzer et al 
(2008:37-38) describe how poor economic conditions (poor external markets), high taxes, a high 
interest rate, and government regulations can explain about 18 per cent of SME failures. But this 
distinction between internal and external factors is largely artificial and misleading as determinants like 
education, skills and confidence are often the outcome of contextual factors outside the entrepreneur’s 
sphere of influence (Guglielmetti 2010:2). It nevertheless offers a convenient starting point for 
exploring the impact of governance and government on entrepreneurship. In Peschka’s (2011:11-14) 
words:  
Fragile states represent the world‘s most challenging business environments, often with the most 
bureaucratic hurdles and the fewest property protections for entrepreneurs” with obstacles ranging from 
“asset destruction to microeconomic instability (high proportion of informal economic activity); poor public 
institutions; corruption; security; access to finance; labor (sudden influx of workers into the labor market); 
land ownership (breakdown of the legal system); infrastructure; market distortions (grants and subsidies 
abound); and poor tax enforcement and collection (vicious cycle). 
Conflict or fragility does not destroy the private sector or entrepreneurship, except in extreme cases, 
but distorts it, often resulting in the pursuit of short-term gains through informal or criminal activities or 
rent-seeking and corruption (Peschka 2011:3-4) – in short, ‘destructive entrepreneurship’ (Baumol 
1990).  
2.5.2. Entrepreneurship as cause, effect and cure  
The potential of entrepreneurship, or certain forms of entrepreneurship, to contribute to peace, security 
and development is by now widely acknowledged and pursued (Anderson et al 2011). Entrepreneurs 
can create jobs – the prime priority of the international community these days (Jones and Elgin-
Cossart 2011:2; WB 2011; Lund 2009:88) –; propel economic growth (Estrin et al 2006:693; Collier 
2006:9; Sternberg and Wennekers 2005); provide goods and services, including public goods (Batley 
and McIoughlin 2010); and provide an environment for learning, experimentation, innovation and 
competition through which they fulfill a ‘cost discovery’ function (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003 in Naudé 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  7
2006:7-8). What is more, entrepreneurs generate change from inside the country and its economic 
system, rather than from the outside, potentially reducing donor dependency (Metcalfe 2006:60 and 
Keister 2000 in Naudé 2006). In addition, by providing vehicles for social mobility entrepreneurship is 
often seen as a way to reduce societal conflict (Stiglitz 2006 in Guglielmetti 2010:5; Peschka 2011:10). 
Ideally, entrepreneurship eventually even contributes to state-building by the positive effect it has on 
the private sector and hence tax income and through delivering tangible ‘peace dividends’ that might 
grant the state some legitimacy by association (Peschka 2011:3, 8). 
While entrepreneurship might contribute to overcoming fragility and hybridity through such peace 
dividends, there is a converse logic suggesting that fragility and hybridity, through insecurity and 
uncertainty, undermine entrepreneurship; which is particularly unfortunate considering that many of 
the world’s fastest-growing markets are found in conflict-affected states (Anderson et al 2011:12). 
Reinert et al (2007:20, 10), for instance, propose that “failure of governance is simply an external sign 
of failed or failing productive structure” in a country.xi And, as discussed before, entrepreneurship itself 
might exacerbate post-conflict problems rather than contribute to their solution.  
Whether entrepreneurship contributes to, benefits from or can help overcome the uncertainties 
inherent in hybrid political orders is related to the various types of entrepreneurship distinguishable. 
Opportunity or innovation entrepreneurs are usually seen as instruments to remedy social conflict. 
However, much of the entrepreneurship emerging or surviving during conflict is necessity 
entrepreneurship. Ciarli et al (2009) find that for Afghanistan the direct negative effect of the conflict on 
entrepreneurship is very small, which they explain by pointing out that small businesses are a means 
of surviving in a situation where any another support is lacking. During conflict,xii entrepreneurship is, 
for the majority of people, a coping mechanism and it usually risk averse in nature and likely to be 
abandoned when other sources of revenue (such as remittances) become available (Ciarli et al 
2009:25; Brück, Naudé and Verwimp 2013). This is in line with studies like those of Smith (in Kaplan 
2009:6) that suggest that poor people in fragile contexts rate self-employment as one of the most 
promising ways to improve their situation. While conflict, then, apparently does not undermine the 
occurrence of entrepreneurship – and might in fact boost it – it does affect the form and nature of the 
entrepreneurial activity emerging, leading perhaps to a disproportionate amount of necessity 
entrepreneurs vis-à-vis opportunity entrepreneurs. Conflict can lead to adverse coping by 
entrepreneurs apparent in reduced long-term investment, truncated supply lines, regressive 
innovation, reduced employment, and less exports (Brück, Naudé and Verwimp 2013). Ciarli et al 
(2009:2, 27) show for Afghanistan that there is little indirect effect of conflict via institutions and 
infrastructure on the quantity of entrepreneurship, but this does not rule out an institutional effect on 
the quality of the entrepreneurship. 
2.5.3. Post-conflict entrepreneurship dimensions  
Six post-war contextual dimensions affect external and internal factors influencing entrepreneurship 
attitudes, activities and aspirations: the legacy of war, institutional potency, government support, 
diaspora influence, market scope and capital requirements.  
First, there is the direct legacy of the violent conflict, which is substantial and tends to last long (Chen 
et al 2007 in Naudé 2007:11). While many post-conflict development policies either explicitly or 
implicitly build on the ‘clean slate argument’, assuming a clear break between conflict and post-conflict 
realities, many local ‘post-war’ contexts are characterized by institutional continuity rather than rupture 
(Richards 2005; Peschka 2011:30; Anderson et al 2011:14; Ciarli et al 2009). This means that apart 
from the insecurity and lopsided spending on military means bred by a continued risk of relapse into 
war (chances of which are about 50 per cent in the first decade after the end of war according to 
Collier (2004:2)), the very causes of conflict – such as the unfair allocation of resources across 
societal groups and lack of alternatives for unemployed youth (Naudé 2012:6) – continue to shape 
social and institutional realities that affect entrepreneurs’ motivations and decisions (Lund 2011:42; 
Jones and Elgin-Cossart 2011:6).  
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A second dimension, which is intimately related to the conflict legacy, but more specifically touching on 
politicization and limited state capacity and institutional multiplicity, is the relationship between 
institutions and entrepreneurship. Institutions regulate social life and business. However, according to 
Ardagna and Lusardi (2010:18), little is in fact known about how a country’s regulatory and legal 
environment affect individuals’ decisions to engage in new entrepreneurial activity, especially when it 
comes to the regulation of product and labor markets and contract enforcement. Bearing in mind that 
for entrepreneurs, one of the core functions of institutions is producing the stability and predictability 
that is required for ‘transactional trust,’ it is important to stress the dual game again; the reality of 
hybrid governance operating under formal, electoral, settings as well as informal, regime, settings 
(Naudé 2007:14-15; Guglielmetti 2010:3). Under hybrid governance with limited state capacity, the 
question is not so much whether regulation exists, but whether it can or will be enforced (and on what 
or whose terms). In most such situations entrepreneurs will regard regulation as a challenge to be 
negotiated rather than an order to be complied with. Regulation might be determined by various sets 
of formal and informal, state and non-state authorities and official legal regulation will not be the only, 
or even most important, institutional parameter that entrepreneurs face. As Estrin et al (2006:716 in 
Naudé 2007:18) note, “personal networks can act as substitutes for missing institutions in fragile 
states in a number of ways, such as making reputational incentives stronger where court enforcement 
is weak; in providing trade credit where bank credit is limited, and in allowing entrepreneurs 
opportunity for ‘portfolio’ entrepreneurship to spread risk” (see also Batley and McIoughlin 2010). In a 
study on the impact of conflict on entrepreneurial activity in Afghanistan, Ciarli et al (2009:26) also 
show that the effects of formal institutions on entrepreneurial activity are often insignificant, partly 
because of an “institutional setting that has de-constructed during a long time of conflict, and that does 
not recognize the value [or authority] of formal institutions.”  
A third dimension of post-conflict settings that effects entrepreneurship is the degree and form of 
government support for the private sector. A lot of this has to do with re-establishing trust in the 
government, with changing (perceptions of) governments “from being invisible or grabbing hands 
towards being helping hands” (Naudé 2007:14), a field of study still facing a knowledge gap (Anderson 
et al 2011:9). The war-time entrepreneurial logic of treating the state as something to be evaded has 
to be reversed if tax revenue is to be gathered; a long-term and cumbersome process (Collier 1994 in 
Guglielmetti 2010:15). Yet even if entrepreneurship, by definition, stems from individual motivation, 
investment, commitment and creativity, government intervention in the private sector can contribute 
greatly to entrepreneurship, particularly in post-conflict situations (Audretsch and Thurik (2004); 
Kauffman Foundation (2007); Naudé (2007, 2009a and 2009b) in Guglielmetti 2010:6). Isenberg 
(2010:12) remarks how, for instance, “Rwanda, Chile, Israel, and Iceland all are fertile ground for 
entrepreneurship—thanks in no small part to the efforts of their governments” becoming an example 
for governments the world over.  
The fourth dimension discussed by Naudé (2007) as critical in determining the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem in post-conflict settings is the role played by entrepreneurs from the diaspora. Members 
from the diaspora can provide pivotal capital, skills, knowledge and networks to the recovering private 
sector of their country of origin (Reinert et al 2007:21). At the same time, their often disproportionate 
political influence, ties to (ethnic) minority groups and role during the war can also exacerbate the 
social tensions that contributed to war in the first place (Koinova 2010:153; Demmers 2005).  
The fifth of Naudé’s (2007) post-conflict entrepreneurial dimensions concerns the scope of the market, 
meaning existing arrangements for transport and trade infrastructure, regional economic integration 
and export capacity. The scope of the market also touches upon the sixth, and final, dimension of 
post-conflict entrepreneurship: human and financial capital requirements. Naudé (2007:20-21) 
proposes that entrepreneurs need to perceive opportunities before these can be exploited. Human 
capital requirements can include a country’s entrepreneurial culture or milieu as well, the degree to 
which entrepreneurship is regarded as a fruitful and desirable (or respectable) in a certain society 
(Guglielmetti 2010:14). Economists tend to be skeptical about the explanatory power of the notion of 
entrepreneurial culture’ (Schoar 2010:68). Yet the fact that in some countries “incentives or social 
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status are set in such a way that the smartest people do not go into entrepreneurship but rather enter 
government jobs or professions such as doctors or lawyers” (Schoar 2010:68) clearly affects 
entrepreneurship structures and outcomes – even if the explanatory power of such dynamics lies 
perhaps in historical and institutional analysis rather than economic theory.xiii  
2.5.4. Synthesis: fragile governance, hybrid government and entrepreneurship 
This paper does not aim or claim to be exhaustive in discussing the external factors impacting 
entrepreneurship. It focuses specifically on the institutional and governmental components of the 
external context affecting entrepreneurship in fragile and hybrid settings. These factors are referred to 
in the literature and figure 1 as ‘institutions’ and ‘government support’ or ‘politicization’ and ‘limited 
state capacity and institutional multiplicity’. As depicted in figure 1, moving from the broader 
governance context to the more specific governance system, the dual game analogy is used to 
demonstrate how institutions in fragile contexts or hybrid systems emerge in a continuous tension 
between an electoral – programmatic or formal – ‘game’ on the one hand and a regime – clientelist or 
informal – ‘game’ on the other hand in which political actors engage to ensure their access to power 
and influence their exercise of it. This institutional tension shapes entrepreneurs’ attitudes, activities 
and aspirations. The remainder of this paper seeks to explore how it does so in Lebanon. 
 
Figure 1: A tentative model on fragile governance, hybrid government and entrepreneurship (figure by author) 
 
 
3. Economics and Politics  in Lebanon  
 
3.1. Politics: the dual game incarnated 
Lebanon has approximately four million inhabitants (Yamout 2012; WB 2011) living on 10,452 km2, 
but there are an estimated 15 million to 22 million Lebanese worldwide. Lebanese society is organized 
along the lines of eighteen recognized religious communities (of which the Maronite Christians, the 
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Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims and the Druze have been the largest and most politically influential) that 
each have their regional strongholds political parties; social institutions like schools, clinics and charity 
organizations; and armed militias.xiv Each sectarian group, moreover, has traditionally been backed by 
various international and regional coalitions (the Sunni, for instance, by the US and Saudi Arabia; the 
Shiite by Iran and Syria; and the Maronites by the French). The central concept to understand 
Lebanon’s society, then, is sectarianism (sometimes labeled confessionalism) that signifies this 
division of society into religious, ‘sectarian,’ communities. The importance of religion in Lebanon’s 
society results from its role as a system of social reference, more than from its role as a spiritual force. 
Sectarianism corresponds with the polarization of social control between Lebanon’s various 
communities. This fractionalization breeds a structural elitism: because society is organized along 
sectarian lines, citizens have historically depended on sectarian leaders for protection and provision. 
In turn, political players have “to show off their prowess by claiming allegiance of their communities” 
(Ziadeh 2006:173). Sectarianism manifests itself in clientelist distributional logic under a system of 
zuama, local strongmen, and integrates political, militia, and business functions (Welsh and Raven 
2006:30) – resulting in what Leenders (2012:232) calls an ‘allotment state’ wherein institution-building 
is highly contested and utilized for sectarian distribution. 
The Lebanese Republic was created in 1926 under a French mandate predominantly as a response to 
“persistent lobbying by the leaders of the Maronite Christian community” (Barak 2003:305). It gained 
independence from France in 1943. From the beginning, the Lebanese State was organized through a 
political system centered on an inter-sectarian power-sharing formula, as expressed in the verbal 
‘National Pact,’ that took its reference from a 1930 census and stipulated that the President of the 
Republic should be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of 
Parliament a Shi’ite Muslim. The Pact included a corresponding sectarian quota system guiding the 
allocation of all public functions and positions. The Pact was slightly adapted in the Taif Agreements 
stipulating the end of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) with executive power, earlier the 
prerogative of the Maronite President being transferred to the government and the Sunni Premier and 
the implementation of a 1:1 ratio between Christians and Muslims in formal institutions (instead of the 
previous 6:5 ratio in favor of Christians). At the same time, however, the Taif Agreements reinstated 
the sectarian logic:  
Ta’if, however, also introduced a major inconsistency into Lebanon’s state-building process by 
simultaneously disavowing and enshrining sectarianism. The accord states that all Lebanese are equal 
before the law and proclaims that political sectarianism should be abolished. Nevertheless, it also 
discriminates on a sectarian basis, allocating certain posts to certain communities, and fails to set a 
schedule for the decreed desectarianization. (Stel 2009:41).  
The post-war era was dominated by de facto Syrian occupation of Lebanon that dampened direct 
sectarian strain, but ultimately enhanced sectarian schism through a divide-and-rule policy (Rabil 
2008:1; Wärn 1998:33). After the ousting of the Syrians in 2005, Lebanese politics has been 
dominated by a polarized programmatic competition between two broad coalitions (Abdul-Hussain 
2010). March 8 is led by Hezbollah and Amal, both Shiite parties and the Christian Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM) and is considered pro-Syrian while March 14 is led by the Sunni Future Movement 
and various Christian parties and is regarded pro-Western.xv Other dividing lines are constituted by the 
issue of Hezbollah’s arms and the stance towards Israel and the desired economy policy. Both 
coalitions are heavily associated with foreign patrons.  
While being a vibrant parliamentary democracy, as a result of its consociational nature, the Lebanese 
State is far from the neutral civil service bureaucracy that states are often envisioned to be. Rather, its 
entire structure is informed by the sectarian quota and quest for inter-communitarian balance 
stipulated by the Taif Agreements that results in endemic patronage and clientelism (Gebara 2007; 
Hamzeh 2001). Leenders (2012:163) characterizes the post-Taif political system as follows: 
Five interrelated features of the political settlement stood out in shaping the process of decision making 
in the Second Republic: (1) an extreme dispersal of power and associated quasi-permanent gridlock in 
the decision-making process; (2) the predominance of the troika [President, Prime Minister and Speaker 
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of Parliament] and the politics of muhasasa [allotment]; (3) continuous attempts to circumvent the built-in 
stalemates of the political arrangement laid out in the Ta’if Accord; (4) extremely weak popular support 
for political elites, exposing them to confessionalist strategies and narrow, local agendas; and (5) the 
overriding role of the Syrian leadership’s interests in Lebanon, its manipulation of the country’s 
differences, and its growing resort to authoritarian interference. 
Makdisi and Marktanner (2010) show how consociationalism  has  exactly cemented the vertical  and  
horizontal  inequality it  was  supposed  to  overcome. Thus, the Lebanese political reality reflects the 
logic of the dual game, combining and integrating a system of clientelist sectarian logic that is 
reinforced and legalized in the constitution and implemented through political parties tied one-on-one 
with their officially-political-actually-sectarian constituencies. 
 
3.2. Fragility as the legacy of perpetual conflict 
Lebanon is considered a fragile country in at least two of the five leading fragility indexesxvi (Lund 
2011:13). Following Naudé’s (2011) characteristics of fragility, Lebanon has a weak state capacity and 
hybrid institutional structures due to sectarian clientelism; its private life is exceptionally politicized for 
the same reason; and the country is extremely vulnerable to external shocks as a result of its polarized 
affiliations with rival hegemonic powers. On top of that, and very much because of that, ever since, 
and even before, Lebanon was created as a state the country has faced several brutal violent 
conflicts. 
The most iconic and horrific of these was the Lebanese Civil War that raged from 1975 to 1990 and 
that took some 150,000 lives, wounded another 200,000; displaced almost a fifth of the population; 
and left “most state institutions paralyzed or collapsed, its physical infrastructure largely destroyed at 
an estimate costs of US$25 billion, and with an estimated fall in per capita income by two-thirds” 
(Leenders 2012:1). The Civil War was fought over many intricately related issues coming together in 
the strife over the role and positions of the Palestinian refugee community and the PLO guerilla 
structure in Lebanon and the division of power between the sectarian groups (see Fisk 1990; Hirst 
2010).xvii 
The Civil War resulted in the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and the subsequent emergence of a 
resistance led by Hezbollah that waged a successful guerilla war, eventually liberating the South in 
2000. Since then, the situation in South Lebanon, monitored by the United Nations Interim Force for 
Lebanon (UNIFIL), remained tense and skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israel continued and 
ultimately escalated in the 2006 Summer War between Hezbollah and Israel that caused widespread 
destruction and left almost 2000 Lebanese and more than 150 Israeli’s dead, 4,054 people injured and 
262,174 displaced (Fatouch and Kolb 2006:97; International Crisis Group (ICG) 2006). It destroyed 28 
‘vital points’ (airports, ports, water and sewage treatment, electrical plants etc.), 600 km of roads, 23 
fuel stations, 80 bridges, 72 overpasses, 15,000 private houses and 160 units in the commercial 
sector (factories, markets, farms, etc.)  (Fatouch and Kolb 2006:98).  
 
   
Pictures taken by the author in the Mleeta Resistance Museum – Mleeta, South Lebanon 
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The Civil War also gave birth to the Syrian occupation of Lebanon that lasted from 1976 to 2005 when, 
during the ‘Independence Intifada’ following the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (the 
zenith of a series of other politically inspired killings of prominent anti-Syrian figures in Lebanon), 
forced the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon.  Various other, but ultimately interconnected, more 
minor conflicts have played out since then. In 2007, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) waged a battle 
against Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist faction located in the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp close 
to Tripoli, resulting in 168 casualties among the army (as well as 47 civilian dead) and almost 
completely destroying the camp in the process (Khalidi and Riskedahl 2007; Knudsen 2011). In 2008, 
Hezbollah and its political allies forcefully took over Beirut to impose a specific power-sharing formula; 
an event that not only killed 71 people, but also seriously disrupted a previous balance of power and 
reemphasized the volatility of Hezbollah’s formidable, and disproportional, armed presence (ICG 2008; 
Stel 2009). The Arab Spring, specifically the civil war that started in Syria in 2011, also affects 
Lebanon; resulting in deadly clashes in Tripoli; kidnappings by armed clans; and frequent riots and 
neighborhood clashes. Besides these demarcated eruptions of violence, there are ongoing clashes 
between sectarian militias and political factions (particularly in some of Lebanon’s twelve Palestinian 
refugee camps). 
These conflicts have affected Lebanon’s economy and entrepreneurship climate. The Civil War has 
been described as the “costliest conflict in recent memory” (Kibranian 2009:9). While an in-depth 
analysis of the direct economic effects of the Civil War on Lebanon’s economy are beyond the scope 
of this paper, Ghazi (1997) provides an eloquent overview and summarizes that in the first nineteen 
months of the war alone losses amounted to US$12 billion (US$10 billion sustained by the private 
sector and US$2 billion by the public sector), according to the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. During the war, “recession in the Gulf led to a sharp reduction in remittances and Beirut's 
prominence as a center for finance, commerce, and tourism faded away.” In the mid 1980s, relative 
calm, a sharp depreciation of the Lebanese pound and a decline in labor costs resulting from inflation 
of 600 per cent, produced a modest economic rebound. However, foreign banks began selling and 
moving out and by 1986 the inflation rate was well over 100 per cent. Government revenues from 
taxation and customs duties continued to erode and economic control was falling into the hands of 
militias. Their tight grip on customs revenues gave them increasing control over what was left of the 
national economy. Growth was cut short completely by the general chaos of 1988-1990 that had a 
dramatic and negative impact on production and exports, triggered massive outflows of capital and 
people.  
Regarding the 2006 war, Lebanon calculates the damage at US$3.5 billion (Rammerstorfer 2008:90). 
Fatouch and Kolb (2006:99-100) provide more disaggregated losses: US$1,4646 million in housing 
and trade; US$404 million in transportation infrastructures; US$208 million concerning electricity 
facilities; US$190 million in terms of industrial establishments and facilities; US$99 million concerning 
telecommunications; US$74 million with regard to water provision; US$16 million concerning military 
installations and US$10 million due to destroyed gas stations. They conclude that the month of war 
“devastated Lebanon just as economic growth appeared to be gathering momentum at last and the 
country was looking forward to a bumper tourist season” (Fatouch and Kolb 2006:96). The CIA World 
Factbook states that following the 2006 war, “pledges of economic and financial reforms made at 
separate international donor conferences during the 2000s have mostly gone unfulfilled, including 
those made during the Paris III Donor Conference in 2007 following the July 2006 war.” Instances 
such as the collapse of the government in early 2011 and unrest in neighboring Syria slowed 
economic growth to 1.5 per cent after four years of 8 per cent average growth (Bank Audi 2011:2). 
These conflicts have not just had economic consequences, they have had, in some cases, partial 
economic causes as well. Regarding the Civil War, Fisk (1990:78) notes that “typically, it was an 
economic dispute between Muslims and Christians in Sidon – involving Muslim fishermen who feared 
that a new fishing consortium run by Chamoun and other Maronites would destroy their livelihood – 
that ignited the fire.” Makdisi and Marktanner (2010:5-6) feel that economic  factors  did  not  play  a  
decisive  role  in  the  onset  of  the Lebanese  civil war and recall that just before the war Lebanon 
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had “a vibrant merchant class, comparatively high per capita  incomes, an economy growing at 
considerable rates, and expanding employment opportunities.” They also recollect, however, that 
economic development was regionally and horizontally highly unequal, causing the migration patterns 
that helped fuel the war. 
 
3.3. Economy: open and modern or corrupt and unproductive? 
Lebanon is generally considered a middle income country, often described in terms its open, liberal 
and modern outlook with minimal state intervention (Leenders 2010:169, Lebanese Transparency 
Association (LTA) 2011:106; Marseglia 2004). This is often linked to Lebanon’s famed human potential 
– built on education and a pro-activeness – that was a dominant theme throughout the interviews. One 
researcher emphasized that private property has always had a special place in Lebanon: “we never 
had the socialist experience that the other’s had in the 1960s. Lebanon has always been a safe haven 
for private capital.”xviii He goes on to stress that, in fact, what he calls this “laissez-faire on private 
property and trade” is an almost sacred thing and can count on quite unique endorsement of all 
political factions, “even Hezbollah.”1 This analysis is confirmed by Leenders (2004:170) who quotes a 
Lebanese economist describing the country’s ‘credo of laissez-faire’ as “so deeply engrained that no 
warlord—no matter how ‘socialist’ in outlook—would think of touching it.” This ‘laissez-faire’ or minimal 
state interference manifests itself in fiscal policies, with extremely low income and corporate taxes; 
monetary policies, testifying of a generally liberal regime; and the absence of significant state 
enterprise except for some public utilities (water, electricity, transport, and communications) (Leenders 
2004:173-174). The state has never nationalized or expropriated privately-owned firms and owns just 
two mobile phone networks, the electricity utility Electricité du Liban (EdL), flag-carrier Middle East 
Airlines (MEA) and the Intra Investment Company that owns the Finance Bank, Casino du Liban and 
real estate assets (LTA 2011:106). Nevertheless, analysts agree, although its economy is dominated 
by the private sector, it is not market based. The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS 2011:7) 
argues that the Lebanese economy is highly oligopolist since more than 50 per cent of the 300 
markets are in the hands of a few companies and two per cent of companies take more than 50 per 
cent of the loans. Leenders (2012) also meticulously documents the dominance of political elites in 
‘regulating’ the Lebanese economy through a dissection of corruption cases referring to the MEA; the 
Ministry of Industry and Oil; the port of Beirut; and Lebanon’s quarrying business. 
Lebanon has a labor force of around 1.5 million people and its NGI per capita was US$7,970 in 2009 
(the total GNI being US$35.2 billion). The Lebanese GDP consists of eight per cent agriculture; 16 per 
cent manufacturing; nine per cent construction and 67 per cent services and commerce (Fahed-Sreih 
2001:1). Lebanon has a high imports to exports ratio, large per-capita imports and a deficiency in raw 
materials (Blom Bank 2012:13-14). Experts predominantly referred to the real estate and banking 
sectors when asked for Lebanon’s main business sectors – even if the real estate sector is facing a 
setback due to declining Gulf investment and general saturation after a post-2005 building boom when 
the Syrians left.2 Manufacturing is relatively under developed, just like agriculture.3xix This is related to 
a combination of high utility costs and regional trade agreements that do not favor Lebanese produce.4  
Some have claimed that Lebanon depends too heavily on tourism, “the center of everything.”5 The 
Authority on World Travel and Tourism (2012:1) estimates the direct contribution of travel and tourism 
to Lebanon’s GDP around LBP 6,229.0bn (9.8% of total GDP) in 2011 (see also Daily Star 2011). It is 
estimated, however, that the indirect effect of tourism is significantly larger as tourism is at the center 
                                                            
1 Author’s interview with policy expert. 
2 Author’s interview with real estate expert. The interviewee said there are 71 banks in Lebanon: 10 big ones and 
60 others (such as family banks). Before the war there were 105 banks, but after the war the central bank 
arranged for mergers. 
3 Author’s interview with diplomat.  
4 Author’s interview with LAU professor. 
5 Author’s interview with micro credit expert. 
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of many other services as well. Lebanon’s close socio-political ties with regional countries, its 
favorable climate (the habitual Lebanese tourism slogan purports one can swim in the Mediterranean 
and ski on the same day), picturesque and diverse landscape and historical liberalism resulting in a 
booming nightlife all account for the prevalence of tourism. At the same time, however, tourism seems 
a precarious driver of the economy in a country plagued by wars as it is extremely vulnerable to 
seasonal fluctuations. The Civil War, for instance ruined the tourist industry.xx The 2006 war also 
proved a major setback for the tourism sector with an income loss of approximately US$2 billion 
(Rammerstorfer 2008:90). Current, Arab Spring related, unrest has also resulted in a severe downturn 
in tourism (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2011:33). 
According to some analysts, this specific economic structure – with relatively under developed  
agriculture despite a favorable environment and a weak industry despite good potential – is the 
outcome of a quick returns oriented post-war governmental vision evolving around “Beirut as the focal 
point of a service-tourism and real estate based economy” consciously “not allowing the serious 
development of industry and agriculture.” There was, according to them a reasoning of “Beirut first and 
the rest will follow” stemming from a drive during the post-war Hariri years to get Beirut back to being 
the Swiss of the Middle East, regardless of the costs. Researchers had similar understandings of the 
dominance of the Lebanese banking sector in the economy, stressing that this was not an organic or 
inevitable development, but rather the result of a conscious campaign by the bankers-cum-politicians 
in power during the establishment of the Lebanese State (Michel Chiha, considered one of the fathers 
of the Lebanese constitution, is perhaps the most iconic of these) (Leenders 2004:173). They maintain 
that industry was in a rather good state after it boomed during the French Vichy years and the Arab-
Israeli wars in the 1960s and 1970s when Lebanon was forced to produce for its own markets, but that 
the powerful banking-political elite pushed for a more real-estate oriented economy, of which the 
tourism is mostly a spillover effect.6 Academics confirm that the ‘structural unproductive nature’ of the 
Lebanese economy stems from both the elite influence during the establishment of the State of 
Lebanon and the specific post-war policies.7 
The Lebanese economy is characterized by a strong dependency on external funds and markets; a 
very sector-stratified development; and a seasonal income distribution due to the predominance of 
tourism. According to WB (2012:v): “Large inflows of foreign financial resources, continuous import of 
low skilled labor, outmigration of skilled labor and a booming real estate market have been key 
features of the Lebanese economy over the past two decades. In recent years, growth has been 
strong if narrowly based, fueled by steadily increasing foreign financial inflows.” 
The Lebanese government itself (Yamout 2012) describes the business environment as “vibrant and 
resilient” as evidenced by the fact that many multinational corporations and international organizations 
have their Levant head office in Beirut. The main bottlenecks identified for reform and development 
are infrastructure and administration. These bottlenecks are reflected in Lebanon’s low (even in 
regional terms) ranking in the WB Doing Business indicators: number 104 out of 183 (WB 2012a:7). In 
a more substantial in-depth study, Mehzer et al (2008:41) by and large confirm this, concluding that on 
a macro-economic level the domestic level is characterized by limited demand, low levels of exports 
and increasing foreign competition. From a micro-economic outlook, business support policies are 
inadequate, firms find it difficult to recruit skilled employees; and physical infrastructure is lacking. 
From an institutional perspective, finally, the extensive bureaucratic red tape, the inadequate 
administrative procedures, the weak judicial sector and the inappropriate tax and labor laws have 
come under discussion as proximate reasons for the difficult environment to business in. 
3.3.1. The dominance of SMEs and family businesses 
Some experts lament the gap between a prevalence of micro enterprises and big businesses, saying 
that the Lebanese economy consists of “90 per cent are micro companies; only some five per cent are 
                                                            
6 Author’s interview with policy expert. 
7 Author’s interview with LAU economist. 
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large companies that generate external revenues. The problem is the lack of companies with around 
200 employees. This is a structural issue in the business lay-out. Micro ventures are nice socially 
speaking and they generate some jobs, but they have no economic impact and are not innovative.”8 
Scholars agree that the predominance of SMEsxxi and family firms is one of the most defining 
characteristics of the Lebanese economy. Saidi (2004:5) notes that “more than 85 per cent of 
industrial companies have less than 10 employees and 90 per cent of SMEs are individual or family 
owned.” According to Mehzer et al (2008:35) SMEs make up 98 per cent of all the firms in Lebanon 
and employ 72.4 per cent of the total workforce, but they highlight that a large percentage of SMEs fail 
within the first five years of operation. This preponderance of SMEs has been ascribed to Lebanon’s 
legacy of war, specifically to import restrictions during the civil war, which stimulated the rise of a large 
number of small-scale industries that aimed to meet the demand for previously imported goods. The 
absence of taxes and government control during the war as well as the wartime depreciation of the 
Lebanese pound and the consequent significant decline in labor costs, also contributed to SME 
environment (Mehzer et al 2008:41).  
Having a large pool of SMEs in an economy could be an impulse for innovative economic activity. 
Welsh and Raven (2006:33), for example, note that in comparison with large organizations, SMEs are 
“less bureaucratic and hierarchical, while being more innovative and customer oriented” as they are 
more flexible [author’s emphasis]. Lebanese business, moreover, is family-led. Surveys consistently 
find heavy reliance by entrepreneurs on family members to establish, develop and grow their 
enterprises (Fahed-Sreih et al 2010:35). Fahed-Sreih (2006 in Fahed-Sreih et al 2010:37) poses that 
family businesses constitute 85 per cent of the private sector, accounting for 1.05 million of 1.24 
million jobs. In the Lebanese banking sector, Fahed-Sreih (2001:2) estimates that 43 per cent of the 
banks are family owned. She goes on to show that 78 per cent of the Lebanese work force in the 
agricultural sector is engaged in family projects; 51 per cent of industrial establishments are family 
establishments, employing 71 per cent of the work force in the industry sector; 62 per cent of service 
and commerce establishments are family owned, constituting for 38 per cent of the work force in this 
sector (Fahed-Sreih 2001:3-4). Lebanese firms have often been described as having a traditional 
management style due to this “predominance of small, family-owned firms [and] informally structured 
business environment” (Mehzer et al 2008:40). The Reference Guidebook on the Corporate 
Governance of Family-Owned Businesses (LTA 2009a:21) concurs that, in Lebanon, “governance in 
family-owned enterprises drastically differs from the governance of other companies.” But De Vries 
(1993 in Welsh and Raven 2006:31) found that small family-controlled firms are in fact “less 
bureaucratic, authoritarian, and impersonal than larger firms that were not family controlled.”  
There is, in other words, a vigorous debate in the literature regarding the origins of this family 
prevalence – especially concerning whether or not is in rooted in the history of violent conflict – and on 
the effects of it on entrepreneurship and innovation. Fahed-Sreih et al (2010:40) argue that the family 
plays an important stabilizing role in social and economic value creation and trans-generational wealth 
perpetuation processes and as such has been a way to navigate the uncertainties and instabilities 
produced by years of war and destruction: “in war torn transition economies, such as those in Lebanon 
that are struggling to rebound following civil war, the family unit is often the only intact socioeconomic 
institution capable of supporting entrepreneurial activities” (Fahed-Sreih et al 2010:37). Although 
Fahed-Sreih would not claim that family business is a consequence of war, as it is more clearly rooted 
in social and cultural structures not directly related to war, it is enhanced by war as a coping strategy.9 
One expert recollects that “they say that being a family business made these companies very 
adaptable during the war; they were autonomous and could take their own decisions and were flexible 
and this is what got them through. They have good experiences with that, so why change it now?”10 
                                                            
8 Author’s interview with start-up consultant. 
9 Author’s interview with LAU professor. 
10 Author’s interview with BIAT representative. 
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Fahed-Sreih et al (2010:42) found that motivations for entrepreneurship evolving around the wish to 
“provide security and to generate the income necessary to create and protect a strong family life.” 
Apart from the succession process usually associated with family business, motivations to ensure 
family well-being thus also drive start-ups of new firms. While employment might at first glance seem 
more secure in assuring a short-term stable income, the argument is that establishing a family firm 
guarantees long-term security through employment options for future generations. In light of the fact 
that the borders between firms and households in fragile states are often blurred (Naudé 2007:15) and 
in a culture in which, as the truism goes, the family is the most important social entity, employment is a 
part of the family’s obligation and businesses are viewed as an extension of the family (Pistrui and 
Fahed-Sreih 2010:85). Fahed-Sreih et al (2010:42) state that 80 per cent of the entrepreneurs 
surveyed was leading family businesses (50 per cent of which were originated and 33 per cent 
inherited). Family participation is apparently critical for the creation of SMEs as well, with the family 
providing primary sources of start-up capital (in the Fahed-Sreih et al study, over 50 per cent of the 
businesses had more than one family investor and 70 per cent had a family member employed full 
time). Entrepreneurship is also a way to enhance not just individual, but also family status (Fahed-
Sreih, 2006:206 in Pistrui and Fahed-Sreih 2010:83). Pistrui and Fahed-Sreih (2010:115), conclude 
that “the ability to create and foster an entrepreneurial mindset across generations is a major element 
of family business continuity and longevity and is instrumental in effective strategic execution, 
innovation and growth.”  
 
     
Pictures taken by the author of family businesses in Tripoli 
 
Others disagree with the position of Fahed-Sreih et al (2010) that family businesses boost 
entrepreneurship. They argue that a family orientation could undermine value chain development as a 
way to access new markets and added value (The Broker 2009:13). Ahmed and Julian (2012:26, 30), 
for instance, acknowledge that family structures have allowed entrepreneurship through opening up 
informal funds, but also signal that family business structures can “divert resources to cover current 
expenses, and discourage risk taking, innovations or the delegation of authority.” They argue that 
some Lebanese cultural features are individualist, but that the family is dominant and “restricts 
entrepreneurial spirit and is, in general, patriarchal and extended, which are also the characteristics of 
a collective culture” (Ahmed and Julian 2012:26). While this is somewhat primordial (it is the way in 
which a family is involved in a business more than the simple fact that it is that will determine the 
direction of this business), this critique does resonate with findings from interviews underlying this 
paper. The high proportion of family firms in the Lebanese economy is sometimes seen as a factor 
hindering entrepreneurship.11 People recount meeting students not interested in acquiring any 
                                                            
11 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
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entrepreneurial skills because they “will just take over the family business anyway.”12 Even those 
generally pertaining that family business in fact boosts entrepreneurship, admit that “those whose 
family has a business, join the family business; those who don’t, try to start their own.”13 Things are, 
however, developing in the right direction.14 A venture capitalist expert indicated that there is more 
focus on liquidity and expansion due to stagnating takeovers of family businesses by the younger 
generation.15 An incubator spokesperson confirmed that the new generation taking over family 
businesses in Lebanon has a different mentality and is more interested in expanding beyond the 
family and getting involved in stock exchange.16  
 
3.4. A culture of entrepreneurship: nature or nurture? 
Lebanon has historically been a center of commerce in the Middle East. The territory that is now 
Lebanon has formed part of numerous illustrious empires, among them the nigh legendary Phoenician 
one and the Egyptian, Persian, Assyrian, Hellenistic, Roman, Seljuk, Mamluk, Crusader, Ottoman and 
French. Lebanon is composed of three main regions (Hourani 1986:3-4). First, there is the eastern 
Mediterranean seacoast. Much of Lebanon’s pre-state history (and current economy) revolves around 
various trading cities located along the coast. Tripoli (or Trablous), established as a trading center with 
the inland of the Mediterranean by the Phoenicians and a naval shipyard during the Hellenistic days, 
was one of the main Crusader centers in the region. Byblos (or Jbeil), an old fishing town considered 
one of the oldest continually inhabited cities in the world. Tyre (or Sour), the main port city of the 
Phoenician traders. Sidon (or Saida) known for its glass manufacturing during the Phoenician days 
and Tyre’s predecessor and continual competitor as the ‘capital of the Phoenicians.’ These cities were 
major flashpoints during the crusader years and faced recurrent destruction and occupation. The 
second region that can be distinguished is the succession of mountains and hills running from north to 
south and known collectively as Mount Lebanon. In the first half of the nineteenth century, under emir 
Bashir the Second, the agricultural economy of Mount Lebanon region was connected with the 
commercial economy of Beirut, expanding the influence of cash crops and creating increased 
economic and political ties with France. The third region is the Beqa Valley, an inner plain on the other 
side of the mountains with a history of agriculture and oriented towards inland commerce with Syria. 
Beirut has historically played a marginal role as one of several port cities along the Mediterranean 
coast, but came to gain importance as the centre of governance linking the three regions previously 
administrated separately. Its importance as a regional port also increased after the closure of Haifa 
port at the creation of the state of Israel (LCPS 2011:4). According to renowned Lebanese historian 
Hourani (1986:3-4) “the difference between these three kinds of region helps to explain something 
about the nature of the country. The life of the mountains has been an enclosed life, away from the 
outside world; that of the ports and the inner valley has been open to a broader world.” 
It is often assumed (see Welsh and Raven 2006:32) that the history of development under diverse and 
competing leaders and realms influenced Lebanon’s propensity to trade and business (rather than 
industry) and have ingrained entrepreneurship in the national psyche – if such a thing exists, 
something particularly questionable in Lebanon – to the extent that “Lebanese culture is one that 
strongly encourages and supports self-enterprise and that ‘successful entrepreneurs not only are 
accepted but also are often considered “champions of industry” and presented as role models for 
others’” (Chakour 2001:41 in Ahmed and Julian 2012:27). 
But existing work on the impact of ‘Arab’ culture on entrepreneurship tends to be deterministic and 
simplistic, rife with platitudes such as the inherent fatalism apparently evidenced in the omnipresent 
expression inshallah (literally ‘if God wills it’, but ranging in meaning from ‘yeah, whatever’ to ‘if the 
                                                            
12 Author’s interview with entrepreneurship education expert. 
13 Author’s interview with LAU professor. 
14 Author’s interview with expert on Lebanese industrialism. 
15 Author’s interview with venture capitalist expert. 
16 Author’s interview with BIAT representative. 
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boss wills it’ or ‘consider it done’) (Rice 1999 in Welsh and Raven 2006:32).xxii It states that factors 
such as Bedouin tradition and wider tribal inheritances, Islam, foreign rule and the West’s need for oil 
(Hickson and Pugh 1995 in Welsh and Raven 2006:30) have influenced Arab management styles but 
by and large fails to describe how. There is an assumption of a negative influence while tribal 
traditions, for instance, can reinforce authoritarian management styles, but often support consultative 
management techniques as well (Welsh and Raven 2006:31). Religionxxiii, too, might form a 
conservative – or fatalist – influence on management or entrepreneurship, but there are also examples 
of authoritative Islamic ‘televangelists’ that exhorts Arab youth to “study hard, stop being ‘leeches on 
the blessings of Allah and create a job, don't wait for one’” (Theil 2007:3 – this mirrors almost exactly 
encouragements by OECD (2011:2) to “become ‘job creators’ instead of ‘job seekers’”). While Islam is 
often perceived as an impediment to business development and entrepreneurship, “most Islamic 
economists view markets as the normal vehicle for conducting transactions” (see also Creevey 1985 
and Vogel and Hayes 1998 in Pistrui and Fahed-Sreih 2010:110-111). Islam even provides an 
entrepreneurship niche, it seems, as “one of the most unique and distinctive developments in the Arab 
world is the emergence and growth of Islamic finance products and services” (Pistrui and Fahed-Sreih 
2010:115, see Calo et al 2008 for an example of Islamic Microfinance). In general, while interest may 
be forbidden in Islam, profit making is praised in many hadiths: “The best gains from honorable trade 
and from a man’s work with his own hands”, and “To seek lawful gain is the duty of very Muslim” 
(Lewis and Churchill 2009 in Pistrui and Fahed-Sreih 2010:115). Broad notions like culture and 
religion, then, are hardly useful in exploring the causes and consequences of entrepreneurship and 
need to be quantified and qualified with regard to specific attitudes, activities and aspirations to have 
any explanatory power.xxiv They will be addressed in this paper only when referred to by experts. 
3.4.1. Entrepreneurship profile of Lebanon 
WEF (2011:9) estimates that 15 per cent of the Lebanese adult population is engaged in 
entrepreneurial activity, but warns that this is mostly necessity entrepreneurship that revolves around 
self-employment rather than job generation.xxv This entrepreneurship level is not as high as Yemen (24 
per cent) or China (19 per cent) in the same measurement, but on a par with Brazil and significantly 
higher than the United States of America (eight per cent), Germany (four per cent) or Japan (three per 
cent). 
In their profile of the average Lebanese entrepreneur, Pistrui and Fahed-Sreih (2010:83-84), paint a 
picture of a 41-year old, male (only 16.82 per cent of the entrepreneurs in their sample were women), 
highly educated person with seventeen years of work experience. They distinguish between an 
existing “deep-rooted entrepreneurial class and an emerging new group of dynamic female 
entrepreneurs.” This supports a comparison by Ardagna and Lusardi (2010:39-40) between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurial working people that suggests that entrepreneurs tend to be 
younger (two years), more often male and eight per cent more likely to hold a postsecondary degree 
(this dynamic seems even stronger for opportunity entrepreneurs when compared with necessity 
entrepreneurs, with the former often being younger, more likely to be male and more educated). 
In Lebanon, one can open four types of ventures: a non-profit organization; a for-profit (limited liability) 
enterprise; a for-profit personal enterprise; and a civil company (only available for those who pursue a 
liberal profession e.g. attorneys) (Feghali et al 2012:8).xxvi As will be elaborated on, there is no legal 
structure available to start a social enterprise. In general the registration process is not complex, but it 
is expensive, requiring a lawyer and costing between $1000 and $5000. According to WB (2012a:15-
16, 20), starting a business in Lebanon requires five procedures, takes nine days, costs 67.1 per cent 
of income per capita and requires paid-in minimum capital of 35.3 per cent of income per capita – 
interestingly, it has recently become more rather than less expensive to start a business in Lebanon. 
Lebanon knows three bankruptcy scenarios: “depending on the type of bankruptcy, one may a) see all 
his or her possessions and assets seized and be prohibited from working for ten years, b) face 
between three months and three years in jail, and c) face up to seven years in jail” (Feghali et al 
2012:8). 
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There might be no Arabic word for entrepreneurship (Theil 2007:3), but the experts interviewed for this 
paper had clear conceptions of entrepreneurship, mostly centered on notions of start-up, self-
sufficiency and independent business. Respondents seemed to regard entrepreneurship both in terms 
agency, the entrepreneur, and in terms of structure, entrepreneurship. Many references were to the 
character of the entrepreneur, as apparent in the half-joking expression that “entrepreneurs, compared 
with industrialists, are less whiners and more doers.”17 There was some resistance to the cliché 
entrepreneur as a “fresh graduate starting a million dollar business,” with experts emphasizing that the 
usual entrepreneurs have quite some experience (usually abroad).18 A widespread referral to the 
‘ecosystem,’ showed experts see entrepreneurship as a phenomenon depending on and consisting of 
a broad set of enablers ranging from culture to governance, education, finances and infrastructure.19  
By and large, experts agreed that the main entrepreneurial sectors were online services, ICT and 
technology; marketing and media; financial services; and (tourist) services. Interestingly, the wine 
industry was mentioned multiple times as well as being increasingly entrepreneurial.20 The majority of 
the entrepreneurial success stories recounted by respondents were in online services and other non-
spatially bound businesses capitalizing on the immense demand for Arabic online content.21 The 
creative sector was also widely seen as very entrepreneurial.  
The perceived motivations for entrepreneurship that experts mentioned were, first and foremost, 
acquiring a higher income, closely followed by (and closely related with) societal status.22 The drive to 
get ‘respect’ and to ‘show off’ was repeatedly mentioned as a typically Lebanese motivation for starting 
a business.23 “People like to say they own a pub; they’re show-offs. Lebanese prefer independence 
and status, they want to be an owner, they want to be the boss – even if it lasts only for a few months, 
they have been the boss at least once in their life. This is a cultural thing.”24 Family well-being, a 
predominant factor in the literature, was hardly mentioned.   
3.4.2. Innovation 
According to a study by WB (2012:46), almost 25 per cent of Lebanese companies supposedly have a 
department specialized in R&D – slightly less than in Egypt – and almost 35 per cent developed what 
the Bank calls a “major new product line” – considerably less than in Syria. While Lebanon was 
entrepreneurial to all experts interviewed, this entrepreneurship was not automatically considered 
innovative. While entrepreneurship has been a hot topic and the subject of a vibrant supporting 
ecosystem, “innovation has been less central in the private sector debates.”25 
Entrepreneurship and innovation are two totally different things […] the indicators for innovation are very 
weak. There are few new products, new technologies, new production systems. Innovation is not the 
same as improvement or tailoring or diversification; it’s not about having ten different kinds of tea.26 
As Doumit and Chaaban (2012:23) eloquently note, the Lebanese context presents many factors that 
can trigger innovation such as “diversity, risk and lack of resources.” The extent to which these 
opportunities are actually capitalized on, however, is subject of debate among academics as well as 
practitioners. On the one hand, Shane et al (1991 in Ahmed and Julian 2012:28) concluded that the 
opportunity to be innovative and the leaders or developers of new technology were frequently cited as 
the reasons for starting a new business. Moreover, SMEs are often considered the major providers of 
technological innovation and in Lebanon, as noted previously, SMEs form about 98 per cent of all the 
                                                            
17 Author’s interview AUB business expert. 
18 Author’s interview with venture capitalist expert. 
19 Author’s interview with entrepreneurship education expert. 
20 Author’s interviews with real estate expert; and diplomat. 
21 Author’s interviews with IDAL representative; and venture capitalist expert. 
22 Author’s interview with polling expert. 
23 Author’s interview with Kafalat experts. 
24 Author’s interview with corruption experts. 
25 Author’s interview with advisor to the Council of Ministers. 
26 Author’s interview with LAU economist. 
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firms (Keng and Jiuan 1989 in Ahmed and Julian 2012:26). On the other hand, stakeholders in various 
studies have identified considerable and persistent obstacles to innovation, most notably weakly 
enforced intellectual property; a limited market; meager training and education on innovation; nearly 
absent research and development; and poor infrastructure  - these will be addressed in part 3 of this 
paper (Doumit and Chaaban 2012:23). In Lebanon, innovation – perhaps in line with individualist 
conceptions of entrepreneurship – is usually described as being ad hoc and personal rather than 
structural and collective. “New technology and product diversification are introduced informally through 
the individual efforts of entrepreneurs” and there is a perceived lack of institutional innovation (banks 
and other financing institutions were especially seen to be conservative) (Chakour 2001 in Ahmed and 
Julian 2012:27).  
There was vigorous disagreement about the meaning of innovation and, subsequently, the extent to 
which Lebanese entrepreneurship can be considered innovative among the experts interviewed. The 
majority of the interviewed felt Lebanon was innovative. They understood innovation in a very broad 
sense of improvement, adaptation, franchising and marketing,27 tailoring28 and added value29 – or 
even “following market trends.”30 They saw innovation not only as the  
Creation of new knowledge and technology and the adaptation of existing ones, but equally important, as 
the diffusion and use of all technologies, products, processes, and practices that are – new to the country 
and the region – although not necessarily to the world. Innovation is, therefore, also about the 
transformation of traditional sectors into higher value-added, knowledge intensive sectors, through the 
local adoption of already existing technology and processes (WB 2012b:32).  
Innovation, then, “isn’t necessarily the invention of space ships.”31 Innovation, one incubator 
representative clarified, is “presenting added value, a new feature. This can be either an existing 
product with a new feature or a whole new product responding to a new need.”32 A public official 
considered “start-ups and innovation interchangeable as innovation these days comes from start-ups 
rather than multinationals.”33 Some respondents also questioned the necessity of innovation, stressing 
that there is no need for each start-up to “provide the world with a patented idea.”34 An incubator 
representative added that “R&D is not a priority in a country this instable”35 and a manager of a 
microfinance institution stressed that perhaps his clients were not innovative in a traditional sense, but 
“when you present them with new options they like it and take the chance.”36  
A smaller group of respondents maintained that Lebanese entrepreneurship was remarkably un-
innovative. The government itself is clear in recognizing the absence of innovation and lists the 
country’s minimal new product or process development and the fact that patents lodged by universities 
do not make it to commercialization by the private sector (SME-unit 2007:20). These analysts adopted 
a more specific, not seldom academic, understanding of innovation as research and innovation based 
new technologies and products reflecting Bizri et al’s (2010:5 in WB 2012b:32) conceptualization of 
innovation as “the application of new ideas, technologies, or processes to productive activities.” One 
economist’s reflection on Lebanese innovation seems representative for this line of thought:  
Everyone assumes that the Lebanese are entrepreneurial and business minded, but people might be 
using the word innovation incorrectly; it is not just about doing something new (about redecorating and 
                                                            
27 Author’s interviews with advisor to the Ministry of Economy; business consultant; and polling expert. 
28 Author’s interviews with venture capitalist expert; and IDAL representative. 
29 Author’s interview with Kafalat experts. 
30 Author’s interview with LAU professor. 
31 Author’s interview with venture capitalist expert. 
32 Author’s interview with Berytech representative. 
33 Author’s interview with IDAL representative. 
34 Author’s interview with start-up consultant. 
35 Author’s interview with BIAT representative. 
36 Author’s interview with microfinance expert. 
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then reopening a restaurant or about introducing fusion cooking in Lebanon). Ultimately, innovation is 
about new products, concepts, technologies and systems that will lead to higher productivity.37  
Ultimately, then, the extent of innovation in Lebanese entrepreneurship depends on the definition of 
innovation. In the words of one diplomat “there is a variation in the understandings of innovation. If you 
see innovation as a Microsoft-like feat, then you’ll find little of this in Lebanon. If it refers to the creative 
way of making economic progression, innovation is widespread, especially on a grassroots level.”38 
One Lebanese research center makes the eloquent distinction between ‘innovation’ – the creation of 
product entirely new to the world – and ‘invention’ - “taking an existing product, for instance a phone, 
and through a process of reverse engineering, tweaking technology and short circuiting inventing a 
way to produce it cheaper and becoming competitive.”39  
Innovation, of course, also clearly differs per sector, with the media and communication and services 
being considered most innovative.40 This coincides with Ahmad and Julian (2012:29) and with the 
observation of WB (2012:32) that “in the particular case of Lebanon, innovation in the so-called 
creative industries (architecture, film, music, advertising, fashion design, gaming, crafts, visual arts, 
and performing arts) represents a promising avenue.” Tourism, most respondents agree, is not very 
innovative (apart from some imported concept restaurants and a very small ecotourism niche).41 
3.4.3. Lebanon’s entrepreneurship support ‘buzz’ 
Mohamad Hodeib speaks passionately about global expansion, stock options and the long, Red Bull-
fueled nights spent drawing up the business plan for B-Com, his half-year-old start-up company that 
makes clothes with witty slogans. It's not something you'd expect to hear from a 17-year-old high-school 
student from Deir al-Zahrani, Lebanon, a poor village in the Hizbullah-dominated South—nor, for that 
matter, anywhere else in the Arab world. Hodeib says he caught the business bug from a school project 
run by Injaz al-Arab, an organization that sends volunteers into schools to teach kids about 
entrepreneurship. (Theil 2007:1) 
Almost all respondents agreed that now is the perfect time to address the issue of entrepreneurship in 
Lebanon: “the term entrepreneurship has become really sexy the last couple of years.”42 Since a few 
years – opinions differ on how long exactly – Lebanon is witnessing what respondents called an 
‘entrepreneurship buzz’; a substantial increase (in both quantity and quality) of various types of 
initiatives to support entrepreneurship. These initiatives range from education to loan subsidies to 
business plan competitions and are implemented by a wide range of private, civil and sometimes 
(semi-)public organizations. While the perceived success and actual output of this new dynamic differs 
among respondentsxxvii – with the exception of the widely acknowledged improved access to finance 
resulting from the Kafalat initiative43 – and have not been structurally evaluated yet44, the simple fact of 
its emergence and existence is broadly acknowledged and embraced.45  
Six components of the emerging Lebanese ‘entrepreneurship ecosystem’ can be distinguished. First, 
there is a system of incubators. Some six years ago four incubators that were supposed to help 
entrepreneurs on the trajectory from idea to business were instigated with the support of the European 
Union (EU Delegation of the European Commission to Lebanon 2008; Lopez-Menchero 2011); one in 
Beirut and surroundings (Berytech); one in the north (the Business Incubation Association in Tripoli, 
                                                            
37 Author’s interview with LAU economist. 
38 Author’s interview with diplomat. 
39 Author’s interview with policy expert. 
40 Author’s interview with polling expert. 
41 Author’s interview with IDAL representative. 
42 Author’s interview with AUB business expert. Some respondents remained skeptical and felt that 
entrepreneurship still was not given the attention it deserves and that entrepreneurs are basically still on their own 
(author’s interviews with business journalist; and LAU professor). 
43 Author’s interview with polling expert. 
44 Author’s interview with policy expert. 
45 Author’s interview with business consultant. 
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BIAT); one in the south (Southbic); and one in the east, in the Beqa Valley (Agripole).46 Where 
Agripole soon had to close shop and Southbic apparently still faces start-up challenges,xxviii Berytech 
and especially BIAT are generally considered rather successful even if their output in terms of actual 
businesses is still marginal in the eyes of many experts.47 These EU initiated incubators are 
considered to have kick started the entrepreneurship boom, with other donors later jumping on the 
bandwagon.48  
Second, there is Kafalat, the single most important – and widely applauded – facilitator of 
entrepreneurship through the provision of subsidized and guaranteed loans.  
Third, there are some government initiatives, most notably the Investment Development Authority 
Lebanon (IDAL) seeking to enhance entrepreneurship through tax incentives, administrative reforms 
and the support of the incubators. Respondents were mostly cynical about this programme, at best 
saying it was still in the start-up phase with little to show for yet,49 at worst claiming it high-jacked the 
success of other initiatives with which it had little to do. In general, there is widespread confusion on 
the extent to which the incubators and Kafalat are part of the governmental structure. The consensus 
seems to be that the great majority of initiatives is in fact private or civil, with some government 
support or cooptation.50  
Fourth, there are support initiatives by international organizations such as the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the 
European Union (EU) and WB.  
Fifth, there are some research and analysis oriented agencies, academic and journalistic – from the 
newly initiated Darwazah Center for Innovation Management and Entrepreneurship at the American 
University of Beirut and the Institute for Family and Entrepreneurial Business at the Lebanese 
American University to the Al-Iktissad Wal-Aamal and Executive magazines.  
Sixth, there is a wide range of private sector and civil society projects, programmes and organizations 
helping entrepreneurs in many different ways – here, one can think of Injaz that provides 
entrepreneurship education; Endeavour that seeks to support more mature entrepreneurs; and a wide 
range of microfinance institutions.  
Experts praise the emergent ecosystem for its organic growth and see it as a relatively native dynamic 
driven by “this smart, small group from universities, the central bank and the private sector – Lebanon 
is small, people know each other – that got together and got increasingly interconnected and mapped 
the needs for this emerging ecosystem.”51 The purposeful addressing of a lack of communication, 
exchange and specialization among the main players in the private sector by this core group of actors 
under the auspices of some widely appreciated experts at the UNDP project within the Council of 
Ministers might have been a determining stage in the budding entrepreneurship support system.  
Investors didn’t talk to entrepreneurs, big and small companies didn’t communicate. I invited them to the 
Council of Ministers where they were forced to sit at the same table and talk to each other.  This initial 
meeting resulted in a rather vibrant mailing list that grew from 15 to 150-200 participants and still 
functions as a main communication channel for sharing events and networking. These players even meet 
on their own accord now.52  
This entrepreneurship development in Lebanon is part of a wider international and regional focus of 
“educators and CEOs, Western aid agencies and multinationals, royals and even Islamists, who are 
now trying to inject the entrepreneurial virus into the region's youth” as a way to generate jobs (Theil 
                                                            
46 Author’s interviews with BIAT representative; and UN expert. 
47 Author’s interview with UN expert. 
48 Author’s interview with UN expert. 
49 Author’s interviews with policy expert; and IDAL representative. 
50 Author’s interview with policy expert. 
51 Author’s interview with UN expert. 
52 Author’s interview with advisor to the Council of Ministers. 
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2007:1-2; WB 2012b:v). One of the main instigators for this endeavor is demographic.53 According to 
Theil (2007:2), 70 per cent of the population in the Arab world is under 25 years old and employing 
them will take the creation of 80 million new jobs by 2020, which means “achieving twice the job-
creation rate the United States managed during the go-go 1990s.” Interviewees disagreed on the 
extent to which the entrepreneurship buzz is externally (meaning donor) or internally driven. Some 
refer to a tradition of “copying the West, being tuned into the West” that allowed Lebanon to pick up 
the Western entrepreneurship focus relatively fast.54  
In Lebanon, at least two other dynamics beyond the demographics and international entrepreneurship 
obsession were mentioned by experts as having instigated the entrepreneurship buzz: the end of the 
Syrian occupation in 2005 and the economic crisis. The withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and 
the (partial) dismantling of Syrian infiltration in Lebanese public institutions is generally seen as having 
been a huge impetus for entrepreneurship, with less corruption and predation and hence more gains 
from creating and running businesses.55 The association of entrepreneurship with jobs, growth and 
self-sufficiency also resonates well with people in times of economic crisis.56 The lack of traditional 
high-return investment opportunities in the West, such as real estate, is also seen to have opened the 
eyes of the diaspora to the potential of investing in Lebanese start-ups.57 More practically, the 
economic crisis multiplied unemployment and forced many employed people to either start a business 
on the side or give up their job (or being fired from their job) to create a new business; the crisis has 
produced legions of necessity entrepreneurs all over the world (IMF 2012:18).58 The crisis also 
reinforced the growing concern in Lebanon about the brain drain effect of their graduates migrating en 
masse to the better paying Gulf region and kindled initiatives to keep them in Lebanon.59 One expert 
also mentioned a generational conflict related to globalization dynamics that undermines the family 
business ‘trap’ and thereby contributes to the entrepreneurship momentum. He noted that because the 
younger generation often is not interested in taking over the family business, not only the younger 
professionals are more inclined to start-up their own new business, but the family business also has to 
be sold. This has resulted in a modest mentality shift with more willingness to sell and exit and more 
emphasis on value creation and venture capital, which in turn can be pillars of entrepreneurship (Naqvi 
2011:12).60 The rise of technology was also repeatedly mentioned as having perhaps not originated 
but at least enabled the surge in interest in entrepreneurship, creating more space for low-investment 
individual initiatives.61 
        
Pictures taken by the author at Berytech and BIAT (middle) offices 
                                                            
53 Author’s interview with venture capitalist expert. 
54 Author’s interview with AUB economist. 
55 Author’s interviews with diplomat; and AUB economist. 
56 Author’s interview with start-up consultant. 
57 Author’s interview with IDAL representative. 
58 Author’s interview with polling expert. 
59 Author’s interviews with Berytech representative; and expert on Lebanese industrialism. 
60 Author’s interview with venture capitalist expert. 
61 Author’s interviews with diplomat; and Berytech representative. 
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3.4.3.a. Limitations of the entrepreneurship support system 
Despite the promise of these developments, Abdo and Kerbage (2012:72) note some features of the 
current Lebanese entrepreneurship support structure that provide a less euphoric picture (they discuss 
women’s entrepreneurship, but in light of the interviews taken for this study, their remarks seem to be 
relevant to the wider entrepreneurship ecosystem as well). They note that the impediments obstructing 
entrepreneurship “are often constructed as constraints on individuals, and only rarely are structural or 
systemic concerns analyzed or addressed” (Abdo and Kerbage 2012:72). This seems to mirror the 
academic literature in assuming a disconnect between internal and external factors hampering 
entrepreneurship. Abdo and Kerbage also note a fundamental lack of vision in many of the 
organizations working on facilitating entrepreneurship and an oversimplified notion on dealing with 
informality:  
There is a belief that linking informal entrepreneurs to formal banks necessarily leads to the formalization 
of their businesses. Yet the assumption that the transition is automatic reveals a lack of understanding of 
the wider causes of informality such as the absence of infrastructure, the low productivity of businesses, 
the lack of incentives to formalize one’s business, and the generally survivalist types of enterprise 
activities (Abdo and Kerbage 2012:71-73).  
More importantly, many initiatives (unconsciously) reinforce existing inequalities, for instance further 
directing women towards traditional low productive sectors deemed ‘feminine’ (Abdo and Kerbage 
2012:76). Despite their perhaps internal origins, entrepreneurship support services in Lebanon, 
moreover, suffer from a high dependence on donor funds and hence donor priorities (Abdo and 
Kerbage 2012:76). This donor dependency, according to some respondents, is not merely 
problematic, but also unnecessary considering that “Lebanon is a high to middle income country and it 
is therefore ridiculous that it should host every single UN division one can think of.”62 There were also 
fundamental doubts about what was called an ‘over focus’ on entrepreneurship by some respondents: 
Yes, for SMEs there are financial facilities undreamt of anywhere else. I don’t know many places where 
you can get a half a million interest free loan as a start-up. There are all sorts of programmes to help 
SMEs; all banks have tailored SME loans. There’re incubators (BIAT, Berytech, Bader) all over the 
country. However, the country doesn’t necessarily need more entrepreneurship. What it needs is to 
develop SMEs from employing ten to employing 200 people. Not every human is an entrepreneur and 
they need not be. 80 per cent just wants to be comfortable employed. They made the same mistake with 
microfinance before: not every poor person is a budding entrepreneur.63  
Finally, some experts suggested, the whole buzz showed that in fact entrepreneurship is not innate in 
Lebanon after all, because if it were, there would be no need for intervention and support.64 A crucial 
deficit of the entrepreneurship support structure in Lebanon that is particularly relevant to the scope of 
this paper, finally, is the fact that the ‘buzz’ is almost completely depoliticized, focusing on grants and 
incubators, but staying away from lobbying for or agendizing the structural governance problems 
undermining entrepreneurship potential.65 
3.4.4. Social entrepreneurship  
Propelled by initiatives like AltCity and Beyond Reform and Development (BDRI), a special feature of 
the Lebanese entrepreneurship ecosystem is the role that the concept of ‘social entrepreneurship’ 
takes within it. Social entrepreneurs can be described as entrepreneurs heading businesses with a 
social purpose mixing not-for-profit and for-profit elements (Doumit and Chaaban 2012:9).xxix While 
social entrepreneurs abound in Lebanon, the leading study on the subject by Doumit and Chaaban 
(2012:9) notes that “the individuals and organizations behind such initiatives are still unfamiliar with the 
term social entrepreneurship and how it applies to their missions and practices.” This is partly because 
                                                            
62 Author’s interview with diplomat. 
63 Author’s interview with microfinance expert. 
64 Author’s interview with policy expert. 
65 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
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there is no legal structure available to start a social enterprise and social entrepreneurs as thus forced 
to register as either an NGO or a private business (with the former being much cheaper - $200,- 
versus $1000-5000 – and easier as a result of tax exemptions and access to donor funds) (Feghali et 
al 2012:8). 
While not unique to Lebanon, social entrepreneurship as a distinct concept or strategy seems to 
reverberate well with the Lebanese context in which relations “between civil society and the private 
sector are very strong in Lebanon, much stronger than relations with the public sector.”66 In a similar 
vein, one academic remarked that:  
There could be a connection between this [social entrepreneurship] and the gap between legal and 
cultural expectations of empowerment in Lebanon and the failure of the political system to deliver this 
empowerment, the legal practice not living up to this. If your voice isn’t heard or your contribution can’t be 
made through politics, people might be more likely to graffiti, flash mobs, art, comedy or other social 
things. This is not the basic human need to live, but it might be secondary human need for making a 
difference.67 
While there appears to be some overlap between the entrepreneurship buzz and the social 
entrepreneurship movement, the latter is oriented more towards civil society. Social entrepreneurship 
is associated more with generating social value that with, for instance, corporate social responsibility 
(Feghali et al 2012:3).68 Nevertheless, Berytech, a business oriented incubator, also has a social 
entrepreneurship programme and many of the motivations of the civil society entrepreneurship support 
initiatives are socio-economic developmental.69 This is in line with work by Audretsch and Thurik 
(2004:1 in Naudé 2007:6) showing that many small business support programmes are in fact 
undertaken for social and political reasons rather than for economic motivations.  
Among the experts interviewed, some regarded social entrepreneurship as regular business with a 
focus on social impact,70 with the “means in which funds are generated and spent” defining what is 
and is not a social enterprise (Feghali et al 2012:3). Some see social entrepreneurship simply as a 
way to make NGOs sustainable and independent in the light of decreasing donor funds.71 Others take 
a more ethic-philosophical approach towards the concept, seeing it as:  
A choice that embodies the values of cohesion, inclusion and integrity, which should govern society’s 
mindset when dealing with issues where human beings are at the core. It is a strategy to find innovative, 
responsive and participatory mechanisms and approaches to solve our problems by taking initiative 
rather than complaining and demanding change. (Doumit and Chaaban 2012:6) 
In this sense, social entrepreneurship is less about business than it is about generating a strategy to 
help overcome challenges in government, civil society and the private sector by developing “an 
alternative for service provision, activism, and commercial work” (Doumit and Chaaban 2012:2).  
 
3.5. Taking stock of Lebanese entrepreneurship 
In terms of the Babson Entrepreneurship Ecosystem Project’s evaluation framework (Isenberg 2010:5) 
the following reflections can be made on the above introduced entrepreneurship ecosystem (history 
and current momentum combined). 
Lebanese public leaders act as strong, public advocates of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship; the 
government seems to be increasingly committed to create effective institutions directly associated with 
entrepreneurship, but fails to remove structural barriers to entrepreneurship; culture at large definitely 
                                                            
66 Author’s interview with AUB business expert. 
67 Author’s interview with AUB economist. 
68 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
69 Author’s interview with Berytech representative. 
70 Author’s interview with start-up consultant. 
71 Author’s interview with AUB business expert. 
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respects entrepreneurship as a worthy occupation; there are multiple visible success stories that 
inspire youth and would-be entrepreneurs; there seem to be enough knowledgeable people with 
experience in creating organizations, hiring, and building structures, systems and controls; there 
increasingly are capital sources that provide equity capital for companies at a pre-sales stage and add 
non-monetary value, such as mentorship and contacts as well as nonprofits and industry associations; 
in Lebanon, there are insufficient, but increasing, educational institutions that teach financial literacy 
and entrepreneurship to high school and college students; the public infrastructure clearly provides 
blatantly insufficient transportation (roads, airports, railways, container shipping) and communication 
(digital, broadband, mobile); there is just one geographic location that has concentrations of high-
potential and high-growth ventures and proximity to universities, standards agencies, think tanks, 
vocational training, suppliers, consulting firms, and professional associations; there are multiple formal 
or informal groups that link entrepreneurs in the country or region and diaspora networks and new 
ventures and local offices of multinationals; there are some venture-oriented professionals; there 
appear to be enough local potential customers who are willing to give advice, particularly on new 
products or services and willing to be flexible with payment terms to accommodate the cash flow 
needs of young, rapidly growing suppliers.  
Thus, the main challenges remaining to the Lebanese entrepreneurial ecosystem are related to 
government and infrastructure, two issues intimately related according to experts and taken up in 
detail in part 3 of the paper.xxx  
 
 
4. Fragile Governance, Hybrid Government and Innovative Entrepreneurship in Lebanon  
 
4.1. Does governance fragility and government hybridity matter for business at all? 
No one will deny the devastating effect of the Civil War on Lebanon’s economy. Moreover, anecdotes 
about the impact of politics on business and of business on politics abound in Lebanon. Illustrating the 
impact of business on politics, the recent lifting of the street blockade organized by Sheikh Ahmad al 
Assir in Sidon to underline his demand from Hezbollah to give up its arms, for instance is widely 
believed to have been brokered by Sidon’s strong business community that had grown increasingly 
impatient with the detrimental effect this blocking of the vital highway between North and South 
Lebanon had on their business. Representatives from Sidon’s municipality, Chamber of Commerce, 
Industry and Agriculture, Merchants Association, Federation of Trade Unions and Employees as well 
as civil society groups called “on the Lebanese authorities to take full responsibility, lift the siege of 
[Sidon] as quickly as possible, and remove all manifestations that are offensive to the city of Sidon, its 
people, and its economic and national roles” (Zaatari 2012). The recent revival of the Hamra 
neighborhood in West Beirut as a major bar district, to take an example of the reverse dynamic – 
politics influencing business – is accompanied by an increased competition between political parties 
(the Syrian Socialist nationalist Party (SSNP) and Amal) demanding protection money and providing 
services (such as water and electricity and even valet parking) through affiliated suppliers (Rahal 
2012). 
Nevertheless, a fundamental question in assessing the effect of governance on entrepreneurship and 
innovation remains whether politics is currently perceived to matter for business. The above anecdotes 
are illustrative and the literature seems to think it does. Klapper et al (2010:143) are confident in 
claiming that case- based evidence suggests that government policy in the areas of taxation and 
enforcement can have a large impact on business registrations and that the data show a strong and 
significant relationship between entry rates and good governance. Briscoe (2009:2-3) infers that “the 
economic conditions which prevail within them [fragile states] are intimately related to their political 
culture, and that poverty and economic informality breed and are bred by poor governance, a porous 
rule of law and institutional weakness.” The majority of interviewed experts agree. However, it seems 
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important to mention that a significant portion of professionals working in or on the Lebanese 
entrepreneurship ecosystem are reluctant to make this linkage. People related to the incubators and 
from private companies implicitly emphasized a ‘just do it’ component as the distinctive characteristic 
of entrepreneurship and seemed to regard reference to politics as an obstacle for entrepreneurs as an 
excuse.72  
The political situation? That’s all excuses; you can’t wait for the situation to become perfect. Yes, there is 
a deadlock, but just go for it. Other people have done it, it can be done. The political things are 
impediments, but not reasons why. It makes life harder, but you still live.73  
There is a recurrent discourse on entrepreneurial resilience stressing the fact that Lebanese work 
around the problems rather than giving up:  
In 2009, 2010, 2011, we were growing, we were doing fine. And we had no government in 2009; there 
were political tensions – but the figures in Kafalat have been growing. So the behavior from 
entrepreneurs is independent from this situation. […] Such situations influence things, but we don’t raise 
our hands [give up]. After 2006 there were many projects in the south influenced by the situation – they 
were bombed and had nothing to repair their business and they asked our help, they wanted more 
money to restore their projects: they didn’t give up. […] This is a mentality thing; there they’re rigid. Here, 
we think you can always find ways – legal or illegal. The will is there, people look forward.74 
They emphasize that the main challenges facing entrepreneurs are the small market and the stratified 
consumption patterns in Lebanon or the lack of vision among would-be entrepreneurs and the difficulty 
to attract and keep ‘the good people’ in a context dominated by lucrative Gulf offers for many talented 
graduates.75 One academic also felt that  
The Lebanese entrepreneurial ecosystem mostly hovers above the direct political tugs of war. Non-
governmental organizations, whether they’re for profit or non-for-profit, are not fundamentally affected by 
political tensions. In fact, the entrepreneurial ecosystem is a-political, blind to religion and to gender; at 
this point in time it is a wonderful place to be in. There is a lot of excitement and cooperation and people 
from ‘different sides of the fence’ connect, this doesn’t matter.76 
There seems to be a consensus among the experts interviewed that it is the internal political system, 
the structural problems with government, more than the often externally initiated eruptions of violence 
and destruction, that most severely undermines entrepreneurship and innovation. In the words of one 
microfinance expert: “We can deal with our problems if we know what our problems are. But things 
change every day and everybody keeps putting new restrictions on things. At least if there are bombs, 
you can avoid the bombs, now you don’t know [what to avoid].”77 It is the structural governance 
problems more than the event-based political problems that concern people.78 Wars can boost some 
forms of entrepreneurship. The fact that Lebanon is ruled by a “kleptocratic corrupt class” unable or 
unwilling to even provide basic necessities of life like electricity, on the other hand, never fails to 
agitate people. “Accidents you can always survive, this structural deficiency is much more problematic 
than the Syrian situation, an explosion, an assassination.”79 
4.1.1. Public-private entanglement 
There are 14 business associations in Lebanon and they have had significant impact on the Lebanese 
business sector. The LTA (2011:106-107) gives several examples ranging from the Beirut Traders 
Association that  initiated important governmental decrees to the Association of Banks in Lebanon that 
has pushed for influential finance sector reforms. Associations such as the Lebanese Business 
                                                            
72 Author’s interviews with venture capitalist expert; IDAL representative; and Berytech representative. 
73 Author’s interview with start-up consultant. 
74 Author’s interview with Kafalat experts. 
75 Author’s interviews with polling expert; and start-up consultant. 
76 Author’s interview with AUB business expert. 
77 Author’s interview with micro credit expert. 
78 Author’s interviews with IDAL representative; and UN expert. 
79 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
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Association (the RDCL) bring together “Lebanon’s more prominent businessmen and opinion makers 
to protect economic liberalism and the interests of Lebanese enterprises” (LTA 2011:106-107). 
Oversight of businesses depends on the sector,xxxi but by and large there is an absence of corporate 
governancexxxii and anti-corruption initiatives are entirely voluntary (LTA 2011:106-108). 
The relations between the public and private sectors – as well as civil society – in Lebanon are 
complex, but close, yet views on politicization of business and corruption differ widely. This seems to 
hinge not so much on disagreement on whether politicization and corruption exist – they do: in 
Transparency International’s 2008 Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), Lebanon scored three out of 
ten (on a scale from zero “highly corrupt” to ten “highly clean”) and ranked 102nd among 180 (LTA 
2011:11) –, but on divergent opinions on their importance for entrepreneurs and business(wo)men. A 
large portion of the sample concurs with Kaplan (2009:7) that in Lebanon, “successful entrepreneurs 
are not those with the best ideas, but those with the best ties to ruling elites.” Spokespersons of a civil 
society watchdog say that “if you know how to bribe well, you can do well” and signal “immense 
conflicts of interest between politics and business.”80 A diplomat described the Lebanese 
entrepreneurship climate as a mix between “19th century American brigand capitalism and Soviet 
steering.”81 Lebanese political analysts confirm that the political class is “embedded in the private 
sector” as “most businessmen are former state officials and most politicians have some businesses.”82 
Leenders (2012:223) evidences how because of their institutional weakness – their failure to meet the 
“essential criteria associated with bureaucratic organization derived from its Weberian ideal type:” a 
clear mandate governed by procedures and regulations with external checks and controls to ensure 
accountability and a separation of public office from private interest – Lebanese public institutions 
have failed to prevent (even facilitates) endemic corruption as manifested in chronic conflicts of 
between private interests of politicians and civil servants and the public institutions they led or worked 
for. This corruption, the porosity of the boundary between the public and private spheres (Leenders 
2012:9), basically concerns the use of public office for private gain and thereby the ‘cheating’ of the 
private sector, a dynamic Leenders illustrates for a wide variety of ministries and institutions. Clearly, 
relations between private sector, public sector and civil society differ per sector and that politicization 
only occurs when there is significant money to be made, such as in the construction sector.xxxiii  
Some respondents stress the connecting quality of business, mentioning that all sectarian groups do 
business with each other and depend on each other to access respective constituent customers.83 
They acknowledge that “the big businesses related to infrastructures and utilities are all indeed 
connected in one way or another to politicians, but if you go one notch beyond that, things are not as 
corrupt as you might think. You can be, for instance, a successful Mercedes Benz dealer because 
you’re a good businessman, regardless of political connections.”84 This is consistent with Mehzer et 
al’s (2008:44) finding that although political affiliations are very common sources of advantage in 
Lebanon, the advantages of such connections ranked only fifth among the manager attributes that 
influence success. Some experts even stress the fact that business(wo)men (from former Prime-
Minister Hariri to current Prime Minister Miqati) are leading politicians in Lebanon point to a merit-
based and technical conception of governance, a ‘businessization’ of politics rather than a 
politicization of business.85 
However, a leading analyst concluded that while the private sector says it wants to stay away from 
politics and therefore refuses to lobby for better governance regulation, this is in fact “preposterous,” 
as they are all “entangled.”86xxxiv Such observations seem more than justified in light of existing 
research into the workings of patronage networks in the public and private sectors in Lebanon – a 
                                                            
80 Author’s interview with corruption experts. 
81 Author’s interview with diplomat. 
82 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
83 Author’s interview with LAU professor. 
84 Author’s interview with AUB business expert. 
85 Author’s interview with entrepreneurship education expert. 
86 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
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dynamic glaringly obvious in many of Lebanon’s post-war reconstruction flurries. Reconstruction 
processes, it is safe to say, have further strengthened the dominant role of the private sector in 
Lebanon, albeit not in a very constructive way as they have resulted in a rise of corruption (Leenders 
2004:174). This is largely due to Lebanon’s public contracting system that is extremely vague. LTA 
(2011:85) euphemistically states that “very limited information exists around contracting and there is 
no information available about the size of the procurement market. Clearly, transparency is an issue. 
In practice, public contracting and procurement is subject to patronage and clientelism, “whereby all 
political leaders take advantage of their position to promote the interests of their own communities.” 
The private real estate company Solidère that was charged in 1991 with rebuilding and developing the 
heart of Beirut constitutes a widely referred to example of the endemic corruption and clientelism 
characterizing ‘development’ in Lebanon – from bribing MPs to accept laws to the creation of 
unconstitutional schemes to appropriate private property (Leenders 2012:58-64). Solidère’s board of 
directors was dominated by allies of then Prime Minister Hariri, just like its private contractors and all 
state institutions whose authorities touched upon the works of Solidère, including the Higher Council 
for Urban Planning, the City Council of Beirut, the Land Registry and the Ministry of Finance. Leenders 
(2004:184) concludes:  
The entire scheme was anchored in Hariri’s tightly knit network of contacts and allies, who acrobatically 
crossed the boundaries between public and private whenever required. As Saree Makdisi concludes, 
Solidère became ‘the ultimate expression of the dissolution of any real distinction between public and 
private interests or, more accurately, the decisive colonization of the former by the latter’.xxxv 
4.1.2. External versus internal obstacles  
There have been several academic studies into the challenges facing entrepreneurs in Lebanon. 
Ahmad and Julian (2012:35) claim that internal factors are critical in deciding the success or failure of 
Lebanese entrepreneurs, with innovation, flexibility, product quality, human resources and venture 
capital being the core limitations. Mehzer et al (2008:34) similarly argue that business failures of 
Lebanese firms are mainly due to internal controllable factors including lack of innovation and 
flexibility, inferior product quality, the lack of experience of owners/managers in the sectors, an 
unfavorable personality, conflict between business partners, the failure to establish a market niche, the 
excessive withdrawal of cash by owners, inventory problems and bad communication skills.  
Leenders (2004:175), in contrast, points out that “when asked about which factors they held 
responsible for their failures and/or successes in business, entrepreneurs very rarely pointed at market 
dynamics in the pure sense.” He refers to a 1995 WB survey among entrepreneurs that revealed that 
market participants were much less troubled by market factors (such as domestic or foreign 
competition or lack of demand), than by a high cost business environment due to erratic government 
policies, corruption, complex procedures, and delays on customs as well as a stifling state 
bureaucracy at both central and municipal levels. A 1999 cross-sector survey of businessmen’s views 
on which Leenders (2004:175) reflects cited similar external factors (corruption, government 
procedures and informal competition) to be the biggest obstacles to doing business. A 2006 Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) survey of more than 450 Lebanese enterprises also found 
corruption to be the main obstacle to investment (LTA 2011:107).  
In any case, as noted above, the separation between such external and internal factors affecting 
entrepreneurs is highly artificial, perhaps especially so in fragile settings – considering that ‘internal’ 
factors are mediated through ‘external’, contextual factors. Company processes are shaped by larger 
cultural and social structures; management skills are related to educational opportunities; product 
quality depends on availability and affordability of resources. This interrelatedness between internal 
and external aspects of entrepreneurship is perhaps most clear with innovation, that is considered by 
Mehzer et al (2008) and others to be an internal quality of entrepreneurship, but that is in turn affected 
critically by external factors. Mehzer et al’s (2008:42) observation that “many of the studies made on 
Lebanon by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), 
UNIDO, WB and other governmental bodies and NGOs have dwelled on the external environmental 
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setbacks that affect an enterprise,” while “very little research, if any, has focused on the management-
related factors in Lebanon” is therefore no less valid, but perhaps slightly less imperative. 
 
4.2. Challenges for Entrepreneurship 
In the literature, the external factors affecting entrepreneurship most commonly cited are – in order of 
salience – economic downturns and the high cost of infrastructure (utilities); poor external markets, 
high taxes and high interest rates (on loans) (Mehzer et al 2008:44). The challenges related to utilities 
and to governance were mentioned by respondents for this paper as key bottlenecks for 
entrepreneurship. These will therefore be discussed below in the context of the theory discussed in 
part one of this paper. 
4.2.1. Utilities and infrastructure  
Access to reliable and cost-effective infrastructure and utility services remains a major constraint on 
economic activity in Lebanon (WB 2012a:viii). Informants considered infrastructural facilities, mainly 
electricity, water, internet and telecommunications the most important restriction for entrepreneurs. 
Utilities are unreliable and expensive, undermining competitiveness of entrepreneurs; demanding 
more extensive investments for start-ups; and causing business failures.87 Scholars have noted that 
“utility costs are extremely high and considered as indirect taxes” (Mehzer et al 2008:44) mitigating the 
low tax burden in Lebanon (the country ranks 30 out of 183 in the Doing Business index on taxation 
(WB 2012a:68)). It is not that the utilities are not available, but that they are unreliable and expensive, 
putting immense strains on household budgetsxxxvi and limiting financial scope to expand and invest.88 
GEM (2007:4) concludes that the lack of proper infrastructure and the resulting high transportation 
costs are a huge obstacle for accessing domestic markets. The government itself (SME-unit 2007:6) 
notes Lebanon’s weak competitiveness, being second to last in the region.xxxvii  
 
        
Pictures taken by the author of electricity wiring in Palestinian camps and gas distribution in Lebanon (middle) 
 
The insufficient state of Lebanon’s infrastructure is often related one-on-one with specific governance 
practices evolving around inefficient public spending, deficient regulatory frameworks and poor 
management (WB 2012b:viii). The experts interviewed for this study go much further and invoke the 
clientelist and oligopolistic nature of the utility and telecom sectors as the core explanation for their 
                                                            
87 Author’s interview with microfinance expert. 
88 Author’s interviews with advisor to the Council of Ministers; and UN-ESCWA expert. 
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bad performance.xxxviii Leenders (2004) meticulously documents and analyzes several examples of 
utility contracts and projects doled out to regime favorites (with, to mention but one of his examples, 
the terms of two GSM contracts granted to private operators in 1994 “widely believed to have been 
molded to serve the interests of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, Defense Minister Muhsin Dallul, and 
Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam after each of them obtained a controlling share in these 
companies” (Leenders 2004:177). A government advisor explained that she found it impossible to 
reform the moribund telecom sector, mostly because there is a lot of power for politicians to run and 
operate the telecom networks. Politicians are able to perform favors and sometimes make business 
deals advancing their political aims. This is an example of how public money is being used indirectly 
as an election fund (see also Leenders 2012:66 on the use of funds of the Central Fund of the 
Displaced of the Ministry of the Displaced for private election campaigns). The Lebanese sectarian 
quota system effectively working as an official mechanism to ‘divide the pie’ of state jobs among 
sectarian communities through a clientelist award system, is often seen as the core problem: 
“politicians put their people in the administration and now even the public companies are divided.”89 
There is a paradox in that the economy is business-driven, while key facilitating infrastructural sectors are 
government owned such as electricity and telecom sectors. The same goes for the banking sector. It is 
heavily regulated, but this regulation de facto means that the barrier to entry is high and there is no 
competition. There is a perceived fear of international bidding, as if contracts are divided on sectarian 
lines – the public thinks that if Turkey gets he contract, it goes to the Sunnis, if Iran gets it, it goes to the 
Shia, if France gets it, the contract goes to the Christians.90  
The electricity crisis that Lebanon faces at the moment is exemplary for the other utility and 
infrastructure sectors. In June, citizens across the country staged daily protests against the increasing 
electricity cuts (Daily Star 2012). Lebanon suffers a severe shortage of electricity, producing 1,500 
megawatts of electricity per day with consumption exceeding 2,400 megawatts per day (Daily Star 
2012). Already in 2008, WB (2008:4) subtly summarized that:  
The Lebanese electricity sector is at the heart of a deep crisis. The sector is unable to supply the reliable 
electricity needed by homes, offices and industry. It is a massive drain on government finances, crowding 
out more valuable expenditures on education, infrastructure, social protection, and health, and putting 
macroeconomic stability at risk. The sector accumulates huge debt with little to show for it, and those 
who are least able to provide for themselves suffer the consequences most. The state of the electricity 
sector symbolizes to the public Lebanon's profound challenges of governance, inclusion and 
accountability. 
Obtaining an electricity connection in Lebanon requires five procedures, takes 75 days and costs 99.9 
per cent of income per capita (WB 2012b:35). However, the real problem is not to establish the 
connection, but to arrange the back-up for this connection that is likely not to work more than a few 
hours per day. Respondents surmised that outside Beirut, electricity runs for just four hours per day, 
with the rest having to be covered through generators that are very expensive and often facilitated by 
mafia-like middlemen.91 This undermines competitiveness. One microfinance expert narrates how the 
electricity failures required his company to buy its own batteries of $4000,- for each office, because the 
generators only work at night.92 
The Lebanese Parliament approved a $1.2-billion electricity bill for the construction of 700-megawatt 
power plants in 2011 and the Cabinet agreed to rent power-generating ships for a maximum of three 
years in order to produce 270 megawatts simultaneously with the construction of 1,500-megawatt 
power plants (Daily Star 2012). Nevertheless, for many observers, the failure of the government to 
                                                            
89 Author’s interview with corruption experts. 
90 Author’s interview with advisor to the Council of Ministers. 
91 Author’s interview with micro credit expert. There are many illegal generator companies. The government used 
to shut these down, but this has stopped, which is thought to be a result of the government having bought into 
them. (author’s interview with AUB economist) 
92 Author’s interview with microfinance expert. 
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address the electricity crisis is a hallmark of its overall malfunctioning during a ‘long, hot summer of 
incompetence’: 
“Last week, as temperatures hit 40 degrees, the capital was brought to its knees with repeated power 
cuts and surges. The airport, arguably Lebanon’s shop window, was without air conditioning for three 
days, while homes and businesses outside the capital had to do with as little as four hours of power a 
day. In many ways, it is probably better that many tourists stayed away. A vacation this summer would 
likely put them off coming here for good. […] There can be no more costly, ad hoc, stop-gap solutions 
that simply kick the proverbial can further down Lebanon’s potholed roads. There should be a national 
strategy to end 20 years of shame by governments of every color.” (NOWLebanon 2012) 
WB (2008:4) estimates that electricity subsidies made up 39 per cent of total government spending 
between 1997 and 2006. Yet the overwhelming perception seems to be that while the government, as 
a state institution, might be losing money on the electricity file, politicians, as private economic actors, 
are carefully scooping up the same money through their affiliated companies and contacts.93xxxix The 
politicization of the electricity sector has it roots in the Syrian occupation, Leenders (2012:183) argues, 
during which time the doling out of electricity and oil contracts to Syrian allies was institutionalized.  
Thus, although privatization has been proposed, the state has little resources left to invest, and 
political interests have so far prevented privatization.94 It has also been feared that privatization would 
be no remedy for politicization, because “even if it would be privatized, the monopolies would remain 
as it would just be taken over by the same ‘entrepreneurs’ that would see it as a chance to make 
money rather than to innovate.”95 The electricity issue is seen, some experts fear, as a bargaining chip 
in other political struggles in the current extremely polarized arena: “there is political blockage; it’s all 
political and personal; trying to share the cake and get your favorites nominated. ‘If I don’t get my 
judge, I won’t accept your electricity law.’”96 Current tensions and strikes within EdL national electricity 
company – that has not been audited since 2003 and faces a US$1.5 billion deficit (LCPS 2011:7) – 
stem for a large part from the tendency of Speaker of Parliament to dole out EdL jobs among his 
party’s followers to the extent that it is seen to breach the quota guidelines in the eyes of other political 
groups.97 The electricity file, then, clearly shows the functioning of the dual game logic, with services 
being provided through formal government channels but by means of an informal, clientelist logic. 
4.2.2. The dual game: institutional clientelism 
According to WB (2012:xi) Lebanon’s political economy is characterized by the existence of powerful 
interest groups in key economic sectors (most notably banking and real estate).xl This mix leads to the 
capture of the decision-making process in the areas of economic and social policies:  
“On the one hand, and because of the sectarian polarization of the system, bargaining, cliental behavior, 
and political rent shape the functioning of institutions. On the other hand, internal political divergences 
and the influence of vested interests have a strong impact on the legal process regulating social and 
economic life. And, finally, the electoral system is playing a major role in perpetuating political, social, and 
economic dominance.” (WB 2012b:xi) 
The tension between political leaders’ traditional distribution of public goods among sectarian 
constituents and their adherence to national accountability to citizens through elections is entangled in 
Lebanon’s political system that combines programme-based elections and parliamentary democracy 
with a sectarian quota system reinforcing, in fact legalizing, clientelism. The two constituent parts of 
the dual game, then, are rather ingeniously combined into one master game of acquiring votes to 
secure state resources and distributing state resources to acquire votes – all along sectarian rather 
than programmatic lines. Political hybridity does not only undermine business directly, through 
corruption, but also indirectly, through high utility prices resulting from oligopolies and job-distribution 
                                                            
93 Author’s interview with real estate expert.  
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part of the sectarian quota demands and clientelist reward systems (Leenders 2012:231).98 Lebanon’s 
state apparatus is characterized by many institutional weaknesses, partly stemming from the fact the 
administrative boundaries and mandates have been vague as a result of their dependence on the 
informal 1943 National Pact (LTA 2011:11). 
One effect of the clientelist and rent-seeking system for entrepreneurship is the restricted access to 
markets because of the strong political gatekeepers installed by oligopolistic business(wo)men.99 WB 
(2012:43) recognizes this by urging the government to “address key barriers to entry and competition 
and to level the playing field for all investors” as this “will be essential to convince more entrepreneurs 
to take the risk to enter markets, innovate and create jobs.” The sectarian logic driving the dual game 
also results in segregated and politicized rather than merit-based employment – even if business 
might span across sectarian divides – with one diplomat noting that “for instance, no matter how good 
you are as an economist, if you’re not a Sunni, you’ll never work at the HSBC bank.”100 A zero-sum 
mentality instigated by thinking along quota lines – every additional position for a Shia mirrors a lost 
function for a Sunni – undermines much of the efficiency of public institutions. A civil servant recalls 
how the Nahr el-Bared crisis generated a momentum to improve the economic situation in North 
Lebanon and develop a special economic zone in Tripoli:  
All laws and decrees were passed, which was a spectacular achievement as parliament was totally 
blocked, deadlocked. But then we needed to nominate an authority (a management commission of some 
eight people) and we didn’t manage to do so in three years. It proved impossible to nominate: ‘not your 
brother, we won’t take his cousin’. […] Everything is about personal and communitarian shares and 
division. […] We cannot get the right people in the right places. […] It’s never about the project, it’s 
always about the person.101 
A government advisor agrees that “the country is run by managers with no more than one year 
expertise in the sectors they’re running; […] there is no interaction between technical experts and 
politicians,”102 echoing the academic who poetically noted that “the churn of politics only haphazardly 
puts people with technical skills in power.”103 
Apart from ruining competitiveness through generating expensive utilities and infrastructures, sectarian 
clientelism might also affect on entrepreneurs’ motivations. With a state structure that seems to have 
the distribution of public jobs as a primary function and that makes access to jobs dependent on 
political (i.e. sectarian) affiliation, the system could create incentives to rely on such channels of 
employment rather than, for instance, starting a business.104 This logic seems to be confirmed by a 
political scientist remarking that while Lebanon has a relatively mercantile and entrepreneurial culture, 
“outside of Beirut people’s biggest ambition is to work for the state [mostly in the army] to get a stable 
income. This might be less than in other Arab countries, but it is still a strong tendency.”105  
Faith in the potential of elections to generate real change in terms of, for instance, utilities seems the 
exception rather than the rule.106 Generally, experts agree that as long as people depend on their 
sectarian leaders for security and jobs, elections cannot do more than reconfirm time and again the 
sectarian balance, or deadlock.107 Elections are expected to generate a lot of change in the informal 
clientelist advantage or disadvantage that you might face as an entrepreneur (Lund 2011:60). For a 
project manager in an international humanitarian organization “with elections everything changes. […] 
If Hezbollah, for instance, gets a minister, he will gather all his people around him and if the minister 
                                                            
98 Author’s interview with AUB economist. 
99 Author’s interview with UN expert. 
100 Author’s interview with diplomat. 
101 Author’s interview with advisor to the Ministry of Economy. 
102 Author’s interview with advisor to the Council of Ministers. 
103 Author’s interview with AUB economist. 
104 Author’s interview with LAU economist. 
105 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
106 Author’s interview with expert on Lebanese industrialism. 
107 Author’s interview with diplomat. 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  34
changes, all people change and the new ones have a different point of view and a different opinion.”108 
Academics agree that “in general, this is the tendency. New government want to change for the sake 
of changing and their predecessors want to block for the sake of blocking. Depending on who wins this 
could lead to either extreme fluctuation or extreme deadlock.”109 At the same time, paradoxically, 
elections are considered to inevitably reinforce the governance deficits challenging entrepreneurs 
(most notably the infrastructural issue).  
Formal regulation for business and entrepreneurship is as disputed when it comes to Lebanese 
practice as when it comes to theory. While some respondents blast existing regulation as a framework 
to facilitate corruption rather than to protect entrepreneurs (Lebanon ranks 97 out of 183 in protecting 
investors in the Doing Business Index, so this does not seem too farfetched (WB 2012a:58), the 
majority does recognize the need for regulation of the market and the players in it. Dr. Nasser Saidi 
(2004:6), former Minister of Economy and Trade, Minister of Industry and first Vice Governor of 
Banque du Liban, seems to speak for many when he asks for the “building institutions – laws, 
organizations, rules-of-the-game, and a framework for economic activity – that will allow us to have 
political and economic governance at a par with international codes and standards, allowing us to 
compete in regional and world markets.” In line with the literature, however, the relevant question in 
this fragile setting is not so much whether regulation was there, but whether it is enforced. Leenders 
(2012:224) leaves little doubt:  
In virtually all Lebanese institutions, ambiguous mandates and ill-defined procedures 
effectively paralyzed attempts by the state’s watchdog agencies to carry out external checks 
and controls. Moreover, where mandates and procedural rules remained unclear, so did the 
criteria by which the state’s audit and inspection bodies could assess officials’ decisions. In 
addition, the state watchdog agencies failed to implement checks and controls, for they 
lacked the capacity to do so or were perceived as obstructing the speedy implementation of 
reconstruction. Finally, discretionary powers and lack of accountability fueled unbridled 
conflicts of interest.  
The Doing Business indicators do not bode well either. They suggest that enforcing a contract requires 
37 procedures, takes 721 days and costs 30.8 per cent of the value of the claim, which means that, 
globally, Lebanon stands at 120 in the ranking of 183 economies on the ease of enforcing contracts 
(WB 2012a:84-85). Lebanon ranks below other MENA countries and many upper middle income 
countries in terms of public accountability, quality of administration and overall quality of governance 
(Saidi 2004:2). 
 
      
Pictures taken by the author of random signs in Beirut perhaps symbolizing clientelism 
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This lack of enforcement seems at least partly related to the clientelism governing Lebanese politics 
that is reflected in the observation that Lebanese entrepreneurship is “personal rather than 
institutional” in the majority of cases, which means one must deal “with the boss rather than the 
system” (Ahmed and Julian 2012:26, 31). This need not necessarily be detrimental, as emerging 
business ethics codes (such as the one by the Rassemblement de Dirigeants et Chefs d’Enterprises 
Libanais (RDCL) initiated in 2004 or the 2009 Code of Ethics & Whistle Blower Procedure by the 
Lebanon Anti-Bribery Network) might indeed guide ‘the boss’ (Saidi 2004:1) and “personal networks 
can act as substitutes for missing institutions in fragile states by making reputational incentives 
stronger where court enforcement is weak” (Estrin et al 2006:716 in Naudé 2007:18). The experts 
interviewed for this paper, however, were rather unanimous in regarding this dependence on informal 
arrangements as problematic – a sentiment in line with most of the academic literature (Leenders 
2012) 
This reinforces the analysis made by Leenders (2004:176) that while Lebanon may be a laissez-faire 
economy with minimal state interference, “this by no means implied that the forces of demand and 
supply were given free reign.” Rather, social networks substituted for bureaucratic organization and 
have mediated economic activity in Lebanon decisively, continually reinforcing the importance of 
wasta (personal connections) for reaching entrepreneurial goals (Leenders 2004:182, 189, 177). 
4.2.3. Failing government support 
Enough is surely enough. Lebanon’s economy is kept alive by banking, remittances and real estate 
development, but these are hardly the ingredients for a considered, balanced and organic road map for 
growth and prosperity. There are limited job opportunities, prices are rising, and our youth is disillusioned, 
a dangerous thing in such volatile times. Once again we call on the government to invest in 
infrastructure—leading to eventual privatization—and encourage banks to lend to small businesses. Let 
the private sector do the rest. This government, one that is drawn from a political class that is defined 
more by mediocrity and corruption than anything else, has set new standards in incompetence. The best 
we can hope for is that the security situation is contained and we can limp along until parliamentary 
elections are held in 2013. In the meantime, we shouldn’t hold our breath. (NOWLebanon 2012) 
There seems to be broad agreement, even among civil servants and government advisors, that the 
Lebanese government by and large fails to provide sufficient support to entrepreneurs. As a result, 
there is much resentment among entrepreneurs towards the Lebanese State. Small entrepreneurs, 
according to a manager of post-war SME support programme, “hate the government” and she 
recounts how their beneficiaries distrusted the ministry and anything governmental. This is also 
related, she continued, to the historically negligent role of the state that makes it hard for government 
officials to implement regulations: “can the government close down a company that’s not complying if 
that hurts 100 families? Where was the government when they started and struggled?”110 Chakour 
(2001 in Ahmed and Julian 2012:31) highlights that the Lebanese perceive those people working for 
government agencies in Lebanon as incompetent and ineffective in supporting new firms. 
Failing government support is habitually attributed to a lack of vision and subsequent policy.111xli “The 
government doesn't have a vision; they're just day-to-day crisis managers; they have become fire 
fighters.”112 An entrepreneurship education consultant adds that public decision-making culture in 
Lebanon is not entrepreneurial, that entrepreneurship “is seen as an individual thing, it is not 
approached structurally.”113 In fact, government regulations tend to be seen more as a restraint on 
entrepreneurship.114 Experts – including those from a business background – agree, however, that the 
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government can and should have a constructive role towards entrepreneurs: “it can’t really happen 
without them [the government]; it will happen in unique cases, but against the odds only.”115 
Much of the government failure seems related to the absence of a government body for planning.116 
Yet, while there are capacity problems due to the immense national debt and government deficit,117 
the consensus is that the absence of government support has more to do with political will than with 
capacity or resources. The economy, it is widely echoed, is not a priority for Lebanese state officials 
busy with sectarian politics: the Lebanese government “doesn’t govern, it does politics.”118 In a flaming 
NOWLebanon onion piece aptly titled ‘Can We Talk About the Economy, for Once?’ Ghoussoub 
(2012) claims that  
The fact is the economy has never been given the priority and avidity it deserves and it’s for this reason 
that we continually fail to manage even the most straightforward challenges. Even during relatively easier 
times, the majority of our “policymakers” are busy with what is most distant from the concerns of the daily 
lives of citizens whose fierce indignation is accumulating with unclear consequences. Politicians still fail 
to see that the economic situation and overall quality of life have been major reasons behind recent 
upheavals in the region (remember Mohamed Bouazizi?). Further, they seem incredulous of the idea that 
building a strong and resilient economy and improving the overall standard of living might contribute to 
the country’s security. 
While this absence of proper policy and commitment on behalf of Lebanese government officials is 
usually seen in terms of disinterest or self-interest, one academic argues that this might be too 
simplistic and that there is an element of ideology to this distant government. He contextualizes the 
current weakness by pointing out a historical ‘die-hard capitalist belief’ among Lebanese elites that 
entrepreneurship is something to be ‘baptized through fire,’ rather than to be pampered. “There is this 
sense of a free market; of economic growth depending on individual initiative; a ‘leave it alone, leave it 
to the entrepreneur’ mentality.” Ironically enough, he said, it might be exactly “this ideology of 
individual initiative that is harming entrepreneurship.”119  
While there is no disagreement about the abysmal state of government support to the private sector 
and to entrepreneurs, within the Lebanese entrepreneurship ecosystem a debate is currently going on 
about the direction government support is going. Some experts claim modest improvements. Indeed, 
one of the four pillars of the Lebanese government’s Economic Vision for Enterprise Development 
(2007:2) is “enhancing international competitiveness through entrepreneurship and innovation.” The 
government substantiates its ambitions by elaborating it will establish and financially support pro-
active business support programmes to encourage new business start-ups; provide financial 
incentives to encourage commercialization of R&D at university level and encourage spin-out 
businesses; and create an export assistance programme with a target of generating 500 new 
exporting companies by 2013. Any modest enthusiasm amongst the experts interviewed, however, 
seems to be about the creation of certain government (supported) bodies to boost entrepreneurship, 
but is accompanied by equal levels of disappointment with its actual functioning.  
In 2002, the Lebanese government developed an economic reform programme (including large scale 
privatization) that was supported by international donors at the Paris II conference. Due to internal 
disagreements in the government between the March 8 and March 14 coalitions, however, this 
programme was never implemented (LTA 2011:106). IDAL, to give another example, was set up as a 
one-stop shop for permits and licenses to foreign and Lebanese investors to speed up and simplify 
administrative procedures (Ahmed and Julian 2012:31). For one policy expert, however, this says 
nothing so much as that “the bureaucracy is horrible. They have created this express way, but thereby 
admit failure. They indicate ‘we can’t fix the road, so we’ll make a new road; we can’t get rid of the 
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normal 100 stops, so we make an exceptional one-stop-shop.”120 Such cynicism probably stems from 
the questionable reputation of IDAL in the Hariri days during which it “clearly favored business allies of 
the Prime Minister” (Leenders 2004:183). Kafalat is widely considered the success story of the 
entrepreneurship ecosystem, but the extent to which it is associated with government differs. Some 
people do credit the government for Kafalat’s achievements,121 but representatives from Kafalat 
themselves did not consider their organization as having anything to do with the government. The 
UNDP project at the Council of Ministers is working on improving the Doing Business indicators for 
Lebanon and is seen by a WB expert as a positive example of the right direction in which the 
government is moving. Other respondents tend to agree with this.122 A representative from the 
Lebanese Business Women Association (LBWA) has mixed experiences with government support. On 
the one hand, she praises the monthly meetings with the Minister of Economy and Trade, but on the 
other hand she concludes he is not able to help – something she accepts rather than criticizes. The 
government itself boasts its involvement in a wide range of initiatives supposed to enhance 
entrepreneurship, ranging from modernizing key legislations to addressing the market failure for seed 
funding and exit funding and improve education (Yamout 2012). Some academics and consultants 
also note that some promising projects are created under de auspices of ministries.123   
Institutional potency and government support for the private sector at large and for entrepreneurship in 
particular are closely related as the commitment of a government to work towards a developmental 
state depends on its capacity and vice versa. In Lebanon, in short, such government vision and 
support is perceived as extremely poor. Saidi (2004:5) sums up how “corruption hinders development: 
reduced domestic investment; reduced foreign direct investment; overblown government expenditure; 
distorted composition of government expenditure away from education, health, and the maintenance 
of infrastructure towards less efficient public projects that have more scope for manipulation and bribe-
taking opportunities and subsequently proposes to reduce the size of government to reduce scope for 
bribery and corruption. This may be a mistaken and populist assumption that there is no corruption 
outside the public sector, but the Lebanese government – like governments in any fragile governance 
setting – faces weak trust in government and fear of its interference (LTA 2011:27). 
Existing policies and regulations are cumbersome and ineffective – GEM (2007:4) accounts how 
extensive governmental procedures are a primary reason for women not to register their companies – 
and supportive entrepreneurship policies are non-existent: Mehzer et al (2008:41) lament that “the 
business environment proved to be not so suitable for investments, since there were no initiatives on 
the part of government organizations to provide guidance for those entrepreneurs.” A legislative 
framework for social entrepreneurship is also absent and the role of municipalities is marginalized 
“though they can play a key role in leveraging social enterprises” (Doumit and Chaaban 2012:16). 
Reflecting on Naudé’s (2007:13) components of post-conflict government support for 
entrepreneurship, the potential problems of centralized decision-making (i.e. a limited reach, lack of 
local knowledge, no accommodation of spatial differences) are evident with regard to official policy, but 
might be compensated with informal local support. It seems that the neglect of small businesses is 
evident in the oligopolistic nature of the Lebanese market and the concentration of the market share in 
the hands of a few – often politically affiliated – companies, despite the lip service paid in policy 
discourse to the importance of SMEs. In the end, the issue of government support seems to be 
surrounded by a circular ambiguity: the problematic nature of the policies that do exist prompt people 
to be extremely wary of the positive potential of the policies that could exist. 
4.2.4. Instability, uncertainty and insecurity 
Bad infrastructures, clientelist governance and failing government support are all reinforced – some 
would say caused – by Lebanon’s history of conflict and the anxiety, tension and uncertainty these 
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have infused in Lebanese daily life. Experts agree that “with stability, entrepreneurship would multiply 
by a factor of ten,”124 with stability referring to both governance dynamics – no more war – and 
government system – less fluctuation in ruling party so as to stabilize the regime. Confirming findings 
for Afghanistan by Cusack and Malmstrom (2011:7), it is important to stress that it is the uncertainty, 
instability and unpredictability stemming from physical insecurity, rather than the physical insecurity 
itself that is perceived as detrimental for entrepreneurs.  
All elements noted by Naudé (2007:11) as risks of a legacy of war are extremely pertinent in Lebanon. 
A continuous tension and wide felt chance of relapsing into violence impede investment and initiative; 
unfair allocation of budgetary resources across sectarian groups is considered a major determinant for 
socio-economic inequalities and divergent business successes among societal groups; rent-seeking 
sectors such as real estate are disproportionally big; the political system is caught in a  deadlock 
broadly perceived to be the result of regulatory capture of public offices by (partially) war-time 
entrepreneurs and entrenched by the post-war peace agreement stipulating sectarian quota systems; 
income inequalities are regarded problematic in light of limited social security; and there is an 
astronomical government debt (some US$55 billion; 150.7 per cent of GDP in 2010, the fourth highest 
in the world), that, while not directly caused by military spending, is linked to the war through the costs 
of physical reconstruction (LTA 2011:11; CIA World Factbook).  
During the interviews, there were many references to instability to explain problems with or failures of 
entrepreneurship in Lebanon – there was a widespread feeling that another regional war about to hit 
Lebanon hard was inevitable. The insecurity and uncertainty this situation generates is detrimental for 
entrepreneurs in that it discourages planning, investment and morale.125 A remarkable paradox 
permeated the accounts of the experts interviewed. On the one hand, they complained about the 
volatility of the governance dynamics (regional wars, national fighting) and on the other hand, they 
brought up the deadlock of the government system (no real change despite continuous replacement of 
civil servants and rewriting of policies). As noted before, the latter is considered more harmful and 
more complicated to accommodate for entrepreneurs than the former, because it is more entrenched 
and, as discussed in the previous section, has more structural effects (in terms of utility infrastructure 
and other facilities). “The problem is definitely deadlock; nothing changes; everybody, all parties, put 
sticks between the wheels of the others and the population suffers.”126 Nevertheless the impact of 
potential violence and destruction is an important consideration for entrepreneurs as well.xlii  
4.2.4.a. Causes of instability 
Three underlying issues – whether causes or manifestations of the instability remained debated – 
were mentioned to explain this instability. First, the legacy of war - the fact that business mentality and 
structure are still geared towards short-term, quick-gain and highly mobile deals and sectors – and the 
threat of recurrent conflict (be it through Syrian spillover, Israeli aggression or internal sectarian strife) 
that was widely felt and further reinforces short-term thinking. Some experts believe that the war has 
had a negative effect on entrepreneurship, mentioning that it “taught people to become lazy, to look for 
easy money […] which is per definition incompatible with entrepreneurship.” During the war, people 
have made either dirty money – through corruption and extortion – or easy money – getting paid for 
doing nothing; these people could be a potential entrepreneur but have no incentive to take the 
opportunity.127 A diplomat adds that the people that made their fortune in the arms trade, extortion and 
illegal dumping of waste are still in power; the current Prime Minister has made a fortune under the 
Syrian occupation.128 Second, one academic noted, vividly remembering the Syrian era, Lebanese 
business(wo)men and entrepreneurs might fear a stable and predatory government more than an 
instable, weak government; “in Lebanon, the fear of instability isn’t nearly as high as the fear of the 
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consequences of being successful under a regime that is capable of expropriating your wealth. […] 
People can more easily deal with disruption than with theft.”129 Third, a real estate expert added, 
Lebanon has no Minister of Planning, which, for him, is at the root of the lack of vision of the 
government for entrepreneurship and development and the failure to provide utility services. One 
journalist cynically summarized the feelings of many when he noted that “Lebanon is the best 
governed country, but it is governed for the wrong purposes.” He continued that politicians benefit from 
instability and uncertainty which allows them “to milk the system and channel the money to 
themselves.”130  
4.2.4.b. Consequences of instability 
A leading Lebanese policy specialist is of the opinion that the Lebanese economy is not a real market 
economy, but rather a ‘laissez-faire’ economy built around oligopolies rather than competition.131 
Uncertainty and lack of clarity are not simply byproducts of Lebanon’s complex political arrangements, 
but inherent to it. Leenders (2012) shows it is this institutional opaqueness that allows the corruption 
enriching Lebanon’s ruling elite. Informants too were convinced that sectarian elites’ interests are 
served exactly by the lack of an open competitive context.132 The effects of this instability of 
entrepreneurship, according to the respondents, are manifold and diffuse. As noted before, there are 
experts who question whether instability has significant negative effects on entrepreneurship, referring 
to examples of entrepreneurs adapting to war, rather than succumbing to it. Some finance experts 
pointed out that “political stability is relative: what might be stability for one person can be instability for 
the other.”133 In any case, instability’s effects are complex and sometimes contradictory. The current 
war in Syria, for instance, has a direct and negative effect on business134 – reducing exports and 
tourists and increasing smuggling.  However, in line with the often ambiguous relationship between 
conflict and businesses, the current war in Syria may also have some potential positive effects on 
Lebanese business, for instance by providing opportunities for entrepreneurs from North Lebanon to 
assist in the reconstruction of  Syria once the civil war is ended.135  
Most experts, however, consider the absence of stability the one and only missing ingredient for 
Lebanon to become a thriving entrepreneurial business center: “Lebanon has good services, good 
education, good tourism and good health […]. All we need is stability. If Lebanon is stable, all Arabs 
come here, because the life is good here, we have everything.”136 Nearly all respondents agree with 
Mehzer et al (2008:40) that pessimistic perceptions of future prospects matter and that because of 
Lebanon’s hazy future, many experts consider Lebanon a good place for quick deals, but not for long-
term commitments. The LCPS has critically engaged with the leading resilience discourse and 
explored the impact of the political situation on the economy between 2005 and 2008. Their report 
concluded that there was no initial impact on a sector by sector basis, but that – in comparison with a 
constructed control case – the political situation resulted in five per cent less growth in GDP. They 
dubbed this the ‘opportunity deficit.’ A representative added: “we’re not resilient to conflict, we just hold 
back on investment and added value; we didn’t lose, because we made sure to not invest in 
something you can lose. It is thus misleading to go with this resilience story all the time.”137 Tourism is 
one sector disproportionally affected by instability and insecurity as the current ‘lost summer’ 
illustrates. Due to travel warnings from Western states and since recently also Gulf states and the 
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nonappearance of the tourist regularly entering Lebanon via Syria the tourism sector missed out on 
considerable amounts of income with potentially devastating results for many tourist oriented SMEs.138 
A short-term mentality might not undermine entrepreneurship as such, although it is widely agreed that 
it favors less sustainable (and less job-providing and growth-inducing) entrepreneurship – in terms of 
the theoretical model, it guides entrepreneurs’ aspirations towards opportunity entrepreneurship. 
Experts emphasize that much of this dynamic is implicit, that it is an internalized mentality, rather than 
a measurable behavior.139 A core concern stemming from the instability is the regional and 
international competitiveness: “If we deal with a US customer and the roads to the airport are blocked, 
why would he want to deal with us; they want consistent services and secure products and they will go 
other places.”140 Another effect of instability recurrent in all interviews was the discouraging influence 
on investment, specifically, but not only, foreign direct investment.141 While there is a widespread 
belief that crises make people creative and entrepreneurial, there were also remarks that the instability 
made people – especially women – more inclined to seek the stability of employment.142 Mostly, 
experts felt that instability did not so much affect the number of start-ups, but would drastically affect 
the sustainability of these new enterprise; they note there is a high turn-over of business and a lot of 
business failures and bankruptcies.143  
If you look in any street in Beirut, you’ll see so many places for rent; there is a very high turn-over. People 
borrow money, open a bar, something bad happens (people close the airport road and burn tires), they 
lose money and have to close again. You can’t predict, you can’t plan, you can’t have a real business 
plan. And then if you can’t pay, you go bankrupt. Take Rue Monot for instance, the club street of Beirut: it 
was killed by a 2008/2009 sit-in.144 
 
     
Pictures taken by the author in Beirut, signifying political-economic polarization in Lebanon 
 
Another effect of the instability threatening Lebanon’s entrepreneurs is the migration of many talented 
graduates and young professionals (and even established business(wo)men) limiting the availability of 
good quality employees.145 A final issue often linked by experts to the instability factor is the 
concentration of business and entrepreneurs in Beirut. While there are increasing initiatives to develop 
the rural areas of Lebanon as well as incubators to support entrepreneurs in other parts of Lebanon, 
these developments are seen as long overdue and Beirut and its immediate surroundings remain the 
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dominant center of all economic activity (Doumit and Chaaban 2012:23). Some experts note that 
“differences in entrepreneurial scale and form are determined more by educational and cultural 
background then by region.”146 Some find that “spatial diversity is not a big issue: all regions have their 
potential and strengths.”147 But the vast majority feels that this potential is not developed and the 
centralization of business in Beirut is a fact of life even if slowly but surely more attention is being paid 
to the north and the south.148 
4.2.5. Market scope and capital requirements  
Other characteristics of the Lebanese economy that are potentially unfavorable for entrepreneurship 
include the absence of sophisticated venture capital and stock exchange; the enduring difficulty to 
access funds; and the dominance of family business. These factors are related to the above described 
hybridity but, according to the experts interviewed for this research, in a less direct way.  
Experts stress the oligopolistic nature of the Lebanese economy that creates high access barriers for 
entrepreneurs and obstructs open and equitable competition and thereby complicates the creation 
added value.149 On top of that, the extensive level of regional trade integration is seen as a mixed 
blessing: while Lebanese business benefits from its regional focus, Lebanon’s industry feels severely 
dented by such integration and cannot compete with production in other MENA countries. In Lebanon, 
exporting a standard container of goods on average requires five documents, takes 22 days and costs 
$1050; importing the same container of goods requires seven documents, takes 32 days and costs 
$1250 – export costs decreased whereas import costs increased (WB 2012a:76-77). Thus, Naudé’s 
(2007:12) urge to increase the export capacity of small firms seems not to have been met in Lebanon. 
Regional competition is also inauspicious due to smuggling and, apparently, misguided customs 
regulations.150 The absence of a proper stock exchange and related venture capitalism, other 
specialist argue, helps to keep entrepreneurship small and survivalist as it makes it harder to exit and 
dampens the appetite of banks to lend.151  
The main issue here, however, is access to funding. Here, Lebanon ranks 78 out of 183 on the Doing 
Business index, better than it does on most other indicators (WB 2012a:51).xliii One venture capitalist 
sketches an image of a Middle East “landscape that facilitates easy access to capital” due to oil 
fortunes, a regional real estate boom and declining Western investment returns. This capital, however, 
rarely reaches start-ups, partly because of the absence of a structured debt market and due to the 
continued demands by banks for collateral.152 As OECD (2006:2) notes, entrepreneurial start-ups are 
generally not well-suited to the traditional forms of debt finance since they require funding for a period 
during which they are not generating revenues to cover expenses. Yet many practitioners note a shift 
in the finance field and say that with Kafalat – that guarantees loans vis-à-vis the banks – “access to 
finance is no longer a problem if you have the basic things arranged for your initiative.”153 There is 
even a hint that the old adage that access to finance is the main bottleneck now obscures other 
challenges related more to business vision and management skills. Kafalat representatives indicate 
that banks are still a major obstructive factor as they are conservative and since there are few 
alternatives for them.154 They also feel, however, that their initiative has considerable spillover effects 
and that  
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Banks are opening up branches everywhere now. In Bashinta (in Metn) where there are only berries and 
apples, the Bank of Beirut is opening a branch in a farmers' village. And other banks start to open 
branches in small villages as well. There is a real mentality change compared to a few years ago; there is 
a tangible evolution in the last four to five years, with more attention for small people and small business. 
In Kesarwan, there are just farmers with apple trees […]. They give them facilities, credit cards...155 
There is annoyance with the banking sector at large that is considered to have too big a say in politics 
and seeks to undermine other institutions offering finance to entrepreneurs.156 It is said to support 
existing business over start-ups despite governmental and societal pressure and guarantees to 
facilitate the latter.157 Interestingly enough, there is a simultaneous pride towards the Central Bank, 
that is seen as Lebanon’s only properly functioning (semi-)public institution; widely credited for 
navigating Lebanon through the economic crisis with minimal damage; and admired in the person of 
its President that has received various international awards and is seen as one of the few public 
officials actually owing his position to merit (see Leenders (2012:225) for an elaboration on the 
‘Central Bank Anomaly’).158 
 
4.3. Challenges for Innovation 
The above dealt with the impact of Lebanon’s hybrid political order on entrepreneurship. Since 
entrepreneurship and innovation, in Lebanon, are not synonymous, the specific impact on innovation 
will be discussed in this section. As was the case with entrepreneurship, instability, institutional tension 
and limited government support are recurrent themes, but these factors influence innovation differently 
than they do entrepreneurship.  
As was mentioned, a lack of innovation was identified by Mehzer et al (2008:44) as a key reason for 
SME failure in Lebanon and WB (2012b:v, 42) has noted that “highly productive industries and 
innovative activities do not seem to benefit from financial inflows that mainly end as short-term 
deposits in Banks or real estate acquisitions” and that the creation of new opportunities for innovation 
activities is wanting. This is problematic because “innovation has been the driver of growth and 
development in many small and resource poor economies around the world” (WB 2012b:xi).  
4.3.1. Instability: short-term copying rather than long-term investment 
While respondents disagreed about the extent to which uncertainty and insecurity undermined 
entrepreneurship, they were almost unanimous in their conviction that it dents innovation. A manager 
of one of the incubators sums up:  
There is no stability; people are more concerned with security and safety and market stability than with 
R&D. But at any training we give we introduce the concept. And without being biased, when Lebanon is 
stable, it can be the center of innovation for the whole region. It has the universities; it has the expats that 
work in R&D, IT, technology and innovation. It is really the best candidate in the region. But stability is the 
main obstacle as it makes people think in short-term needs.159 
This negative relation between instability and innovation is mediated through demoralization.160 A 
major and immediate impact of instability and the broader political climate in Lebanon, harming 
innovation then, is the brain drain effectuated by the migration of large numbers of Lebanon’s most 
talented (young) people to the West and, especially, the Gulf where they have more chance to get a 
job based on merit rather than connections, get more salary, more appreciation and more opportunity 
                                                            
155 Author’s interview with Kafalat experts. 
156 Author’s interview with UN expert. 
157 Author’s interview with polling expert. 
158 Author’s interview with business journalist. 
159 Author’s interview with BIAT representative. 
160 Author’s interview with expert on Lebanese industrialism. 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  43
(LTA 2011:29). This, experts agree, is one of the most severe problems threatening innovation in 
Lebanon.161 
Insecurity is also seen to discourage industry – “when the instability hits, machines get destroyed, 
money gets transferred”162 – supposedly a key driver of innovation.163xliv The investments needed 
according to the Lebanese Association of Industrialists, in industrial zones and infrastructure, are not 
being made, largely due to insecurity future prospects.164 One economist even states that “the 
delinkage of entrepreneurship and innovation thus has to do with the structure of the Lebanese 
economy and the dominance, the ever increasing dominance, of the unproductive sectors.”165 
Moreover, there is an intuitive feeling among experts that existing companies purposefully abstain 
from innovation to minimize their losses during a conflict. The banking sector, for instance, is praised 
for keeping Lebanon out of the international economic crisis, but according to some this is mostly 
because they did not use and understood the modern finance techniques that caused the crisis in the 
first place.166 Another effect of past and future conflict is the before mentioned short-term vision that 
can lead to entrepreneurs going for the easy fundable and easy to exit – i.e. mainstream – businesses 
rather than investing in riskier new ventures. People tend to do what they see others doing, not willing 
to take much risk and innovate.167 Short-term entrepreneurship, again, for many experts results in 
unsustainable and un-innovative business:  
In my opinion, this situation screws up the business mentality. People don’t have a long-term vision; they 
just go until the next crisis. They want to guarantee good education and foreign passports for their kids 
and they don’t mind ruining the country or the environment in the process, because their future is outside 
the country. The entire bourgeoisie has foreign passports and is not Lebanese. It’s all about maximizing 
your profit until the country falls apart.168  
Analysts blame this short-term vision for the tendency in Lebanon to copy rather than innovate or 
invent.169 One CEO of an entrepreneurship support NGO elaborates that “there are few new ideas or 
new companies, even in the driving fields. Our success stories are all copycats.” He explains that 
companies prefer to market their product or service as the Middle Eastern version of an existing 
Western item rather than as an entirely new or original one.170 A government official added that most 
successful companies produce Arabic content for existing websites or “replicate or customize 
American, Chinese or Latin American products.”171 Two political scientists observe that: 
If someone is successful (with a juice shop or a pub) someone else will open up exactly the same 
business right next door. […] They also keep relocating, following demands and trends and necessarily 
working from short-term perspectives. Clubs renovate, change names, reopen – people create a new 
company to get new loans. In Nahr al-Moud, a restaurant opened and very shortly after a second, very 
similar restaurant opened right next door. Slightly later, a third restaurant (with the same food and the 
same ideas). There is a concentration of similar businesses. They also seem to feel safer in such 
concentrations; they share the customers, but also the PR and they are more convinced people will keep 
coming.172 
The business magazine Executive dubs this tendency the ‘economics of proximity,’  the logic that “a 
successful establishment causes other establishments to open around it, with the idea that the 
consumers in search for a certain item will find it easier to head to that area where multiple 
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establishments offer this item” (Rahhal 2012). Other observers mention the aptness of Lebanese for 
franchise and branding; not even engaging in incremental innovation of the product, but introducing it 
to new markets and perhaps adjusting the wrapping.173 When asked for success stories or examples 
of innovative entrepreneurship, one professor produced a list that was topped by two entrepreneurs 
successfully introducing an international franchise in Lebanon.174  
Instability also affects people’s educational choices and while Lebanon is highly educated, many 
experts complain that people opt for quick return studies rather than elementary studies needed for 
visionary and innovative development: “people (or people’s parents) want doctors, architects and 
bankers. People study engineering, not physics; business, not economics; law, not philosophy. While it 
is the economists, physicists and philosophers that come up with new discoveries and new 
research.”175  
4.3.2. Institutional tension and inadequate government support: deficient intellectual property and 
R&D 
Inadequate government support for entrepreneurship manifests itself in a limited legislation that 
undermines innovative business structures, such as those proposed by the social 
entrepreneurship paradigm. The entrepreneurship buzz described previously, moreover, according 
to some is: 
Quite dry and technical, there is relatively little attention for the soft and qualitative side of facilitating 
entrepreneurship. There is little actual innovation; little progressiveness. If you come up with a crazy idea 
here, if you think out of the box, people react cynical rather than supportive; there is little collaboration 
and little sense for the pursuit of perfection or excellence. There is a satisfaction with mediocrity here, 
people try to put in as minimal as possible instead of as maximal as possible.176 
A major obstacle for innovation, according to respondents as well as the literature, is the weak 
intellectual property rights enforcement – even if intellectual property rights laws have been passed 
and updated in 1946, 1996 and 2000 (Doumit and Chaaban 2012:23; Yamout 2012). WB (2012:47) 
concludes that there are significant problems with patents and the legislation for patent protection in 
Lebanon which undercuts economic rewards for innovation. WB (2012:xi) simulations show that 
property right enforcement and promoting innovation would at least double the growth pay-off of 
reforms. Corruption experts go much further and state that  
Property rights are a joke in Lebanon, which means there is a lot of piracy. If you come up with a product, 
you don’t have the privilege to have the property right. This means nobody gains from innovation: you 
make an investment and the next week everyone does the same. This is also related to the fact that the 
judicial system is extremely corrupt; there is a lot of political interference. This is important, because the 
law is there, but it isn’t implemented of enforced; there is no legal protection.177 
Apart from limited enforcement, there is also a limited awareness among entrepreneurs themselves 
about the nature and importance of intellectual property rights, according to one incubator 
spokeswoman.178 
The Lebanese government proudly lists its commitment to R&D mentioning its research collaboration 
with and funding of universities and showcasing the Lebanese talent:  
35,305 engineers actively registered in the Order of Engineers (one per cent of total population); 1300 
yearly enrollment (i.e. graduating engineers); Diaspora (pool of 12 Millions) eager to find opportunity to 
return home; 44,720 (29 per cent of total universities enrolment) specialize in STEM subjects; Lebanese 
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in post-graduate positions at top universities (MIT, Stanford, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin). Top 
companies (Intel, Microsoft, Oracle). (Yamout 2012).  
At the same time, it does acknowledge the lack of ideas and concepts, which it relates to a limited 
input from universities and a lack of funding for research and development as a key deficit in the 
Lebanese entrepreneurship ecosystem.179 In its 2007 Economic Vision for Enterprise Development, it 
embraces an ambitious definition of innovation as not just new technologies but also products, 
processes and systems (SME-unit 2007:15). The government has a remarkably R&D-focused policy 
vision to enhance innovation and mentions its commitment to training and capacity-building for 
entrepreneurs; establishing a logistic technology center; improving access to information; encouraging 
institutional linkages and international partnerships; and promoting ICT (SME-unit 2007:16). 
Yet WB (2012:xi) concludes that “research and development; the scientific backbone for innovation; is 
weak in Lebanon.” There was no disagreement about the terrible state of R&D in Lebanon among the 
interviewees.xlv Even if some people suggested that with the development of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, “there are many organizations helping entrepreneurs with free and external R&D,” 
spending on R&D is believed to be less than 0.1 per cent of the GDP in Lebanon.180 Some institutes 
are there. The Ministry of Economy and Trade has an Industry Research Institute funded by EU and 
several universities have relevant research centers. Most R&D that is being done concerns IT, 
although there is some directed towards industry and agriculture.181 An advisor to the Ministry of 
Economy and Trade elaborated that the little research being done by the Ministry concerns the 
“compiling of some basic info on import and export, on world trade initiatives, on bilateral relations; 
these are just basics, they don’t represent vision for development.”182 Yet an academic noted that 
while R&D indeed would benefit from more government support and funding, R&D is not really seen 
as a responsibility of the government and people’s expectations center on access to funds and 
regulation rather than funding R&D.183 
Some experts blamed Lebanon’s small market, noting that innovation is expensive and that the real 
R&D can thus only be done by the large economies of the USA, China, Japan and Germany.184 Others 
agree that the overwhelming SME nature of Lebanese business dictates that there is little funding 
available for R&D.185 Some point towards the fact that few Lebanese actually believe in the necessity, 
or even usefulness, of R&D.186 This is supposedly related to a “low research culture; people are not 
used to spend time on research and are looking for the quick gains. It’s not a government priority and 
few companies work on this themselves.”187 One academic related this absence of R&D not merely to 
a short-term, quick-gain mentality, but also to the ‘hyper-individuality’ in Lebanese entrepreneurship 
thinking: “people think that it is enough to be street smart; make money; evade taxes. All this might 
channel energy and resources away from the sub sectors that could actually be entrepreneurial or 
innovative.”188 Experts perceive an imbalance in this regard in that “there are lots of ideas, but there is 
little research; we have the best universities but they have no real research centers.”189 A business 
consultant added that Lebanese have a mercantile mentality, preferring trade and delivering on 
demand, rather than creating new demand: “designers here make maybe only 30 dresses a year (of 
$20,000 each) on request, rather than investing in a collection.”190 It might also be that a research 
culture is there, but it is private and consultancy based. One consultant, for instance, was adamant 
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that there are enough research companies (such as Statistics Lebanon; Infopro; Information 
International) and that they problem is not so much with research as it is with planning.191 
Related to this minimal R&D, experts note a weak information system, with little data being available 
on regulation and policy or on consumer behavior and regarding basic economic statistics. Lebanon 
does not have an access to information law, which would for instance render tendering processes for 
state procurement public (LTA 2011:87). This both follows from a weak research culture and further 
buttresses it, as proper basic data is a requirement for R&D. Many relate this to the weakness and 
partisan nature of public institutions. Some experts believed that there was no central bureau of 
statistics;192 others were aware that it existed, but were hardly enthusiastic about it.193 A UN 
programme manager complained that besides limited socio-economic data, there is a big deficit in 
information on policy orientation that could help entrepreneurs to be innovative:  
There is no sector orientation plan […] and there is no data on the position of sectors, on challenges they 
face. The UN is trying to work on this. Because once you have information, you can orient and determine 
your competitiveness. […] As it is we’re turning on our place, we’re going in circles. There are no policies. 
There is, for example, no food safety law.194 
 A representative of the LBWA confirms that one of the biggest challenges for female entrepreneurs is 
to determine which sector and what kind of business would be viable, competitive and adding value, 
because there is not enough data on which they can base such choices.195 Others add that while 
some information is provided by state institutions, for example on inflation, it is unreliable.196  
Another group of respondents, however, is of the opinion that the information required by 
entrepreneurs to be innovative is available if not necessarily obvious. They argue that “if you are not 
creative, flexible, connected and committed enough to get the basic information you need – even if 
this can be challenging – you would not have made it as an entrepreneur anyway.”197 Ciarli et al 
(2009:25) point out that in Afghanistan entrepreneurs are more likely to refer to media channels than 
to formal information sources such as Mullahs and Government representatives and business 
associations play an important role in knowledge provision. A similar dynamic seems to by at play in 
Lebanon (even if specific references to this were not present in experts’ accounts).  
Part of the information vacuum may lie in the informal nature of many start-ups. IMF (2011:45-46) puts 
the informal economy in Lebanon, as a share of officially measured GDP, at about 30 per cent in 
Lebanon, elaborating that some 67 per cent of the working force does not contribute to a retirement 
pension scheme, which it sees as partially resulting from rigid labor market regulations. The LTA 
(2011:108) is extremely concerned with this as it means that government does not collect taxes of 
nearly a third of GNP. While experts interviewed for this paper generally felt that entrepreneurship in 
the informal sector did not constitute a significant or problematic phenomenon for entrepreneurship, 
there were some references to large amounts of unregistered micro enterprises that might constitute a 
blank on the entrepreneurship information radar and could distort estimates on competitiveness and 
innovativeness.198 Experts primarily linked informality to two aspects of the Lebanese economy, 
namely family dominance and unfavorable labor laws. The tendency to keep business ‘in the family’ 
often coincides with diverging degrees of informality and when asked for their perspective on family 
business, many respondents automatically touched upon the topic of informality.199 The effect of 
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Lebanese labor laws, on the other hand, is less unobtrusive: “the fact that it costs a lot here to hire 
someone legally means that most entrepreneurs will be cheating and will hire people on contract basis 
without paying for social benefits, for instance.”200 In a generic sense, the dual game government 
system with its clientelist tentacles spreading towards entrepreneurs, encourages them to work around 
problems, rather than to mention, tackle, and solve problems, a tendency that might breed flexibility, 
but perhaps not innovation.201 
In all, it seems that the issue of (dis)information is indeed related to governance, but mostly in the 
sense that weak public institutions in combination with a minimal research culture result in fragmented 
and limited information on socio-economic indicators.xlvi Yet the relation central in the literature – that 
polarized programmatic competition results in volatile and uncertain policies (Kenyon and Naoi 2010) 
– is certainly present in the account by the experts interviewed, but entrepreneurship at large more 
than innovation specifically. Innovation is felt to suffer more from lacking research and data than from 
policy uncertainty.  
 
4.4. Entrepreneurs’ Responses to Governance Fragility and Government Hybridity 
Entrepreneurship, as Lebanese respondents never failed to reiterate, depends on flexibility, 
adaptability and recognizing and creating opportunity. As such, it is important to emphasize that 
Lebanese entrepreneurs have not merely suffered under the challenging circumstances discussed in 
detail above. They have also actively responded to these challenges and have even pointed out 
several advantages of Lebanon’s specific business circumstances – sometimes generated by 
governance fragility and government hybridity and sometimes existing despite of it. Three main coping 
strategies can be distilled from the experts’ accounts: investing in self-sufficiency and independence 
from state structures and support; broadening visions and markets beyond Lebanon; and diversifying 
across multiple sectors. 
The absence of regulation and stability may have been internalized by Lebanese entrepreneurs. The 
interviews convey pride in the educated and entrepreneurial identity many Lebanese adopt and to 
some extent also faith that Lebanon’s human capital will eventually prevail. “Lebanese are used to do 
things independent from their context; some business plans don’t even take this into account.”202 This 
scoping paper is not the first to note that “the Lebanese perceive Lebanon as a place where there is a 
high value placed on self-sufficiency, individualism and personal initiative, and that generally the 
Lebanese do not rely on the government to provide for their well-being” (Chakour 2001 in Ahmed and 
Julian 2012:30). Political scientists noted that “the behavior from entrepreneurs is independent from 
this [the political] situation. Ok, there is an influence, but mostly the Lebanese are ambitious and 
forward looking and they don’t see entrepreneurship as limited to government policies or politics.”203 
One professor summarizes that “this is how people feel about the government, that there is no 
advancement. The private sector works hard and does generate this advancement. In response, 
people operate as if the government doesn’t exist. They got used to this in the war and they continued 
to operate like this. In fact, this is what keeps them going.”204 
4.4.1. Independence from the government 
As discussed in length, what is generally perceived as bad governance and instability have detrimental 
effects on entrepreneurship (generating apathy, lack of confidence and a tendency to postpone 
decisions and investments) and the trust deficit towards the government can hardly be welcomed from 
any point of view.205 Yet, the fact that entrepreneurs have learnt not to rely on the government is also 
                                                            
200 Author’s interview with business consultant. 
201 Author’s interview with AUB business expert. 
202 Author’s interview with Kafalat experts. 
203 Author’s interview with Kafalat experts. 
204 Author’s interview with LAU professor. 
205 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  48
seen as an incentive for entrepreneurship, making people, by necessity, more creative: “All is private 
sector driven here and this is the beauty of it; it results in better quality companies (at the cost of high 
failure rates, but this is worth it). This baptism of fire is what sets Lebanon apart from, for instance, the 
Jordanian ecosystem.”206xlvii A WB expert added: “I really feel Lebanon has potential for innovation. 
Exactly because there is no national strategy and everything emerged from the grassroots up. They 
don’t rely on the government, but are self-sustainable. Here, it might actually be an advantage that 
they have to do it themselves.”207 One academic concludes: “the fact that there never has been a 
government, makes you depend on your own. […] Entrepreneurship is indeed not despite but because 
of the political situation.”208xlviii Companies are not only self-sustainable, but often self-sufficient, they 
sometimes 
Operate as if the government doesn’t exist. They got used to this in the war and they continued to 
operate like this. In fact, this is what keeps them going [in this political climate]. And all of them have 
contingency plans. Everyone has two generators to deal with the electricity problems. Because there is 
no public transport, they would start their own transportation; they would provide it to make their company 
a pleasant place to work. […] They are basically self-sufficient.209 
Another economist supposed that the Lebanese entrepreneurial ecosystem is now at a stage where it 
fully understands the current situation and is able to utilize that knowledge as a comparative 
advantage: “it might be that people are now banking on this, the thriving ecosystem might be a 
response to the realization that nothing’s going to change. People at this point are actually quite 
capable of predicting things and they have set up their systems beyond and without the 
government.”210 
4.4.2. Beyond Lebanon 
Apart from a commitment to ‘not depending on government,’ Lebanese entrepreneurs are also guided 
by the principle of ‘not depending on Lebanon,’ meaning that they regard expanding to foreign markets 
as a key requirement for sustainable business. Globalization has fundamentally altered public 
expectations and the relationship between politics and economics in any country (Briscoe 2009:9). 
The eternal dependence of Lebanese communities on foreign patrons makes a regional perspective 
inevitable; and there is a generic logic in expanding to Middle Eastern markets, but experts agree that 
Lebanese entrepreneurs are more outward looking that the average business(wo)man due to the risky 
environment within Lebanon itself.211 Regional networks have traditionally been strong, but have only 
been encouraged by the 2006 war that “caught everyone off guard and caused big problems for 
everyone; businesses made no money for one and a half month. Since 1991, businesses had been 
focusing almost exclusively on Lebanon, worked within their comfort zone. Since the war, they look 
more outside, invest more outside.”212 A study by Baalbaki and Sweidan (2000 in Ahmed and Julian 
2012:29) on the management objectives behind the development of corporate websites in Lebanon 
concluding that the main reason for owning a corporate website was to attract clients outside of 
Lebanon seems to confirm this. Entrepreneurs often either opt for production processes within 
Lebanon (specifically regarding IT or offshore businesses) that serve clients outside Lebanon or the 
other way around, producing outside (circumventing all the utility and infrastructure problems) for a 
Lebanese market.213 A similar logic of spreading geographical risk is prevalent within Lebanon as 
people often relocate their business from direct conflict zones to safer areas, preferably investing in 
multiple branches (this ranges from shops and cafés closing their Downtown branch in 2008 to focus 
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on satellites in East Beirut to factories in the south relocating their production to northern branches in 
2006). 
4.4.3. Diversification and spreading the risk 
A third response to Lebanon’s business climate, experts agree, is for businesses to diversify.214 
Internet cafés specialize on gaming as well so as to provide customers with an alternative in the event 
of internet failure; local food and beverage producers and middlemen broaden their range of produce; 
microfinance organizations “urge people to go beyond the usual stuff (hairdressing, shops, computers) 
and give them related trainings, such as handicrafts (basket weaving, chocolate design, photography) 
that create markets around weddings in villages; urging them to diversify” to be able to deal with 
market instability.215 Apart from diversification, Lebanon’s instability tends to favor labor and human 
resource intensive business (IT, consultancy and outsourcing) over businesses depending on material, 
land and machines (industry) as entrepreneurs live with the continuous reminder that they need to be 
able to flee, relocate or sell quickly.216  
 
4.5. Despite or Because? Can Hybridity enhance Entrepreneurship and Innovation? 
4.5.1. Opportunities for entrepreneurship 
Lebanese entrepreneurs have not just responded to crises, they have often thrived despite and 
sometimes because of them. There is still, remarkable as it may seem, considerable optimism to be 
found among some business(wo)men that point towards the enormous potential of Lebanon to be 
released “once there is an improvement in the management of the public sector”; towards the 
changing mentality of the younger generation;xlix towards the opportunities of oil and gas extraction 
along the Lebanese coast.217 Lebanese experts identified almost as much opportunities for 
entrepreneurs in Lebanon as they did obstacles. These ranged from flexibility and resilience stemming 
from war; an innate or constructed entrepreneurial identity; the abundance of inspiring examples; the 
availability of international support funds; the supporting role of the diaspora; the relative strength of 
the private sector; the negotiation and marketing skills stemming from societal fragmentation; and the 
trendsetting role of Lebanon regionally. Some of these incentives have been generated by instability, 
war, clientelism and the other factors addressed above; some opportunities are related to it; and some 
are seen as completely separate from the reality of governance fragility and government hybridity.  
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4.5.1.a. The positive legacies of war? Resilience, flexibility and creativity 
As mentioned, many experts believe that the Lebanese economy is entrepreneurial because, not 
despite, of the various wars they witnessed and the challenging governance context in which they 
operate. The war has generated many opportunities for entrepreneurs – as recounted by the SME 
boom during the civil war – and Lebanese entrepreneurs “are leading the rebuilding and development 
process in the post-war economy” with construction representing 24.3 per cent  of the entrepreneurs 
surveyed by Fahed-Sreih et al (2010:44). Physical reconstruction has long even been regarded as the 
avenue for nation-building (Saidi 2004:11). The potentially positive side-effects of war on 
entrepreneurship, however, are mostly seen as mentality and motivation issues, with challenges 
generating resilience, creativity and flexibility, key traits of a successful entrepreneur.218 One academic 
seems to capture this sentiment quite well in explaining that “the legacy of the war did have a defining 
impact on Lebanese entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurial spirit and environment flourished during 
the war: we did not just survive, we flourished. It functions in a way as a selection process: it’s either 
leave or be creative and adapt against all odds.”219  
The need for social entrepreneurship is especially related to governance and government challenges, 
with a mantra to see crises as opportunities, “the more bumpy the road, the more need for social 
entrepreneurship.”220 Here, too, the civil war is seen as a major contributor to Lebanon’s widespread 
social entrepreneurship and more current examples of opportunity entrepreneurship related to political 
crises abound: “when the airport road is blocked, motor taxi services immediately emerge; when tires 
are burnt out of protest, people go out to collect the metal – there is a running gag, that the business 
opportunity in Lebanon is tires, as the Lebanese traditionally burn tires during protest.”221 Others 
added that in response to the electricity crisis, many generator companies have now emerged. 
Academics are more cautious, but do concur that, theoretically, the wars in Lebanon might have 
destroyed elements in the economic system that impeded entrepreneurship thereby contributing to a 
more conducive entrepreneurship context. The mere fact that normal employment ventures become 
more scarce (or ceased to exist) during war, generated a need for other channels of generating 
income, leading to entrepreneurship.”222 Again, however, the different forms of entrepreneurship need 
to be kept in mind. Most of the entrepreneurship generated by conflict is necessity or opportunity 
entrepreneurship, or even predatory or destructive entrepreneurship; relatively little can be considered 
innovation entrepreneurship (Jones and Elgin-Cossart 2011:10).  
The challenging context has not merely made entrepreneurs creative and flexible, many reason, but 
also the institutions and organizations they deal with. A manager at one of Lebanon’s leading 
incubators remembered how “in 2006, Kafalat suspended all payments and the banks were 
understanding as well; developments were considered as some sort of force majeure. This gives 
people confidence, they know they can shut down and re-open if need be.”223 A microfinance 
organization recalled that, with reference to the 2007 Nahr el-Bared war, “some clients had everything 
demolished and we forgot completely about them paying back.”224  
4.5.1.b. Entrepreneurial culture and identity 
Respondents were vigorously divided on the matter of entrepreneurship culture, especially on its 
origins. Business(wo)men and private sector entrepreneurship supporters reflexively refer to culture 
and history as an explanatory factor for Lebanese entrepreneurship. A venture capitalist captured this 
view by stating that “the Arab history and culture is extremely positive on entrepreneurship; this is a 
business culture at heart – we’re not a rent society, of buying land and sitting on the money, there is a 
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tendency towards risk and venture.”225 Others found that the “Semitic mind is geared towards 
conceptualizing, not towards implementing.”226 Testimonies that “the Lebanese have always been 
traders, since the Phoenicians; it almost runs in the blood, it’s in our nature;”227 that “the Lebanese as 
a person is an entrepreneur. He takes risks, takes initiative, follows his dreams and is creative. This is 
because of our history, we are very proud to stem from the Phoenicians;”228 and that the success of 
entrepreneurship is “part of our entrepreneurial culture; it is in our character to multi-task; to take 
initiative; to overcome problems”229 are widespread and shared with conviction.  
Academics agree that something like an encouraging entrepreneurial self-identification existed in 
Lebanon, but emphasized that this had little to do with “DNA” or even history and more with the place 
entrepreneurship took in the post-independence nation-building discourse230 
In the process of constructing a nation, we used this theme (the Phoenician entrepreneurial legacy) to 
distinguish ourselves from the Syrians (forgetting that the Arab and Muslims were traders as well). Michel 
Chiha […] has posted this idea of a country of traders and merchants. […] We were forced by the 
circumstances; it’s not in our blood. […] We’re not more or better, it’s just a thing we constructed to make 
us feel better.231  
The importance of a self-identification as entrepreneurs might of course be exaggerated in a society 
lacking any other convincing overarching identity, fractionalized as it is between different socio-cultural 
groups. Moreover, the ‘innateness’ of entrepreneurship in the Lebanese spirit can also result in 
laxness: “entrepreneurship is a part of the culture, that is true, but you need to think about it 
professionally and not everybody does that; often they don’t have the education or know the sector or 
the product.”232 A lot of young starters apparently have no idea of the vastness of challenges involved 
in starting up a business and have an unrealistically rosy picture of making money as a 
business(wo)man, seeing it as solely depending on talent and vision and lacking the commitment it 
takes.233   
A more tangible link between culture and blooming entrepreneurship might be constituted by the 
abundance of examples Lebanese have of successful entrepreneurship. The importance of such 
examples and role models was widely felt. Respondents were proud in mentioning the worldwide fame 
of Lebanese professionals: “Carlos Slim; Elie Saab; Carlos Ghosn (Nissan); Jacques Nasser (Ford); 
the first open heart surgery was performed by a Lebanese; the director of the most famous cancer 
center in the world (in Houston) is Lebanese.”234 An expert working at a Lebanese incubator 
emphasized that for his clients the inspiration transferred by successful businesses they know 
provides a key motivation for their entrepreneurship ambitions:  
They have seen big examples and this makes them confident that they can make it. They think ‘if this guy 
would have waited for the perfect moment it would never have happened.’ Success stories about those 
that make it work inspiringly. We always look at the success story: ‘if this guy can make it, why can’t I?’235  
This relates to Ardagna and Lusardi’s (2010:45) observation that the probability of becoming involved 
in an entrepreneurial activity when knowing someone who has started a business increases by three 
per cent for opportunity entrepreneurs and by 0.5 per cent for remedial entrepreneurs and provides 
further substance to the importance of family business for entrepreneurship. 
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4.5.1.c. The autonomy of the private sector 
A third component of Lebanese society that is seen to favor entrepreneurship, and that is linked ipso 
facto to the weakness of state institutions is the strength of the Lebanese private sector. “In Lebanon, 
the private sector is bigger than the state. The private sector does not ask or propose to the 
government, it just acts and only tells the government afterwards.”236 As discussed above, the 
weakness of the public sector can manifest itself in a detrimental way for entrepreneurship through 
capture of public institutions by established business(wo)men and privileged business sectors 
(bankers and lawyers) that might undermine government policy conducive for entrepreneurs that might 
one day compete with them (see Leenders’ (2012:42; 77) analysis of Lebanon’s quarrying and 
pharmaceutical industries for apt examples). However, the notion of the strength of the private sector 
vis-à-vis the government is also often invoked as a positive thing for entrepreneurs and thus seems 
both curse and blessing. The absence of strong enforcement of regulations caused one Lebanese UN 
representative to ponder that “the ministry is so flexible with them! You can just do it; it is easy to open 
a business. You just need the connections and networks and the Lebanese are very good at that.”237 
That the strength of the private sector translates into entrepreneurship and not just traditional business 
is also due to the widely referred to bad corporate culture in Lebanon. Compared to Europe, 
apparently, “it is hierarchical, formal, old school; there is hardly any room for advancement in such a 
patriarchic culture and a lot of people don’t want to work for a boss here.”238 This is also related to the 
predominance of family companies in Lebanon which is seen to limit potential for socio-economic 
mobility, as promotions tend to be based on family ties rather than merit.239  
4.5.1.d. Development and reconstruction aid 
Of the entrepreneurship opportunities directly related to fragility and hybridity, international support 
(often in a development aid context) for entrepreneurship was a recurrent theme. People believed that 
the recent entrepreneurship buzz would not have been as vibrant as it is without the involvement of 
international agencies that would not have been there had Lebanon not been ‘in trouble.’ A UN 
programme manager elaborated on an entrepreneurship support programme that was part of the post-
2006 economic recovery and rehabilitation efforts (financed through the Lebanon Recovery Fund 
(LRF) and focusing on the regions that had suffered most from the war) that went far beyond mere 
reconstruction and rehabilitation into development, upgrading and improvement of enterprises, 
involving capacity development and training (UNIDO 2010:vi). Moreover, the entrepreneurs in question 
did not just benefit from international funds and support, but could also count on extensive support 
from Hezbollah. This dynamic led the UN expert to conclude that some entrepreneurs she worked with 
“pray for a war as this brings funds (not unlike we do at the UN); they have this experience that after 
war there will be help.” 240 
4.5.1.e. The “diaspora is our petrol” 241 
Lebanon, some maintain, is not the country, but the people, “an important distinction as we have a 
very active diaspora that is at least as big as the amount of people living in Lebanon and that is 
actively involved in Lebanon.”242 This diaspora consists of both business migrants and war time 
refugees and constitutes a regional (Arab) and an international (global) diaspora:243  
We’re all over the globe. We went to the Gulf at the oil boom when they needed skilled labor and now 
we’re in services. We’re in Africa (Nigeria, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire). We’re in Afghanistan, there’s a 
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Lebanese restaurant in Kabul based on the logic of ‘just follow the US army.’ It’s hard to find a family 
without a relative outside.244 
There are very strong ties between Lebanon and its diaspora (so much so that there is talk about 
giving them the right to vote) and “even if many people leave Lebanon, they keep their contact office 
here […] and continue to tap into the Lebanese human resources;”245 “they have a home here, their 
kids go to school here, they come here 6 to 8 times per year – they’re directly involved.”246 
Lebanon’s (business) diaspora is often identified as the single most important contributor to Lebanon’s 
rebuilding after the 2006 war (Salem 2011:116) and is routinely referred to as a source of national 
pride and potency, being the most important source of investment and capital. WB (2012:v-viii) 
summarizes the positive effects of the diaspora on the economy at large and estimates that capital 
inflows, accelerating in the 2007-2010 years and to a large extent by and via Lebanese expatriate 
businesses, have contributed to shaping the economic structure and policy in favor of non-tradable 
sectors and relaxed the budget constraints of both public and private sectors. “Indeed, in a context of 
political polarization and lack of decision-making, the availability of foreign inflows made possible the 
financing of large fiscal and current account deficits, delaying important structural reforms to reduce 
distortions in the economy.” According to the Migration and Remittances Factbook, in 2010, emigration 
constituted 664.1 thousand, or 15.6 per cent of the Lebanese population, with the emigration rate of 
tertiary-educated population reaching 38.6 per cent. The incoming remittance flow was estimated at 
US$ 7,558 million in 2009, with an outward flow of US$ 5,749 million (WB 2011). Finance experts 
shared that they had sources within the Central Bank estimating that US$ 11 billion is transferred 
annually from expats to relatives and friends.247 Others suppose that some 20 per cent of the 
Lebanese GDP consists of remittances (which mirrors estimates by IMF (2011:63)).248 It should be 
noted, however, that “the Lebanese diaspora is not sending money to Lebanon, but to family and 
organizations.”249 The diaspora, therefore, does not so much boost Lebanon’s public sector as it does 
its private sector. In terms of entrepreneurship, the diaspora is important mostly because of the 
networks and the money it provides. Some claim that many initiatives in the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem have been adopted as a result of the influence of expatriates returning to Lebanon and that 
diaspora networks reinforce the budding ecosystem. The Lebanese are successful in business, an 
academic proposed, precisely because they’re not in Lebanon.250  
Other experts are more critical, agreeing that “the remittances of the Lebanese diaspora save the 
economy, but at the price of inflation.”251 One person felt that due to the instability and lack of 
government vision “the diaspora believes in Lebanon, but it believes in Lebanon as a place to live 
happily, not as a place to do business. They don’t invest. If they would invest in Lebanon there would 
be tremendous progress.”252 He even pondered whether the diaspora remittances would not 
undermine entrepreneurship rather than support it, by making people lazy and dependent (a hunch 
that would be confirmed by Ciarli et al’s (2009) finding that necessity entrepreneurs in Afghanistan 
became less entrepreneurial as soon as they had access to remittances). Others observed that 
diaspora ties with Lebanon are gradually becoming more strained due to an increasing fatigue of 
Lebanese abroad with the ineffectiveness and corruption in Lebanon.253 In any case, it appears, while 
there is a tradition of utilizing diaspora knowledge and funds, with for instance US based Lebanese 
entrepreneurs outsourcing the work for their software development companies to people based in 
small towns in North Lebanon, the potential is still under exploited, with experts noting the need to 
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invest in e-commerce to tap into the diaspora more effectively.254 WB (2012:viii) also notes that 
Lebanon is not benefiting optimally from the role that can be played by the diaspora as there is still too 
little brain circulation between skilled members of the diaspora and the home country.  
Entrepreneurial connections with the diaspora have an impact far beyond remittance flows into the 
realm of long-term political and policy effects. This dynamic is aptly illustrated by the history of Rafiq 
Hariri’s impact on post-civil-war Lebanon. Hariri, a Sunni Muslim entrepreneur made his fortune in 
Saudi Arabia during the oil boom and returned to Lebanon in the 1980s. Lebanon’s post-conflict 
recovery was “largely associated with his name, since he managed to channel his own vast fortune 
made on construction businesses and Saudi resources into the Lebanese post-conflict economy” 
(Koinova 2010:156). This dynamic had profound influence on the future of the country, not in the least 
because Hariri consolidated his political power stemming from his economic investment as a prime 
minister of five governments between 1992 and 1998 and between 2000 and 2004 before he was 
assassinated in 2005. Other dynamics also suggest the diaspora has a real political impact, with 
different diaspora communities holding different political parties or leaders responsible for protecting 
their interests. One civil society activist noted that the Shia diaspora in Africa and the Gulf is getting 
increasingly impatient with Hezbollah, which it feels is unable to ensure its interests, with potentially 
important effects on election results.255 
4.5.1.f. Fractionalization and diversity 
A further trait of Lebanese society that, in the eyes of many experts, contributes to Lebanese 
entrepreneurship is Lebanon’s socio-cultural fractionalization and diversity along sectarian lines. 
Fragility, in both economics and political science, is often associated with ethnicity or socio-economic 
fractionalization that is assumed to both cause conflict and be the main effect of conflict (providing the 
lines along which politicization occurs). While this rather primordialist view on ethnicity and identity has 
been long since refuted (Bauman 1999; Eriksen 1993) – the separation between race, language and 
religion (with the latter supposedly most endogenous) is empirically problematic, to name but one thing 
– Alesina et al (2003) point out an interesting potential discrepancy between the effects of ethnic and 
linguistic fractionalization associated with negative outcomes in terms of the quality of government on 
the one hand and religious fractionalization on the other hand (Alesina et al 2003:158). In Lebanon, 
there is a feeling that “traditional businessmen separate themselves from politics” because they want 
to serve all parties, rather than narrow down their clientele to one political or sectarian group. For 
many of the experts interviewed for this paper, the fact that Lebanon is known for its mixture of 
Christians and Muslims is an added value as “this mixed culture means we can attract more people 
that will feel comfortable here and like it. We’re open and this reflects on business. People are more 
willing to deal with Lebanese.”256 Not seldom, this argument is based on the perception that the 
Christian side of Lebanese culture is associated with Western liberalism and will hence attract 
international funding and reach Western markets.257 The fact that Lebanese business(wo)men have to 
“be able to co-exist with different parties and show different faces (to for instance customers and 
patrons)” is thought to demand a specific set of social and managerial skills – flexibility, adaptability, 
conviviality, cordiality, mood management and emotional intelligence – that is especially useful for 
entrepreneurs.258 
This is related to another Lebanese feature, that could perhaps be called the ‘regional flag store 
function,’ namely the idea that Lebanon – not in the least place due to the large amounts of Arab 
tourists it (usually) attracts – serves as some sort of advertisement display for the rest of the region 
which would make it an attractive place to start up new initiatives. The experts interviewed felt that “in 
the Arab world, people really look up to the Lebanese - not the fighting Lebanese, but the authors, the 
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media, the businessmen.”259 Lebanese, from journalists to state officials, feel that their country is a 
regional trendsetter – slowly becoming more popular than even the ‘Egypt touch’ – in terms of culture, 
cuisine, music. This makes it the perfect place for any regional entrepreneur to “start up and show 
off.”260 This is perhaps what Naqvi (2011:12) calls “the cultural “X” factor that is the key in defining the 
backdrop against which entrepreneurs prosper.”l The same reasons that make Lebanon so popular 
with tourists, give it an added entrepreneurial value as a ‘showcase’:  
So why do entrepreneurs come here all if it’s just expensive and insecure? For the very basic reason that 
it is fun to be here: Beirut has energy, good weather, nightlife, liberalism; it’s a place where people want 
to go. This is why Doha or Jeddah or Amman would always be spending more on attracting people. No 
one wants to go there. The fun and energy of Beirut is what is needed for entrepreneurship; it was a 
similar dynamism that generated the Silicon Valley boom.261 
Infused, no doubt, with a healthy dose of national pride, the idea of trendsetting nevertheless seems to 
make sense when looking at the Lebanese success in franchising: “there are 70 Lebanese companies 
branded in Arab countries and elsewhere. Jordanians, Kuwaitis, Dubai’s – they all want to invest in 
Lebanese brands,” leading a government advisor to conclude that “they want us; we have something 
no other Arab country has.”262 
4.5.2. Opportunities for Innovation 
Many of the above considerations regarding the potential positive influence of governance fragility and 
government hybridity on entrepreneurship might also hold concerning innovation. However, as noted 
before, in Lebanon, entrepreneurship and innovation are far from interchangeable, with 
entrepreneurship mostly regarded as not very innovative. Below, several components of Lebanese 
society – some related to conflict and clientelism, others not – that were mentioned as conducive for 
innovative entrepreneurship are explored, most importantly the increasingly favorable societal and 
policy context, the competitiveness of the market, Lebanon’s high-quality education system and 
Lebanese risk inclination. 
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4.5.2.a. The buzz 
Respondents mentioned that there is an increased recognition of the importance of not just 
entrepreneurship, but innovation-based entrepreneurship. Incubators launch the discussion on 
innovation with clients, discussing the benefits of it and the requirements for it.263 Urged on by the EU 
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and WB, the government emphasizes its commitment to “encourage new concepts and 
commercialization of R&D: increase spending on R&D; create a grant for funding concept ideas; 
develop university-industry linkages and intra-university collaboration; and instate a technology 
transfer office (Yamout 2012). The plans to create a Tripoli Innovation Hub focusing on ICT and 
media/communications might be a case in point (Melki 2012). The creative sector – from architecture 
to design and blogging – is often seen to be booming because of the lack of government support, with 
‘poverty generating creativity.’264 The rise of IT is another factor enhancing innovation, moving 
business plans away from ‘bricks and mortar’ initiatives heavily relying on labor and land to more 
flexible, human-resource oriented projects. A government advisor called IT development as “the key 
game changer in the private sector ecosystem.”265 These accounts are confirmed by a representative 
of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI) that elaborated on ALI’s ambition to recruit young 
entrepreneurs in the fields of “software design and haute couture industry. We want to introduce these 
in ALI, attract businessmen in these sectors, because they have the creativity and the future.”266 
4.5.2.b. Education 
The single most important Lebanese asset for innovation is, according to almost all experts 
interviewed, Lebanon’s excellent education system.267 “Education is everything in Lebanon and is 
seen as the best investment you can make. Parents in Lebanon will go to great length to get their kids 
the best education they can get, often at private schools.”268 The Lebanese government prizes its 
highly educated population with a net enrollment in primary education of 98.3 per cent; an overall 
literacy rate of 90 per cent (98 per cent for those aged 15-24); 42 colleges and universities in higher 
education, including: 4 Lebanese Universities in the top 100 Middle Eastern universities; 29 per cent of 
total university enrollment in STEM subjects enrolment (44,720 students); and Lebanese students 
scoring top regional positions in mathematics in TIMSS [Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study] in 2007 (Yamout 2012). WB (2012:45) also praises Lebanon’s 54 per cent gross 
enrollment rate in tertiary education (by far exceeding the 26 per cent rate registered for the MENA 
region and the 23 per cent rate for middle-income countries) resulting in a raking on the UN Education 
Index of 88 out of 177. While education is not seen as a necessity for entrepreneurship – Mehzer et al 
(2008:44-47) note that work experience rather than education is considered crucial for entrepreneurs 
and that “work experience compensates for a low education level” – it is regarded as vital for 
innovation. This prioritization of education is, by some, seen as partially a response to conflict and 
instability. 
The link between instability and entrepreneurship might go via education. Growing up in war and in an 
unstable country gives you the feeling that you might have to feel anytime and this generates a tendency 
to over invest in human capital, because this is what you can take with you. This is why parents invest in 
their children’s education and this is why the universities grew so much. […] With all this instability, you 
can’t get attached to the land; agriculture won’t work as you have to be able to leave it behind.269 
However, despite (or perhaps because) of the importance attributed to education in fostering 
innovation, experts voiced manifold concerns regarding the current state of education in Lebanon. 
They noted the paradoxical situation that the most highly educated country of the Middle East has one 
of the poorest R&D track-records and low levels of innovation – with education seen as a ticket abroad 
or into the banking sector rather than a step stone to innovative entrepreneurship.270 WB (2012:34) is 
concerned that the oversupply and misallocation of teaching and administrative staff making the 
education system unsustainable by causing salaries and wages to represent almost 90  per cent of the 
Ministry of Education’s total spending. Practitioners note that universities are starting to provide the 
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needed entrepreneurship programmes and seeking to encourage innovative and research-based self-
employment, but simultaneously agree that these initiatives are as of yet scattered and without any 
real result.271 There is an important distinction here, for many observers, between private schools that 
are “more entrepreneurial and encouraging of risk-taking” and public schools “delivering unprepared, 
unskilled graduates.”272 One journalist commented that “we don’t graduate specialized people, they 
get a degree in Business Administration, but not in marketing, finance or entrepreneurship; this is a 
recipe for unemployment, they know everything, but they know nothing. The credibility of the degrees 
is therefore doubtful.”273 INJAZ, an organization specialized in entrepreneurship education to youth 
from seven to 18 years, is highly concerned with youth unemployment which they see as the result of 
the lack of appropriate skills (Injaz 2011).274  
4.5.2.c. Risk perception 
An ongoing discussion on the nature and consequences of Lebanese risk inclination or aversion was 
apparent in interviews with experts. It is usually assumed that innovation inherently requires a certain 
appetite to try new things and therefore embrace the risk of failure or loss (Naqvi 2011:12-13). On the 
one hand, there is a thesis among Lebanese stipulating that general instability, a lack of social 
acceptance for failure and lack of insurance options minimizes willingness to take risks and thereby 
innovative entrepreneurship.275 A microfinance expert explained that “a major issue is the lack of 
health insurance; a major disaster is always lurking behind the corner. There is no protection and the 
risk involved the entire family. […] We tried to set up insurance ourselves, but it turned out to be 
impossible, the price and costs were just too high.”276 Adding to this, a scholar on social 
entrepreneurship explained that “the costs of failure are disastrous, both socially and 
legally/financially. Business failure is not seen as a learning process or an attempt at success, but as a 
death warrant. Getting legal bankruptcy is almost impossible and the chances of starting up another 
business are small.”277 On the other hand, and closely related with the idea of the unique Lebanese 
entrepreneurial culture, respondents noted that while “70 per cent of new business don’t continue, […] 
people always believe they’re with the 30 per cent” and are hence quite inclined to take risk indeed.278 
The prevalence of success stories on entrepreneurship are also seen to make people relatively more 
willing to take risks to make their business innovative and successful.279 One academic wondered 
whether corruption and rent-seeking might not in a way spur innovation, or at least creativity, 
reasoning that if something becomes too successful, the predatory politicians will get into it which 
might signal to some people that it is time to move on to something new.280 In essence, this thesis 
stipulates, the experience of Lebanese with instability and destruction has altered their evaluation or 
interpretation or risk, creating a higher acceptance threshold for risk due to a culturally transmitted 
experience with resilient supply networks: 
People would ask themselves the question ‘would it devastate me?’ and would usually conclude it would 
not. Because of their previous experience with war, they have relatively much trust in that someone will 
take care of it. Someone will open another port, someone will arrange for water somehow, someone will 
make sure I can still make phone calls; someone will make a business out of garbage collection. There is 
an important faith in a resilient supply network which grows from (culturally transmitted) experience. 
People in Lebanon would apprehend opportunities and challenges differently and would be less likely to 
                                                            
271 Author’s interview with business consultant. 
272 Author’s interview with UN-ESCWA expert. 
273 Author’s interview with business journalist. 
274 Author’s interview with diplomat. 
275 Authors interviews with business consultant; and AUB economist. 
276 Author’s interview with microfinance expert. 
277 Author’s interview AUB business expert.  
278 Author’s interview with expert on Lebanese industrialism. 
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abstain from starting a business than other people in the same situation that don’t have the collective 
experience that things will continue to function in some way.281 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
5.1. Summary 
Governance fragility and government hybridity are seen to significantly impact the Lebanese 
entrepreneurial ecosystem by the majority of experts interviewed for this scoping paper, not in the 
least via the incestuous relations between the public and private sector. The main obstacles experts 
identified for Lebanese entrepreneurs were:  
 The high costs of utilities and infrastructure that make businesses uncompetitive, which was 
identified as the most important, but certainly not the only, manifestation of the clientelist and 
oligopolistic nature of the Lebanese society and economy 
 Failing government support and a lack of political vision for the economy stemming from 
Lebanon’s corrupt and informal business environment  
 The instability and unpredictability related to violent conflict that make investment and 
planning difficult and foster a short-term, migration-focused mentality 
Challenges for innovation stemming from governance fragility and government hybridity were mainly 
considered to be: 
 Instability leading to short-term mentalities and replication rather than invention 
 Insufficient government support leading to limited intellectual property rights protection and a 
glaring absence of R&D 
 Institutional tension and multiplicity that result in a lack of available socio-economic data to 
base business plans on 
Lebanese entrepreneurs respond to these challenges by operating as independent from government 
as they can; by building on Lebanon’s perceived trend-setting role and taking a regional perspective 
and  producing in or exporting to other countries from the very start; and by diversifying their produce 
or services.  
The specific Lebanese context is also seen to offer particular opportunities or assets to Lebanese 
entrepreneurs. The most important of these were considered to be:  
 The resilience and flexibility (and risk inclination) stemming from war 
 The autonomy of the private sector 
 Post-war international support for economic reconstruction 
 The availability of diaspora networks and finances 
 Social and negotiating skills stemming from socio-cultural diversity 
Particular positive features of Lebanese society for innovation were mainly:  
 The increased awareness of the importance of innovation 
 The competitive economy 
                                                            
281 Author’s interview with AUB economist.  
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 The well-developed Lebanese education system 
 
5.2. Reflections and Conclusions 
This exploratory paper has sought to illustrate that a fragile governance context – facing protracted 
conflict; politicization of private life; limited state capacity and institutional multiplicity; and vulnerability 
to external shocks – feeds into a hybrid governance system characterized by a dual game of 
combined informal clientelism and formal programmatic competition that shapes Lebanese 
entrepreneurship in important ways. 
5.2.1. Entrepreneurship 
In Lebanon, entrepreneurial attitudes appear to be very positive – because of its challenging political 
context as much as despite of it. Lebanese are apt in recognizing and utilizing business opportunities; 
they do not just have a high skills perception but also have high post-secondary education rates; fear 
of failure seems to be relatively low in the sense that Lebanese are rather inclined to start their own 
business;li Lebanese have remarkable networking skills facilitated by both the enormous socio-political 
diversity and the wasta-based access to resources and services; cultural support, finally, is abundant 
and ‘societal status’ was repeatedly mentioned as one of the main motivations for becoming an 
entrepreneur. There is, still, a broadly shared conviction that the ‘can do spirit’ of the Lebanese will 
eventually overcome political challenges and that even modest reform and stability could provide an 
enormous boost to entrepreneurship.    
Entrepreneurial activity in Lebanon, on the other hand, seems to be more adversely impacted by the 
governance and government challenges central to this paper. According to experts, there are equal 
parts of necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs in Lebanon, indicating a mediocre opportunity start-
up score; start-ups, moreover, are mostly in the service sector and less in technological potential 
sectors (although ICT could be an exception); human capital, in terms of level of education, is high, but 
not always tailored to entrepreneurial needs; competition, finally, is often hindered by the oligopolistic 
Lebanese economy.  
Entrepreneurial aspiration, the component linking entrepreneurship to innovation, is also 
underdeveloped in Lebanon, to a large extent due to the governance and government predicaments 
discussed. Few entrepreneurs generate products or services customers consider to be new; while 
cutting edge technology may be used enthusiastically by Lebanese entrepreneurs, it is not developed 
in Lebanon; the persistent SME orientation of Lebanese entrepreneurs seems to signify a limited 
growth potential of entrepreneurs; internationalization, however, is high among Lebanese 
entrepreneurs; and formal venture capital is increasingly available to add to the existing reservoirs of 
informal venture capital resulting from positive entrepreneurship attitudes. 
The above findings have three main implications for studying entrepreneurship under hybrid 
governance. First, fragile governance contexts (including protracted violent conflict) and hybrid 
governance systems (combining clientelist redistribution with elections and a semblance of a formal 
administration) do not so much affect the degree of entrepreneurship, but do influence the form of 
entrepreneurship, fostering necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship and discouraging innovation 
entrepreneurship. Second, and in line with this, is it misguided to automatically link entrepreneurship to 
innovation in fragile and hybrid settings. Building on a commercial culture dominated by banking and 
services, characterized by family-led SMEs and with high appreciations for entrepreneurship, Lebanon 
can be considered an entrepreneurial country. This entrepreneurship, however, does not go hand in 
hand with an innovative outlook. Third, the often made distinction between internal and external 
entrepreneurship components does not do justice to the business realities under hybrid governance. 
As apparent in the attitudes-activities-aspirations triangle, entrepreneurship has a structural 
component, the influences external to the entrepreneur, and an ‘agency’ component, the influences 
the entrepreneur can directly address. While all experts interviewed agreed that this structural political 
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context affected entrepreneurship, there was also a tendency among the more business-oriented 
respondents to regard entrepreneurship first and foremost as a personal issue. This is also reflected in 
the recent entrepreneurship support buzz that is partially successful, but under-utilizes its potential 
because it does not deal with the structural components of instability and governance singled out in 
this paper and recognized by much of the literature and the interviewed experts as decisive issues in 
fostering entrepreneurship. While such depoliticization is of course a pragmatic – and perhaps wise – 
decision in light of the entrenched nature of the political problems identified, one reason why the 
current ‘buzz’ might be less effective then hoped for could be its depoliticized nature. The very 
emergence of a constructive output of a lobbying campaign by entrepreneurship experts spanning the 
sectarian divide provides an inspiring challenge to the inevitability of sectarian clientelist logic that is 
generally said to permeate and corrupt all economic policy making efforts. At the same time, however, 
there is an implicit risk that the proud emphasis on the fact that entrepreneurship is ‘in the Lebanese 
psyche’ and ‘runs through the Lebanese blood’ is turned into an excuse for not investing in structural 
political reforms. 
5.2.2. Fragility and hybridity 
My study also holds two core implications for the broader analysis of fragility and hybridity. First, it is 
illusory to associate hybridity exclusively with unconstructive developments or despondency. As my 
findings on Lebanese entrepreneurs’ responses to business challenges show, there is resilience and 
pro-activeness among ‘hybrid entrepreneurs’ that could provide foundations for future development. 
Second, it is misleading to understand hybridity as a transitory phase or characteristic and assume the 
main problem lies in policy uncertainty and unregulated programmatic competition. Instead, the dual 
game metaphor might enable more in-depth analysis. Regarding entrepreneurship, hybrid regimes are 
associated with uncertainty (or volatility) that is often present on a policy and on an institutional level. 
Kenyon and Naoi (2010:488) define hybrid political regimes as “polities where political parties with 
widely different economic platforms compete and where respondents lack access to credible 
information regarding possible policy changes.” Yet, as my historical overview of the Lebanese 
political economy shows, hybrid governance situations are, at least to some extent, stable, rather than 
necessarily transitional. Policy uncertainty might be related not to transitional dynamics but to the 
particular form of vigorous but somewhat unregulated or informal political competition. Such 
uncertainty or volatility then stems not from the ‘inherent instability’ of hybrid regimes as a ‘residual 
category’ (Roesller and Howard 2007:17), but could be related to the tensions between the formal 
electoral game (campaigns, programmes and elections) and the informal regime game (patronage, 
nepotism and mobilization of the ‘streets’). Actors may feel less bounded by either set of institutions 
and have to deal with contradicting or multiple sources of information on opportunities and restraints 
which makes both official policy and day-to-day practice less predictable and the perceived costs of 
getting things done and risks of investing more considerable. Markets, after all, can be just as hybrid 
as polities, constituting “bundles of rules, institutions, regulations, enforcements (or lack thereof) and 
thus highly intricate webs of transaction costs and externalities that create context-specific motivators 
for particular economic behaviour” (Reinert et al 2007:6). 
In Lebanon it seems it is not so much policy uncertainty as an intricate mixture of contextual volatility 
and systemic deadlock that hampers innovative entrepreneurship. In essence, entrepreneurship in 
Lebanon is plagued by an interconnected amalgamation of volatility and inertia. On the one hand, 
there is the insecurity, instability and unpredictability inherent in the fragile governance context that 
prevents a long-term vision and investment and thereby undermines if not entrepreneurship then 
certainly innovation. On the other hand, there is the entrenched clientelist and oligopolist deadlock 
characterizing the hybrid governance system that precludes competitiveness. While at first glance 
seemingly contradictory, volatility and inertia might be more deliberately related via societal leaders 
using “disorder as a[n] […] instrument” through the “use and creation of personalized informal patron-
client networks” (Chabal and Daloz 1999 in Di John 2011:5; see also Leenders (2012)). The 
detrimental effects on innovative entrepreneurship this paired volatility and inertia breed, then, suggest 
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that the elite-bargain and sectarian quota system adopted to guarantee stability has not merely failed 
– at least in economic terms –, but has added to Lebanon’s predicaments (Briscoe 2009:7).  
Thus, the key to enhancing innovative entrepreneurship may be found in the Lebanese political 
system rather than its economy. As Makdisi and Marktanner (2010:14) have keenly noted: “As 
Lebanon is famous for its economic entrepreneurship, it  remains  to  be  hoped  that  political  
entrepreneurship will  eventually  follow  to  resolve Lebanon’s trap of consociationalism.” 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  62
References 
 
Academic literature 
Abdo, N. and C. Kerbage. 2012. “Women's entrepreneurship development initiatives in Lebanon: 
micro-achievements and macro-gaps.” Gender & Development 20:1:67-80. 
Abdul-Hussain, H. 2010. “How Far Can Democracy Go? The Case of Lebanon 2005.” Middle East 
Institute Singapore. 
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat and R. Wacziarg. 2003. “Fractionalization.” 
Journal of Economic Growth 8:155-194. 
Anderson, J.J., T. Evers and G. Sjöstedt. 2011. “Private Sector Actors and Peacebuilding. A 
Framework for Analysis.” International Council of Swedish Industry. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson. 2001. “The colonial origins of comparative development: 
An empirical investigation.” American Economic Review 91:5:1369-1401.  
Ács, Z.J. and L. Szerb. 2009. “The global entrepreneurship index (GEINDEX).” Jena Economic 
Research Papers. 
Acs, Z, P. Braunerhjelm, D. B. Audretsch and B. Carlsson. 2009. “The knowledge spillover theory of 
entrepreneurship.” Small Business Economics 32:1:15-30.  
Ács, Z.J. and W. A. Naudé. 2012. Entrepreneurship, Stages of Development, and Industrialization. In 
Szirmai, A., Naudé, W.A. and Alcorta, L. (eds.). Pathways to Industrialization in the 21st 
Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 14. 
Ahmed, Z.U. and C.C. Julian. 2012. “International Entrepreneurship in Lebanon.” Global Business 
Review 13:1:25-38. 
Ardagna, S. and A. Lusardi. 2010. Explaining International Differences in Entrepreneurship. The Role 
of Individual Characteristics and Regulatory Constraints. In J. Lerner and A. Schoar (eds.) 
International Differences in Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Audretsch, D.B., M.C. Keilbach and E.E. Lehmann. 2006. Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Banerjee, A.V., and E. Duflo. 2007. “The Economic Lives of the Poor.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21:1:141-67. 
Barak, O. 2003. Lebanon: Failure, Collapse, and Resuscitation. In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.) State Failure 
and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.  
Batley, R. and C. McIoughlin. 2010. “Engagement with Non-State Service Providers in Fragile States: 
Reconciling State-Building and Service Delivery.” Development Policy Review 28:2:131-154. 
Baumann, G. 1999. The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities. 
London/New York: Routledge. 
Baumol, W. J. 1990. ”Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive.” Journal of Political 
Economy 98:5:893–921. 
Boege, V., A. Brown, K. Clements and A. Nolan. 2008. On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging 
States. State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility.’ Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management. 
Boege, V, A. Brown and K. Clements. 2009. “Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States.” Peace 
Review: A Journal of Social Justice 21:13-21.  
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  63
Briscoe, I. 2009. “Chasing the Tigers. Can Fragile States Copy the Asian Miracle.” Conference report 
Fundacíon par alas Relaciones Internacionales y el Díalogo Exterior (FRIDE) Seminar in 
Madrid, 6-7 October 2008. 
Brock, W.A. and D.S. Evans. 1989. “Small Business Economics.” Small Business Economics 1:1:7-20. 
Brownlee, J. 2009. “Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions.” 
American Journal of Political Science 53:3:515-532. 
Brück, T, W. A. Naudé and P. Verwimp. 2013 (forthcoming). “Business Under Fire: Entrepreneurship 
and Violent Conflict in Developing Countries.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1-17. 
Cammett, M. and S. Issar. 2010. “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of 
Welfare Allocation in Lebanon.” World Politics 62:3:381-421.  
Chandler, D. 2006. Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building. London: Pluto Press.  
Ciarli, T., S. Parto and M. Savona. 2009. “Conflict and Entrepreneurial Activity in Afghanistan. Findings 
from the National Risk Vulnerability Assessment.” Paper submitted to the Special Issue of the 
UNU-WIDER Project Workshop on Entrepreneurship and Conflict INCORE. University of 
Ulster, Londonderry, Northern Ireland – March 20-21.  
Collier, P. 2004. “Development and Conflict.” Oxford: Center for the Study of African Economies.  
Collier, P. 2006. “War and Military Expenditure in Developing Countries and Their Consequences for 
Development.” The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 1:1:9-13. 
Cusack, J. and E. Malmstrom. 2011. Bactrian Gold - Challenges and Hope for Private-Sector 
Development in Afghanistan. Kaufman Foundation Research Series Expeditionary Economics. 
Demmers, J. 2005. Nationalism from without: theorizing the role of diasporas. In S. Mehendale and T. 
Atabaki (eds.), Central Asia and the Caucasus: transnationalism and diaspora pp. 10-21. 
London and New York: Routledge.  
De Weijer, F. 2011. “Rebuilding Fragile States. Changing the Rules of the Game.” The Broker 26:8-15. 
DiJohn, J. 2011. “Failed States in Sub-Saharan Africa. Literature Review.” London: School of Oriental 
and African Studies. 
Duffield, M. 2007. Development, Security and Unending War, Governing the World of Peoples. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Eriksen, T.H. 1993. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto Press. 
Estrin, S., K.E. Meyer and M. Bytchkova. 2006. Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies. In M. 
Casson, B. Yeung, A. Basu and N. Wadeson (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Entrepreneurship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fahed-Sreih, J. 2004. “Corporate governance comes of age in Lebanon.” Families in Business 
March:22-25. 
Fahed-Sreih, J. 2006. “Distinctive Trends, Challenges, Problems and Opportunities facing Family 
Businesses in the Middle East.” Lebanon: Lebanese American University. 
Fahed-Sreih, J., D. Pistrui, W.V. Huang and H.P. Welsch. 2010. “Family and Cultural Factors 
Impacting Entrepreneurship in War Time Lebanon.” International Journal of Entrepreneurship 
and Innovation Management 12:1:35-51. 
Fahed-Sreih, J. and D. Pistrui. 2010. “Motives for Entrepreneurship: the Case of Lebanese Family 
Buisnesses.” Entrepreneurship – Gender, Geographies and Social Context 81-92. 
Faour, M. 2007. “Religion, Demography and Politics in Lebanon.” Middle Eastern Studies 43:6:909-
921.  
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  64
Fatouch, B. and J. Kolb. 2006. “The Outlook for Economic Reconstruction in Lebanon after the 2006 
War.” The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies – Special Edition: The Sixth War. 
Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon. 6:96-115. 
Feghali, T., E. Abuatieh and J. Dandan. 2012. “Social entrepreneurship in Lebanon: Contexts and 
Considerations.” Darwazah Center for Innovation Management & Entrepreneurship at the 
American University of Beirut. 
Fisk, R. 1990. Pity the Nation. The Abduction of Lebanon. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gries, T. and W. Naudé. 2011. “Entrepreneurship and human development. A capability approach.” 
Journal of Public Economics 95:216-224. 
Guglielmetti, C. 2010. Measuring the Business Environment for Entrepreneurship in Fragile States. 
UNU-Wider working paper 2010/14. 
Hagmann, T. and M. V. Hoehne. 2009. “Failures of the State Failure Debate: Evidence from the 
Somali Territories”. Journal of International Development 21:42-57.  
Hamzeh, N. 2001. “Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends.” Middle Eastern Studies 37:3:167-178.  
Hourani, A. 1986. Political Society in Lebanon: a Historical Introduction. London: Center for Lebanese 
Studies.  
Howard, M. M., and P.G. Roessler. 2006. “Liberalizing electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian 
regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 50:2:365-381. 
Hirst, D. 2010. Beware of Small States. Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East. London: Faber and 
Faber.  
Husseini, R. 1997. “Promoting Women Entrepreneurs in Lebanon: the Experience of UNIFEM.” 
Gender and Development 5:1:49-53. 
Isenberg, D.J. 2010. “How to Start an Entrepreneurial Revolution.” Harvard Business Review. 
Johnson, S., J. McMillan and C. Woodruff. 2000. “Entrepreneurs and the Ordering of Institutional 
Reform: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine Compared.” Economics of Transition 
81:1:1-36. 
Jones, B. and M. Elgin-Cossart. 2011. “Development in the Shadow of Violence. A Knowledge 
Agenda for Policy.” 
Kaplan, S. 2009. Enhancing Resilience in Fragile States. Paper prepared for the conference on 
“Moving Towards the European Report on Development 2009” organised by the European 
Report on Development. Florence, Italy – 21-23 June. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology 
and Analytical Issues.” World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 5430. 
Keefer, P. and S. Khemani,. 2005. “Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor: Understanding 
political incentives for providing public services.” World Bank Research Observer 20:1:1-27. 
Kenyon, T. and M. Naoi. 2010. “Policy Uncertainty in Hybrid Regimes: Evidence from Firm-Level 
Surveys.” Comparative Political Studies 43:4:486-510. 
Khalidi, M.A. and D. Riskedahl. 2007. “The Road to Nahr al-Barid: Lebanese Political Discourse and 
Palestinian Civil Rights.” Middle East Report 244 Fall. 
Klapper, L., R. Amit and M.F. Guillén. 2010. Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation across Countries. 
In J. Lerner and A. Schoar (eds.) International Differences in Entrepreneurship. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  65
Knudsen, A. 2011. Nahr el-Bared. The political fall-out of a refugee disaster. In: Are Knudsen and Sari 
Hanafi (eds.). 2011. Palestinian refugees. Identity, space and place in the Levant. 97-110. 
New York: Routledge.  
Koinova, M. 2010. “Unintended Consequences of Diaspora Entrepreneurship During Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction.” International Migration: Character, Scope and Barriers. 
Kooiman, J. 2003. Governing as Governance. London: Sage Publications.  
Leenders, R. 2004. Nobody Having too Much to Answer for: Laissez-Faire, Networks and Postwar 
Reconstruction in Lebanon. In S. Heydemann (ed) Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: 
The Politics of Economic Reform. Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Leenders, R. 2012. Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-building in Postwar Lebanon. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Linde, J. and J. Ekman. 2010. “Patterns of Stability and Performance in Post-Communist Hybrid 
Regimes.” 
Lingelbach, D., L. de la Vina and P. Asel. 2005. “What’s Distinctive about Growth-Oriented 
Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries?” Center for Global Entrepreneurship Working 
Paper 1, UTSA College of Business: San Antonio TX. 
Lund, C. (ed.). 2007. Twilight Institutions. Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing.  
Lund. 2011. Engaging Fragile States. An International Policy Primer. Lessons from Recent Research 
and Practice. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
Makdisi, S. and M. Marktanner. 2010. “Trapped by Consociationalism: the Case of Lebanon.” 
American University of Beirut. 
Marseglia, M. 2004. “Policies for Business in the Mediterranean countries: Lebanon.” Centre for 
Administrative Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. 
McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff. 2002. “The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 16:3:153-70. 
Mehzer, T., R. El-Saouda, W. Nasrallah and M. Al-Ajam. 2008. “Entrepreneurship in Lebanon: a Model 
for Successes and Failures.” International Journal of Arab Culture, Management and 
Sustainable Development 1:1:34:52. 
Menkhaus, K. 2006. “Governance in the Hinterland of Africa's Weak States: Toward a Theory of the 
Mediated State.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, 
Philadelphia.  
Migdal, J.S. 2001. State in society: studying how states and societies form and constitute one another 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Naqvi, O. 2011. “Entrepreneurship MENA: Opening the Flood Gates.” Innovations - Special Edition for 
the Global Entrepreneurship Summit Istanbul, Turkey, December 3-6. 
Naudé, W. 2007. “Peace, Prosperity, and Pro-Growth Entrepreneurship.” UNU-WIDER discussion 
paper 2007/02. 
Naudé, W. 2012. “Does Family Business Matter for Development?” Blog on keynote speech delivered  
at the international conference of the International Council for Small Business. The Economic 
University of Cracow, Poland. 
Naudé, W. 2012. “What is the (New) Deal with Fragile States?” UNU-WIDER Policy Brief 1. 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  66
Naudé, W., A.U. Santos-Paulino and M. McGillivray. 2008. “Fragile States.” United Nations University 
Research Brief 3. Tokyo: UNU. 
Naudé, W, A.U. Santos-Paulino and M. McGillivray (eds.). 2012. Fragile States. Costs, Causes, and 
Responses. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Naudé, W. A and Z. J. Ács. 2011. “Entrepreneurship, Stages of Development, and Industrialization.” 
WIDER Working Paper WP2011/80. United Nations University, Helsinki, Finland. 
Patrick, S. 2006. “Weak States and Global Threats - Fact or Fiction?” The Washington Quarterly 
29:2:27-53. 
Peschka, M.P. 2011. “The Role of the Private Sector in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.” World 
Development Report 2011 Background Paper. 
Pistrui, D. and J. Fahed-Sreih. 2010. “Islam, Entrepreneurship and Business Values in the Middle 
East.” International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 12:1:107-118. 
Rabasa, A, S. Boraz, P. Chalk, K. Cragin, T. Karasik, J. Moroney, K. O‟Brien and J. Peters. 2008. 
“Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks.” Santa Monica: 
RAND.  
Rabil, R. 2008. “Hezbollah and Lebanon: the Curse of a State.” Open Democracy Website, 21 May. 
www.opendemocracy.net (accessed 10 May 2009).  
Rammerstorfer, K. 2008. “The Lebanon War 2006. A country between terror and resistance.” Mag. 
Phil thesis. University of Vienna. 
Reinert, E.S., Y.E. Amaïzo and R. Kattel. 2007. “The Economics of Failed, Failing and Fragile States: 
Productive Structure as the Missing Link.” DRAFT – ask permission to quote. 
Richards, P. 2005. No Peace No War. An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Oxford: 
James Curry. Pp. 1-21.  
Roesller, P.G. and M.M. Howard. 2007. “Measuring and Analyzing Post-Cold War Political Regimes.” 
Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 
30-September 2. 
Salem, M. 2011. “Networking Postwar Lebanon: a System Analysis Model of Rebuilding a Shared 
Knowledge Society.” MA thesis University of Ottawa. 
Schmotz, A. 2010. “The Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes. Surviving Institutional Tension.” Berlin 
Graduate School of Social Sciences. 
Schoar, A. 2009. The Divide between Subsistence and Transformational Entrepreneurship. In J. 
Lerner and S. Stern (eds.) Innovation Policy and the Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Snyder, J.M. and M.M. Ting. 2002. “An informational rationale for political parties.” American Journal 
of Political Science 46:1: 90-110. 
Specker, L. and I. Briscoe. 2010. “Early Economic Recovery in Fragile States. Case-Study Burundi - 
Operational Challenges.” The Hague: Clingendael Institute. 
Stel, N. 2009. “Forcing the Lebanese Back to Dialogue. Hezbollah’s Role in the May 2008 Beirut 
Clashes Analyzed from a State-Building Perspective.” MA Thesis Utrecht University.  
Stel, N., D. de Boer and D. Hillhorst. 2012. “Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State 
Institutions. Service Provision and the Legitimacy of State Institutions in Situations of Conflict 
and Fragility. Experiences from Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories. 
Synthesis Report.” The Hague: Peace, Security and Development Network.  
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  67
Sternberg, R. and S. Wennekers. 2005. “Determinants and Effects of New Business Creation Using 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Data.” Small Business Economics 24:3:193-203. 
Wärn, M. 1999. “Staying the course: the ‘Lebanonization’ of Hizbollah - the integration of an Islamist 
movement into a pluralist political system.” Stockholm: Stockholm University.  
Welsh, D.H.B. and P. Raven. 2006. “Family Business in the Middle East: an Exploratory Study of 
Retail Management in Kuwait and Lebanon.” Family Business Review 12:1:29-48. 
Ziadeh, H. 2006. Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon. London: Hurst. 
 
Secondary sources 
Authority on World Travel and Tourism. 2012. “Travel and Tourism – Economic Impact 2012.” 
Lebanon. London. 
Bank Audi. 2011. “The Lebanon Weekly Monitor.”Week 48. 
BLOM Invest Bank. 2012. “The Lebanon Brief.” Issue 776. 
The Broker. 2009. “The power of value chains. Including the rural poor in global markets.”  
Calo, C., S. De Nardi, L. Galimbertu Faussone, B. Genisio and P. Palloto. 2008. Islamic Microfinance: 
Alternative Development in Northern Lebanon Project Proposal.  
CIA. 2012. World Factbook.  
Daily Star. 2011. “Lebanon Posts World’s 22nd Highest Growth Rate in 2010 Tourist Arrivals.” 
Daily Star. 2012. “Hezbollah, Amal call for swift action to end electricity crisis.”  
Delegation of the European Commission to Lebanon. 2008. “Active EU support for private sector 
development.” 
Doumit, G. and L. Chaaban. 2012. “Social Entrepreneurship Momentum Briefing Report.” Beirut: 
Beyond Reform and Development. 
Economist Intelligence Unit. 2011. “Democracy Index 2011. Democracy Under Stress.” 
Fahed-Sreih, J. 2001. “Final report English – working copy.” 
Gebara, K. 2007. “The Political Economy of Corruption in Lebanon.” Beirut: Lebanese Transparency 
Association.  
Ghazi, A. 1997. “Lebanon’s economy: Historical Overview.” (accessed via 
http://www.ghazi.de/econhist.html#civil)  
Ghoussoub, W.. 2012. “Can we talk about the economy, for once?” NOWLebanon Website 7 July.  
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. 2007. “Gender Entrepreneurship Markets Country Brief Lebanon 
2007.” 
Guy, M., C. Niethammer and A. Moline. 2011. “Women on Boards: A Conversation with (Male) 
Directors.” Washington: International Finance Corporation. 
Injaz Lebanon. 2011. “Invest, Innovate, Inspire.” 
Inman, Philip. 2012. “World Bank business rankings obscure poverty and corruption, critics argue.” 
The Guardian Online accessed at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/economics-
blog/2012/oct/26/world-bank-business-rankings-poverty-corruption 
International Crisis Group. 2006. “Lebanon at a Tripwire.” 
International Crisis Group. 2008. “Lebanon: Hezbollah’s weapons turn inwards.”  
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  68
International Finance Cooperation. 2008. “A Guide to Business Registration in Lebanon.” 
International Monetary Fund. 2011. “Regional Economic Outlook Middle East and Central Asia.” 
International Monetary Fund. 2012. “Youth Demanding Change.” Finance and Development. March. 
Kibranian, G. 2009. “Postwar July 2006 Reconstruction Report. Case Studies: Housing and 
Infrastructure.” Beirut: Lebanese Transparency Association.  
Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. 2011. “Entering a Grey Area: Lebanon’s Economic Challenges in 
the Arab Spring.” 
Lebanese Transparency Association. 2009a. “Reference Guidebook on the Corporate Governance of 
Family-Owned Businesses.”  
Lebanese Transparency Association. 2009b. “Postwar July 2006 Reconstruction Report. Case 
Studies: Housing and Infrastructure.” 
Lebanese Transparency Association. 2009c. “Youth Against Corruption.” 
Lebanese Transparency Association. 2011. “National Integrity System Study Lebanon 2011.” 
Lebanon Anti-Bribery Network. 2009 [?]. “Code of Ethics & Whistle Blower Procedure for Small and 
Medium Enterprises.” 
Lebanon Anti-Bribery Network. 2010. “You’re Being Audited. How to Deal with Governmental 
Inspectors: Know Your Rights.”  
Lopez-Menchero, F. 2011. “Private Sector Development European union Support.” Power point 
presentation for the WB workshop 21 June 2011. 
Melki, R. 2012. “Development of an innovation hub in Tripoli.” Draft 12 (April 2012). 
NOWLebanon. 2012. “Long, hot summer of incompetence.” 23 July. 
OECD. 2006. “Venture Capital Investment in MENA Countries – Taking Advantage of the Current 
Opportunity.” MENA Investment Policy Brief 1. 
OECD. 2008. “Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations, from fragility to 
resilience.”  
OECD. 2011. “Employment, Skills and Entrepreneurship Strategies in the Mediterranean - Pathways 
for the Future.” Expert meeting OECD-UfMS-Ajuntament de Barcelona – Barcelona, 18 July. 
Rahhal, N. 2012. “Drunk on Success” Executive Magazine 27 June. 
Saidi, N. 2004. “Corporate Governance and Business Ethics in Lebanon.” Speech delivered at the 
launch of the RDCL Code of Business Ethics. Beirut – 24 April. 
SME Unit, Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade. 2007. “Lebanon Economic Vision for Enterprise 
Development: Promoting the development of a Globally Competitive Economy in Lebanon.” 
Theil, S. 2007. “Teaching Entrepreneurship in the Arab World.” Newsweek International.  
UNIDO. 2010. “LAISER Evaluation Report.”  
WB. 2008. “Republic of Lebanon. Electricity Sector Public Expenditure Review.” 
WB. 2012a. “Doing Business: Economic Profile Lebanon.”  
WB. 2012b. “Using Lebanon’s Large Capital Inflows to Foster Sustainable Long-Term Growth.” 
WEF. 2011. “Accelerating Entrepreneurship in the Arab World.” 
Yamout, S. 2012. “PPP Innovation in Lebanon: the Way Forward. Innovation, Technology and 
Entrepreneurship A Policy Roadmap to Increase Competitiveness and Jobs.” Presented at the 
Middle East and Eastern Europe Cross-Regional Conference: Prague, May 21-23 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  69
Zaatari, M. 2012. “Sidon businesses urge end to Assir ‘siege’.” The Daily Star 13 July. 
Nora Stel  stel@msm.nl 
  70
Endnotes 
 
                                                            
i Several research programs are currently aiming to address this knowledge and capacity gap, for instance the 
Entrepreneurship, Security and Governance (ESG) consortium (http://research.msm.nl/Projects/ESG-
Consortium/Home.aspx) 
ii Respondents were selected based on preliminary stakeholder mapping and subsequent snow-ball sampling. 
Considering the exploratory nature of the scoping paper, priority was given to accessing a broad and diverse 
group of experts (from civil society, academia, journalism, the private sector, government and the international 
donor community) rather than a targeted and representative group of businessmen and entrepreneurs.  
iii This roughly corresponds with the authoritative distinction by GEM between necessity entrepreneurship and 
opportunity entrepreneurship – or remedial and opportunity entrepreneurship (Ardagna and Lusardi 2010:18). 
Ardagna and Lusardi (2010:23) show that while the average entrepreneurship rate is much higher in low- and 
middle- low- income countries than in high- income countries, “the type of entrepreneurial activities undertaken in 
these countries is rather different: in poor countries, more than two- thirds of individuals engage in remedial 
entrepreneurial activities, while this type of entrepreneurship drops to 21.9  per cent in high- income countries.”  
iv The distinction between innovation, opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship touches upon the more 
normative discussion surrounding entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are often hailed for contributing to the 
productive economy (as opposed to a less desirable rent economy) (Stiglitz 2006:7 in Naudé 2007:4). 
Differentiating between innovation, opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship, however, clearly shows that not 
all sorts of entrepreneurship contribute to what GEM has dubbed ‘high-potential growth entrepreneurship,’ i.e. 
technologically innovative, pro-growth entrepreneurship (Naudé 2007:5). In essence, entrepreneurs are entities 
that are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth which means that “entrepreneurship is 
a quality that is always present in any country or population, and all that changes is the particular allocation or 
application of that quality” (Baumol 1990 in Naudé 2007:3). Entrepreneurship is thus not intrinsically desirable or 
undesirable and can be productive or unproductive – or even destructive (and which entrepreneur might be 
considered what, of course, is in the eye of the beholder). In this vein, separating entrepreneurship as a 
prescription – entrepreneurship as it ought to be, as it should be encouraged by policy – and as a description – 
entrepreneurship as it is, as it can be analyzed by academics – is essential (Naudé 2007:3).iv That 
entrepreneurship need not be formal is less often recognized. The literature almost exclusively addresses formal, 
officially registered, entrepreneurship, whereas the original, creative and innovative aspects of entrepreneurship 
often – per definition – find roots in unofficial, unexplored and uninstitutionalized contexts (Klapper et al 
2010:133). 
v Klapper et al (2010:152-153) warn that it remains unclear which way the relation between entrepreneurship and 
growth goes; whether “countries that facilitate entrepreneurship see commensurate increases in overall economic 
growth and an expansion of the formal sector” or whether “periods of economic expansion encourage optimism 
and entrepreneurship; for instance, individuals might be willing to leave their job security to start a business if they 
are more confident they could find another job if their business fails.” 
vi The fragile state concept is extremely broad, implausibly sweeping all struggling countries on one big pile; static 
in assuming an end-state of institutional development to be measured; utterly state centric;vi unable to distinguish 
between causes, effects and characteristics; and by now too closely associated with normative policy frameworks 
(Boege et al 2008:2; Di John 2011; Patrick 2006; Duffield 2007; Chandler 2006). It has been challenged and 
refined by more analytically rooted concepts (such as Boege et al‘s (2008, 2009) ‘hybrid political order,‘ 
Menkhaus‘ (2006) ‘mediated state‘ and Lund‘s (2006) ‘twilight institutions‘ (Overbeek et al 2009:24 in Stel et al 
2012:26). In a rudimentary sense, however, the concept of fragility is useful to direct attention to the role of the 
state in wanting socio-economic development by referring to ‘the existence of persistent, systematic, significant 
and interrelated social, political and economic uncertainties’ (Binzel and Brück 2007:5 in Guglielmetti 2010:1).  
vii Interestingly, these indicators are not explicitly economic, but broad economic consequences of these 
governance challenges are often construed as failures to carry out basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies in the 
economic arena or establish a legal and regulatory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, 
open trade, natural resource management, foreign investment, and economic growth (Patrick 2006:29). 
viii Chabal and Daloz (1999 in Di John 2011:5) present a model based on the idea that colonial legacies create 
incentives for societal leaders to use “disorder as a political instrument” through the “use and creation of 
personalised informal patron-client networks.” This insight needs to be completed with another model seeking to 
explain state fragility based on the the idea of the ‘shadow state’ that adds that economic motives and objectives 
are not the unique purview of rebel forces, but also include those of state representatives “siphoning off state 
resources for personal enrichment and the establishment of patronage networks, instead of providing public 
goods such as security and economic governance” (Reno 1995 in Di John 2011:5). Together, these models 
approach the dual game that almost inevitably creates a context in which “economic liberalisation and multi-party 
electoral politics are likely to allow even greater scope for those powerful ‘businessmen of crime’ […] to flourish, 
as such liberalisation policies tend to reinforce the power of ‘shadowy’ entrepreneurial elites” (Chabal and Daloz 
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1999:91 in Di John 2011:5). The shape of the elite bargain on which a political settlement rests, then, is central to 
understanding the context of entrepreneurship and business (Di John 2011:8). 
ix On the contrary, Schmotz (2010:15) argues, hybrid regimes are more likely to turn into autocratic regimes than 
to transit to democracy. He calculates that, after 10 years, 34.1 per cent of hybrid regimes have become 
autocratic whereas only 17.4 per cent became democratic and that after 20 years, 25.3 per cent have 
democratized, while 45.9 per cent have autocratized. Brownlee (2009:515), concurs that “competitive 
authoritarian regimes are not especially prone to losing power” but he claims that when they do, they “are 
significantly more likely to be followed by electoral democracy.” He adds that regimes with a higher GDP per 
capita and regimes operating after 1989 were more likely to be succeeded by democracy than their counterparts, 
but notes that “location in the Middle East significantly reduced the chance of democratic transition, relative to 
those of regimes in other regions” (Brownlee 2009:528). Roesller and Howard (2007:13-14), conversely, argue 
that competitive authoritarian regimes are the most unstable as according to their analysis “nearly one in two 
elections in competitive authoritarian regimes leads to a new regime type, with nine elections (or 17 per cent) 
leading to hegemonic authoritarianism, and 15 (29 per cent) jumping up to electoral democracies.” In much of the 
work on hybrid regimes a democratization bias, the assumption that democracy is necessarily the sole desired, or 
even possible, system is clearly still apparent (Schmotz 2010:7-8; Roesller and Howard 2007:18). 
x Boas and Jennings’ (2005:388 in Boege et al 2008:5) sharp remark regarding the fragile state paradigm bears 
equal relevance to the apparent exceptionality in the hybrid regime concept: “To say that something ‘fails’ or ‘is 
failing’ is a normative judgement that is only meaningful in comparison to something else; in this case, that 
something else is the existence of a Westernized, ‘healthy’ state that, unfortunately, has little relevance to most of 
the states in question because it has simply never existed there.”  
xi More specifically, the failure of political leaders to generate an entrepreneurial system of governance based on a 
‘coo-petitive’ (a mix of competition and cooperation) “diffusion of means (technology, know-how, innovative 
culture, entrepreneurship and information sharing) in a predictable and conducive environment” and the failure of 
donors to provide development assistance as a cure rather than a palliative. 
xii This touches upon some tension in the literature. Some, such as Banerjee and Duflo (2007), remark on poor 
people’s lack of willingness to commit to entrepreneurial activity, an observation which might be related to the 
“high cost for an individual to turn attention away from pressing matters in order to seek or perceive new 
opportunities-which may be scarce” (Gifford 1998:17 in Gries and Naudé 2011:218). Such analysis seems at 
odds with Ciarli et al’s (2009) observation that poverty and conflict necessitates rather than discourages 
entrepreneurship. Again, the distinction between innovation, opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship helps 
unnerve the seeming contradiction.  
xiii As noted previously, economists tend to focus on the impact or output of entrepreneurship, disregarding that 
entrepreneurship can have intrinsic value for entrepreneurs, something that is at least partially socially 
determined. Gries and Naudé (2011:216) seek to address this hiatus by taking a Sen-inspired capability approach 
to entrepreneurship. They stress how people can value being entrepreneurial for various reasons apart from 
material gain and list non-pecuniary values like independence, identity and (self-)respect. Seeing 
entrepreneurship as a capability functioning, however, is possible only by the merit of agency, of entrepreneurship 
being a choice. This means that it concerns innovation and opportunity entrepreneurship, but not necessity 
entrepreneurship (Gries and Naudé 2011:218). The authors go on to show that the increase of entrepreneurship 
depends on the extent to which latent entrepreneurs are willing and able to seize ‘open opportunities’ (Gries and 
Naudé 2011:219). This, in turn, is influenced by the broad general and institutional environment that partly 
determines the efficiency of entrepreneurs' search efforts, and information and transaction costs as explored in 
detail above (Gries and Naudé 2011:221). 
xiv In one of the most recent researches into the demographic issue, Faour (2007:912) estimates that in 2005 the 
Maronites made up 19 per cent of the population, the Shi’ites 34 per cent and the Sunnis 21.3 per cent. 
xv The March 14–March 8 dichotomy is, in fact, coined by March 14 and only grudgingly subscribed to by March 8. 
The terminology links the distinction between the two political blocs to the dates of the anti- (14 March) and pro- 
(8 March) Syrian manifestations.  
xvi Namely: the State Fragility Index at George Mason University; the Fragile State Index of the Country Indicators 
for Foreign Policy Project at Carleton University in Ottawa; the Failed State Index of the Fund for Peace in 
Washington; the Peace and Security Ledger of the Center for Development and Conflict Management at the 
University of Marylandand the Index of State Weakness of the Brookings Institution. 
xvii The Civil War, however, was preceded by another near civil war between US-baked Maronites and Soviet-
supported Muslims claiming between 2000 and 4000 lives. In fact, the very Lebanese State might have never 
been created if not as a belated protection guarantee for the Christians that had suffered several massacres at 
the hands of the Druze in the Druze-Maronite strife in 1860. 
xviii The Arab uprisings and the changing political landscape in the Arab world could make this ‘unique’ position 
irrelevant in the long term as Lebanon might no longer be able to attract capital from Syria and Egypt as it has 
historically done once these countries install a more liberal economic regime themselves (LCPS 2011:6). 
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xix There seems to be considerable mobilization to create an industrial zone in Tripoli, but no concrete output has 
as of yet been generated (author’s interviews with expert on Lebanese industrialism; BIAT representative; and 
advisor to the Ministry of Economy). 
xx The war included the notorious battle of the hotels, in which the Phoenicia, St. Georges, and Holiday Inn--all 
major luxury hotels--became fiercely contested militia strong points. “A score of smaller establishments suffered 
the same fate, as fighting ripped through the heart of the capital. Because the hotels were close to the Green 
Line, which divided the warring factions, they were forced to remain closed for business when the fighting 
stopped” (Ghazi 1997). 
xxi The Lebanese Ministry of Industry categorizes SMEs by the number of employees. It defines micro-enterprises 
as those that employ fewer than four people, small enterprises as those that employ between five and 19 
employees and medium enterprises as those that employ between 20 and 49 employees (Mehzer et al 2008:39). 
xxii Any prevalent fatalism is more likely to stem from decades of war and destruction, then from religious scripture. 
xxiii Interestingly, even while a large proportion of Lebanese is Christian, the literature is slightly obsessed with the 
influence of Islam on business and entrepreneurship. 
xxiv If anything, however, Islamic principles against interest combined with encouragement of “musharaka, 
mudaraba, and ijara (venture capital, partnership, and leasing models)” sounds pro- rather than anti-
entrepreneurial  (Cusack and Malmstrom 2011:11). 
xxv Thirty-four per cent of Lebanese firms had women among the principal owners in 2009 (Guy et al 2011:18). 
Female labor force participation in Lebanon has been fluctuating from 12.5 per cent in the 1960s to 32.3 per cent 
in 2000, and was estimated at 21.7 per cent of the total labor force in 2003 by Lebanon’s Millennium Development 
Report (GEM 2007:1). In 1997, female economic activity was recorded to have reached the highest level of 35.1 
per cent in Beirut, 23.7 per cent in Mount Lebanon, 18 per cent in the North, 17.4 per cent in the South, and 15 
per cent in Nabatiyeh. The lowest female economic activity was recorded in the Bekaa at 12.1 per cent. (GEM 
2007:1) Women in Lebanon face not only challenging institutionalized social norms (such as patriarchic sectarian 
inheritance laws and traditions of transferring savings and resources to male relatives), but legal impediments as 
well, with Article 26 of The Employment Act prohibiting the hiring of women in all mechanical and manual 
industries and specifying working hours as well as schedule and types of work that women are allowed to 
undertake (GEM 2007:5; Abdo and Kerbage 2012:69). For entrepreneurs, the situation in Lebanon is generally 
considered more favorable than in other countries in the region, but women’s entrepreneurship is low compared 
to men’s. Abdo and Kerbage (2012:69) approximate that only 10.1 per cent of women are self-employed, 
compared to 33.9 per cent for men. As a result of social and institutional barriers, women owned business are 
often informal – in 1997, only 17 per cent of women registered their businesses, compared to 44 per cent of men 
– with all due consequences or in the less profitable economic sectors, like handicrafts and food (Abdo and 
Kerbage 2012:67; Husseini 1997:49). A survey by Husseini (1997:51-52) found that 1.2 per cent of women got 
loans from banks, compared to 4.8 per cent of men; that 8.8 per cent of men said that gaining independence was 
an important motivation for their business, compared to only 2.2 per cent of the women surveyed.  
xxvi According to the International Finance Cooperation (IFC – 2008:2) there are ten legal structures for business 
entities in Lebanon: business concern; general partnership; simple limited partnership; limited partnership by 
shares; limited liability company; joint stock company; holding company; offshore company; Lebanese branch of a 
foreign company; Lebanese representative office of a foreign company. 
xxvii A social entrepreneurship incubator, for instance, notes that “we should really be thinking on a different scale, 
though. Now we’re happy with one or two start-ups being funded, or eight start-ups that are part of a program. We 
should really scale this up.”  
xxviii This observation is based on views expressed by key informants (author’s interview with Kafalat experts), but 
has unfortunately not been validated through interviews with Southbic representatives or through literature. Other 
exerts regarded Southbic as the smallest, but most efficient of the incubators (author’s interview with UN expert) 
xxix Doumit and Chaaban (2012:13), in fact, use a continuum from traditional non-profit to non-profit with income 
generating activities to social enterprise/social business to socially responsible business to corporations practicing 
social responsibility to traditional for-profit. 
xxx This is confirmed by studies by WB (2012:v-vi) identifying infrastructure bottlenecks, political instability and 
governance problems as three main constraints for “firms’ activity and investment” and by WEF (2011:11) that 
notes that the regulation and governance component of the Arab entrepreneurial ecosystem are under developed. 
xxxi According to the Lebanon Anti-Bribery Network (2010:12), Lebanese businesses face nine types of audits (tax; 
SSNF; Ministry of Labor; customs; municipalities; consumer protection unit; intellectual property protection unit, 
Ministry of Economy and Trade; General Security; Ministry of Tourism). 
xxxii Fahed-Sreih (2004:22) would disagree and, already in 2004, writes that corporate governance has come of 
age in Lebanon and is gaining interest among family businesses. 
xxxiii Some observers even linked the absence of medium sized enterprises to this, reasoning that while small 
businesses are not lucrative to extort from and big businesses are owned by politicians, the segment in between 
is rewarding to bribe, which could be a disincentive for small businesses to grow. 
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xxxiv In contrast to the traditional private sector, the social entrepreneurship movement does aim to “generate a 
paradigm shift regarding the relations between civil society and the state. NGOs are dependent on the state for 
funding and the private sector is associated with the state through clientelism.” Social enterprises, in their vision, 
could avoid both these traps both and “weaken the grip of politics, […] generating some autonomy and keeping 
clientelism at bay” (author’s interview with social entrepreneurship experts). 
xxxv The reconstruction after the 2006 war can be considered an improvement compared to post-Civil War 
reconstruction, but “political clientelism, embezzlement and other forms of corruption were a substantial concern” 
and some donors decided to pay reparations directly to the individual beneficiaries instead of through the state to 
avoid corruption (LTA 2009b:27). Moreover, infrastructure rebuilding in some cases went through Lebanese 
companies and organizations that acted as donors, which often resulted in contractor and donor being the same 
entity and reconstruction being used as a feature of election campaigns (LTA 2009b:26). 
xxxvi Costs of living in Beirut are higher than in Abu Dhabi, whereas middleclass household incomes often do not 
exceed $1000,- (author’s interviews with micro credit expert; and social entrepreneurship incubator). 
xxxvii As in other fragile countries “the costs and adequacy of these services affects commercial opportunities for 
small farmers, entrepreneurs and businesses, both small and large” (Specker and Briscoe 2010:42). Ciarli et al 
(2009:26) found that in Afghanistan households living in communities with public access to electricity have a 
larger probability of being entrepreneurs. The restoration of physical and communication infrastructure is 
accordingly advised as a core priority in post-conflict private sector development (Lund 2011:89-90; Guglielmetti 
2010:15-16).  
xxxviii One economist explained how the telecom sector is organized. “The emergence of mobile communication 
happened during the Syrian era and fully blossomed during the Hariri era. Two companies were given the 
telecommunications, “as a fig leaf of competition.” They set the price and never went down. When the government 
changed in 2005, they continued the duopoly, but took two different companies. Another government shift 
maintained these companies, but to bash their predecessors they wanted to show how they could do much better 
and forced the companies to lower the price somewhat.“ (Author’s interview with AUB economist) 
xxxix Some experts question this default reference to politicians self-interest and explain that even if, for instance, 
the telecom sector would be privatized there would be no economic growth “on a Chinese scale.” What is more, 
the telecom sector has been a private duopoly until 2004 when the government retook it from “the thieves that 
were running it.” “The telecom sector isn’t stopped from opened up because of the self-interest of the politicians, 
but because it has become a major generator of revenue for the state. For a government facing high deficits and 
debts, it is not easy to give this up.” (Author’s interviews with LAU economist; and diplomat) 
xl The banking sector in Lebanon “has its own structure serving the government debt; supporting their board 
members which are mostly wealthy families.” The political power of lawyers is also often recalled as an example 
of the influence of specific interest groups on policy-making: knowing that almost half of the Lebanese parliament 
apparently consists of lawyers, the mysterious regulation obliging every start-up to hire a lawyer becomes readily 
less mystifying. (Authors interviews with UN expert; and AUB economist) 
xli Some people contrasted the current situation with the time under Rafiq Hariri, someone who was seen to have 
a vision and act on that vision (author’s interview with real estate expert), but many others would probably feel 
that no vision is better than Hariri’s vision was. 
xlii In talking about instability, experts warned, several distinctions need to be made. First, as touched upon above 
as well, the people in function might change – creating a semblance of transformation – but the actual policies, 
the important ones at least, “have been there since the Ottoman days” and will not be changed due to the veto 
power opposing political blocks have in Parliament Other analysts added that while politics thus might seem 
volatile because it is so polarized, economic policy is gridlocked – on purpose, they think, to maintain 
entrepreneurs’ dependence on political connections. Second, a business manager noticed, even if some policies 
change, this has no follow-up on the implementation level. (author’s interviews with advisor to the Council of 
Ministers; UN-ESCWA expert; corruption experts; and business consultant). 
xliii Micro finance experts, unsurprisingly, confirm that access to finance remains the key impediment for the poorer 
segment of the population that makes up a considerable part of the populace but cannot access loans from banks 
(Author’s interview with microfinance expert). Women entrepreneurs also still face considerably more obstacles in 
accessing money, but this is perhaps more due to general societal gender related discrimination than to specific 
finance structures (Author’s interview with women’s entrepreneurship expert). 
xliv According to the ministry of industry, Lebanon’s industrial exports remained fairly constant up to April 2012, 
rising only by 0.49 per cent to reach $1.31 billion. However in April alone, industrial exports witnessed a drastic 
fall of 21.8 per cent to reach $222.7 million compared to $284.9 million recorded in April 2011 (Blom Bank 
2012:9). The industrial sector has also been badly hit by the 2006 war. Estimates suggest that ten large factories 
and more than 700 small and medium industrial units have been completely or partially destroyed, corresponding 
to a total damage of at least $190 million. The same goes for the agriculture sector. Oxfam estimated that up to 
85 per cent of the country's 195,000 farmers have lost all or some of their harvest at a cost of between US$135-
185 million. (Fatouch and Kolb 2006:98) 
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xlv With the exception of one incubator representative that maintained that R&D was widespread, both in 
cooperation with universities and in internal company departments (author’s interview with Berytech 
representative). 
xlvi This reading is backed up the literature. A study by Chakour (2001 in Ahmed and Julian 2012:27) showed that 
the Lebanese find it difficult to get the information required to evaluate business opportunities. Women 
entrepreneurs, especially, complain about the lack of information that limits their access to resources and markets 
(GEM 2007:4). Lebanese firms also state they require more funds for information and communication technology 
acquisition and improvement (Ahmed and Julian 2012:29). Thus, while surveys such as the one by WB (2012:98) 
Doing Business research assume “that a business has full information on what is required and does not waste 
time when completing procedures,” in the Lebanese context this is apparently far removed from the reality of 
doing business characterized by knowledge daps and information insecurities.  
xlvii There were various (spiteful) references to the Jordanian entrepreneurship ecosystem, mostly stating that 
while in Jordan a lot of public money (often provided by the United States) is invested in supporting entrepreneurs 
and all the facilities are there the real entrepreneurial spirit and output is missing. Lebanon is contrasted with this 
situation as a, more desirable, opposite: a situation in which the facilities and government support are lacking, but 
entrepreneurship is nevertheless booming due to ‘the culture’ and ‘the people.’ “We have the people, but lack the 
infrastructure; they have the infrastructure, but lack the people.” (author’s interview  with Kafalat experts). 
xlviii One potentially problematic effect of this mentality is that even government officials now (almost thankfully) 
conclude that “apparently companies don’t really need the government and investors have money to invest 
anyways” (Author’s interview with IDAL representative). 
xlix Here, the is the often expressed hope that the younger, post-war, generation will mobilize against corruption 
(see also LTA (2009c)).  
l Key components of this cultural X-factor include “the family and society structures; the role of and deference 
toward age; the existence and encouragement of innovation, creativity, arts, music, and literature communities; 
freedom of speech and expression; respect for the radical, maverick, and even seemingly crazy view and for 
nonconformity; cultural openness and the breadth and depth of that embrace; and the “continuous beta” versus 
product perfection culture” (Naqvi 2011:12). 
li Fear of failure does impact the type of business they then start, showing a tendency towards the conservative 
rather than the innovative. 
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